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Abstract
How many correct logics are there? For much of logic’s history it was widely assumed that
there was exactly one correct logic, a position known as logical monism. However, the monist’s
hegemony has recently become increasingly precarious as she has simultaneously come under
attack from two sides. On one side she faces logical pluralists who contend that there is more than
one correct logic, and on the other she faces logical nihilists who contend that there are no correct
logics. This thesis aims to defend monism against the twin threats of pluralism and nihilism.
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H￿￿ many correct logics are there? For much of logic’s history it was widely assumedthat there was exactly one correct logic, a position known as logical monism. However,
the monist’s hegemony has recently become increasingly precarious as she has simultaneously
come under attack from two sides. On one side she faces logical pluralists who contend that there
is more than one correct logic, and on the other she faces logical nihilists who contend that there
are no correct logics. Sereni & Sforza Fogliani
The aim of the present work is to defend monism against the twin threats of pluralism and
nihilism. A number of papers defending pluralism have ￿orally-themed titles, such as Andrea
Sereni andMaria Paola Sforza Fogliani’sHow toWater a Thousand Flowers: On the Logic of Logical
Pluralism and Roy Cook’s Let a Thousand Flowers Bloom: A Tour of Logical Pluralism. In keeping
with this theme, a defence of logical monism can therefore be depicted as killing o￿ all but one
of the pluralist’s ￿owers, the remaining ￿ower being the one true logic. From the outset it is
important to note that I shall not be taking a stance on which of the pluralist’s ￿owers remains
– that is, on which logic is the one true logic – and will content myself with trying to justify the
weaker thesis that there is but one true logic, whatever that may be. The rest of this introduction
clari￿es what it is for a logic to be correct, before mapping out the conceptual terrain and giving




The question which the nihilist, monist, and pluralist disagree over concerns the number of
correct logics. But what is a logic, and what is it for one to be correct?
A logic, Li, is a mathematical structure comprised of a formal language and a consequence
relation de￿ned between sentences of that language. The formal language contains sets of logical
and non-logical symbols that form the basic vocabulary, along with a set of rules that recursively
de￿ne which strings of symbols qualify as grammatical sentences. Li’s consequence relation
may be given model-theoretically as |=Li , using cases in which formal sentences can be true
along with a set of clauses that recursively assign truth-values to grammatical sentences within a
case. More speci￿cally,   |=Li ' i￿ ' is true in every case in which   is true. Alternatively,Li’s
consequence relation can be given proof-theoretically as `Li using a set of axioms and rules
that determine which sentences can be proven from others.   `Li ' i￿ there is a sequence of
sentences in the formal language whose last line is ', and in which every previous line is either
an axiom, a member of  , or follows from previous lines via a rule.
So de￿ned, there are uncountably many logics, ranging from propositional and ￿rst-order
classical, intuitionistic, and relevant logics to higher-order, many-valued, and quantum logics.
But what does it mean for one of these structures to be correct? The standard view is that, in
much the same way that a theory of the atom is correct i￿ it correctly represents atoms, so too a
logic is correct i￿ it correctly represents something, namely, the logical consequence relation proper
that holds between natural language sentences.1 To make sense of this, more must be said about
the logical consequence relation and what it might be for a mathematical structure to correctly
represent it. Before we do so, however, it is crucial to note that this view of correctness not only
has historical precedent (e.g. Tarski, 1956a), but when the thorny issue of what it is for a logic
to be correct is raised, nihilists (e.g. Cotnoir, 2018, pp. 301–302) and pluralists (e.g. Cook,
1For present purposes we can stay neutral on whether the relata of the logical consequence relation are inter-
preted sentences, propositions, or anything else, and I use ‘sentences’ merely as a placeholder. However, in §1.4




2010, p. 495; Haack, 1978, p. 222; Shapiro, 2014, p. 7 fn. 1) alike have endorsed it. Thus,
in adopting this de￿nition, we are not beginning from a position that unfairly favours monism
over its competitors.
The logical consequence relation is such that a sentence – the argument’s conclusion – is
a logical consequence of a (potentially empty) set of sentences – the argument’s premisses –
i￿ the argument is necessarily truth-preserving solely in virtue of its logical form.2 For an argument
to be necessarily truth-preserving, it must be impossible for the premisses to be true but the
conclusion false. And for it to be necessarily truth-preserving in virtue of its logical form, its
truth-preservingness must be due to the premisses’ and conclusion’s syntactic and semantic
structure as well as the positions and meanings of the so-called logical terms (MacFarlane, 2017)
– terms such as, ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘not’, ‘if’, ‘some’, and ‘all’.3
Necessary truth-preservation in virtue of form is to be contrasted with necessary truth-
preservation in virtue of content, where ‘content’ refers to the arguments’ non-logical terms’
content. For instance, the argument ‘Platypuses lay eggs. Therefore: Some mammals lay eggs’
is necessarily truth-preserving, not in virtue of its form but in virtue of the contents of the
non-logical terms ‘platypuses’ and ‘mammals’. This is illustrated by the fact that substituting
‘Americans’ for ‘mammals’ yields a non-truth-preserving argument of the same form as the
original. By contrast, the argument, ‘If Hypatia is a woman, then Hypatia is mortal. Hypatia is
a woman. Therefore: Hypatia is mortal’ is necessarily truth-preserving in virtue of its logical
form because, irrespective of which terms we substitute for the non-logical terms ‘Hypatia’ and
‘is a woman’, the resulting argument is necessarily truth-preserving.4
So far we have said what a logic is, what the logical consequence relation is, and that a
logic, Li, is correct i￿ it correctly represents the logical consequence relation. But for this
correctness criterion to be informative somethingmoremust be said about what it is to correctly
2As per usual, an argument is valid i￿ its conclusion is a logical consequence of its premisses.
3Precisely which terms qualify as logical is a vexed matter, and one that we can set aside until we encounter
pluralisms which claim di￿erent logics are correct depending on where the logical–non-logical distinction is drawn
– see §1.3.
4That is, provided that they belong to the appropriate syntactic category.
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represent the logical consequence relation. A natural suggestion is that, in this context, correct
representation is a matter of correspondence between a logic’s own consequence relation and
the logical consequence relation proper. Suppose that we were able to translate natural language
sentences into Li’s formal language. Then, for any natural language argument, we can obtain
its ‘formal counterpart’ by translating its premisses and conclusion into the formal language.
We can then say thatLi correctly represents the logical consequence relation proper i￿ all and
only valid natural language arguments have formal counterparts that are Li-valid.
Following Cook (2010, p. 495), we can formally implement this idea by introducing a trans-
lation function, T , which maps natural language sentences to their counterparts in the formal
language. Letting P be a set of natural language sentences and C be a single natural language
sentence, we can then de￿ne the following correctness criterion:
Correct: Li is correct i￿, for any P, C: C is a logical consequence of P i￿ T (C) is a Li-
consequence of T (P ).
Sometimes I will say that correct logics validate all and only valid natural language arguments,
or that they correctly codify the logical consequence relation, but these slogans all express the
same thought. Now that we know what it is for a logic to be correct, we are in a position to
map out the possible positions one can take when it comes to questions concerning logics being
correct.
2 MAPPING OUT THE TERRAIN
When mapping out the terrain, it is important to highlight that nihilists, monists, and pluralists
all agree that logics are the kinds of things that can be correct, even if they disagree over how
many are. As such, they are united in their opposition to logical instrumentalism, the thesis that
logics are only more or less useful for accomplishing certain aims, and are not ‘correctness-
apt’ (e.g. Rescher, 1969, Ch. 3). Whilst nihilists, monists, and pluralists can agree with the
instrumentalist that logics can be more of less useful for certain purposes, it is the latter part of
the instrumentalist’s thesis that they take issue with.
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We can therefore depict the terrain as follows:5
Can a logic be correct or incorrect?
Yes










Insofar as the present work seeks to address the question of how many logics are correct, it is
predicated upon logics being correctness-apt and instrumentalism being false. Although of-
fering substantive arguments against instrumentalism would take us too far a￿eld, some brief
remarks are in order. The instrumentalist’s thesis that logics are not correctness-apt commits
them to two further claims: that the logical consequence relation proper is empty, and that log-
ics are not in the business of trying to represent any such relation. After all, if the consequence
relation were non-empty and some sentences really were logical consequences of others, then
it is unclear what grounds there could be for thinking that logics do not aim to represent this
relation. Conversely, if the consequence relation proper were empty but logics were trying to
represent it then, in much the same way that all theories of phlogiston are incorrect, these logics
are incorrect and nihilism follows, not instrumentalism.
As a result, instrumentalists are susceptible to two lines of criticism. First, one may simply
object that the logical consequence relation is non-empty because, for instance, it is impossible
for a conjunction to be true but its conjuncts false in virtue of their logical form. This is certainly
the orthodox view and those who accept it need not give instrumentalism any further thought.
However, for those who are unorthodox, during the discussion of logical nihilism I provide an
5The following diagram is based on Haack (1978, p. 225).
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extended argument that the logical consequence relation proper is non-empty. Accordingly,
those tempted by instrumentalism can read this argument as also ruling out instrumentalism.
Second, as Susan Haack notes, the history of logic seems to indicate that logics do aim to
represent the logical consequence relation:
It is clear enough from the history of formal logic (consider Aristotle, for instance, or
Frege) that the motivation for the construction of formal systems has been, on the basis
of an initial conception of some arguments as good and others as bad, to sort out logical
from other, e.g. rhetorical, features of good arguments, and to give rules which would
permit only the logically good arguments and exclude the bad (1978, p. 227).
Thus, given that logics aim to represent the logical consequence relation proper, if this relation
were empty, nihilism ensues not instrumentalism. Having gestured towards some reasons for
setting instrumentalism aside, we can now focus on introducing the dramatis personae in further
detail: the nihilists, the pluralists, and the monists.
At one extreme we encounter the nihilists, who claim that there are no correct logics. Given
Correct, this is to say that there is no logic which validates every valid natural language argument.
Accordingly, there are two straightforward ways to be a nihilist. One can either show that for any
logic,Li, there are invalid natural language arguments that haveLi-valid formal counterparts,
or that there are valid natural language arguments lackingLi-valid formal counterparts. As we
shall see later on, there are two prevalent strains of nihilism found in the literature. One takes
the ￿rst route by arguing that there are no valid arguments and so all logics are incorrect as they
validate invalid natural language arguments. The other takes the second route by claiming that
there are valid arguments that cannot have formal counterparts due to the inherent limitations
of formal languages.
At the other extreme we happen upon the pluralists, who maintain that there are multiple
logics satisfying Correct. At ￿rst glance this may seem strange: how could there be multiple
logics, all of which correctly codify the logical consequence relation, and yet they be distinct?
If there were only a single unchanging logical consequence relation this worry would be well
13
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taken. However, the pluralists’ contention is precisely that this is not so. Rather, following
Shapiro (2014, Chs. 1–2), pluralists can be understood as claiming that the consequence rela-
tion’s extension varies with some independent parameter, such as which cases the consequence
relation quanti￿es over or where the boundary between logical and non-logical terms is drawn.
Consequently, as the ‘value’ taken by the independent parameter changes, the logical conse-
quence relation’s extension varies and so too does which logic satis￿es Correct. Consequently,
there are multiple correct logics. As we shall see, di￿erent pluralisms can then be obtained de-
pending on the parameter relativised to and which logics are correct relative to the di￿erent
values that this parameter can take.
Finally, sandwiched inbetween the nihilists and the pluralists, we ￿nd the monists who claim
that there is exactly one true logic, although they invariably disagree over which logic this is.
Given Correct, this is to say that there is just one logic, Li, such that all and only valid natural
language arguments have Li-valid formal counterparts. A slight quali￿cation is required here.
Monism, as it is usually understood, is not only the claim that there is one logic satisfyingCorrect,
but also that this logic has a non-empty consequence relation. Otherwise we risk classifying as
a monist a nihilist who claims that the logical consequence relation proper is empty and so the
one true logic has an empty consequence relation. Accordingly, in keeping in current usage, I
reserve the term ‘logics’ exclusively for those structures with non-empty consequence relations.
In virtue of being surrounded on both sides, monists face an unenviable challenge when
defending their position. On the one hand, when defending themselves against pluralists, the
justi￿cation that they give for rejecting the existence of multiple correct logics must not simulta-
neously undermine their claim that there is a correct logic. On the other hand, when defending
themselves against nihilists, the justi￿cation that they give for there being at least one correct
logic must not commit them to there being multiple correct logics.6 Despite these di￿culties,
the present work endeavours to show that monism remains defensible.




Notice that monism is entailed by the negations of pluralism and nihilism, and so one way of
defending monism is to defend the following two theses:
Upper Bound: There is at most one correct logic.
Lower Bound: There is at least one correct logic.
This observation informs the structure of the present work. Part I defendsmonism from plural-
ism by defending Upper Bound. Chapter 1 introduces pluralism more thoroughly as well as the
plethora of pluralisms presently on o￿er, whilst chapters 2 and 3 construct the main argument
in favour of Upper Bound. Chapter 2 argues that logic is doubly normative for reasoning. That
is, logic not only constrains the combinations of beliefs that agents may have, as is commonly
supposed, but it also constrains the methods by which agents may form them – a point that
has hitherto gone unacknowledged. Chapter 3 then builds on this by developing the normative
contradiction argument which demonstrates that, given logic is doubly normative for reason-
ing, a wide range of pluralisms are untenable because they entail logically contradictory claims
about how agents ought to reason. Chapter 4 concludes Part I by arguing that the pluralisms
which proved immune to the normative contradiction argument collapse into monism.
Part II completes the defence of monism by defending Lower Bound from the logical ni-
hilists. For there to be at least one correct logic, two further claims must be true. First, the
non-emptiness claim that the logical consequence relation proper is non-empty – that is, there
must be valid arguments. Second, the existence claim that there actually is a logic which correctly
codi￿es this non-empty relation. Recently, both claims have come under ￿re from nihilists.
Chapter 5 defends the non-emptiness claim against Gillian Russell’s nihilism, whilst Chapter
6 defends the existence claim from Aaron Cotnoir’s nihilism. With Lower Bound in place the







A Plethora of Pluralisms
Logical pluralists claim that there is more than one correct logic, and this chapter introduces
logical pluralism more thoroughly before surveying the di￿erent varieties of pluralism on o￿er.
Building on Shapiro’s (2014) classi￿cation of logical pluralisms as di￿erent forms of logical
relativism, §1.1 identi￿es two key components that lie at the heart of any logical pluralism and
how di￿erent pluralisms can be obtained by varying them. The remainder of the chapter then
puts this template to work as the existing pluralisms are introduced.
1 LOGICAL PLURALISM AND LOGICAL RELATIVISM
There are a plethora of species of logical pluralism and, following Shapiro (2014, Chs. 1–2),
they can be classi￿ed as di￿erent forms of logical relativism. In general, and somewhat loosely,
to be a relativist about some domain is to say that the things belonging to this domain – be
they objects, events, actions, or anything else – do not instantiate certain properties simpliciter
but only relative to some parameter, and therefore claims about this domain are only true or
false relative to this parameter (Shapiro, 2014, p. 7). For instance, relativists about etiquette
maintain that which actions are polite or rude is relative to parameters such as culture and time,
so whilst it is neither true nor false simpliciter that it is rude to give someone an even number of
￿owers, it is true relative to present-day Russia but false relative to 18th century Britain.
According to the logical relativist, whether a natural language argument is valid is relative to
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some parameter, P. Since a logic, Li, is correct just in case all and only valid natural language
arguments have Li-valid formal counterparts, whether Li is correct is also relative to P. As a
toy example, suppose that a natural language argument, A, is valid when P takes value p1, in-
valid when it takes value p2, and the validity of all other arguments remains unchanged between
p1 and p2. If logics L1 and L2 are such that A’s formal counterpart is L1-valid but L2-invalid,
and both logics get the validity of all the other arguments right, then relative to p1 L1 is correct
but L2 is incorrect, and vice versa relative to p2. Provided that at least two di￿erent logics are
correct relative to at least two values ofP – or else at least two di￿erent logics are both correct
relative to one value of P – the resulting position is a logical pluralism.1
On this picture, the core of any logical pluralism is comprised of two parts, either of which
can be varied to obtain di￿erent pluralisms. First, the parameter that logics are correct relative
to,P. As we will see, most of the pluralisms presently on o￿er relativise logical consequence to
di￿erent parameters and can be classi￿ed accordingly. Second, a relation which maps each of
the values thatP can take to the logic(s) that are correct relative to them. Let us call this second
component a pluralism’s speci￿cation relation. Accordingly, to ascertain which is the correct logic
for a particular argument being considered by an agent, one only needs to identify which value
P takes in that context, and which logic is correct relative to that value.
For a pluralism to be plausible both components require support. In the ￿rst instance, we
need to be told why arguments’ validity should depend upon P. And once we are told this,
something must be said about why its speci￿cation relation is plausible – that is, why certain
logics are correct relative to some values of P but incorrect relative to others. With this tem-
plate in place, we are now in a position to introduce the di￿erent pluralisms in a systematic
manner. For each pluralism, I begin by stating the parameter to which each relativises logical
consequence and why one might think this to be so, before discussing the pluralism’s speci￿ca-
tion relation. Since many pluralisms relativise logical consequence to parameters that can take
1Notice that logical pluralisms being understood species of logical relativism is quite compatible with the for-
mality of logic. All that formality requires is that, given some value of P , if some argument is valid then so too is
every argument of the same form.
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a large number of potential values, I only discuss a few of the values the parameter can take.
2 CASE-RELATIVE PLURALISM
Beall & Restall (2000, 2006) argue that logics are correct relative to cases, where cases are
“‘things’ in which claims may be true” (2006, p. 89).2 According to Beall & Restall, our con-
cept of validity – or, equivalently, logical consequence – is vague but its core is given by the
Generalised Tarski Thesis (GTT):
GTT: “An argument is validx if and only if, in every casex in which the premises are true,
so is the conclusion” (2006, p. 29).
This core can then be precisi￿ed in di￿erent ways by varying which cases GTT quanti￿es over,
thereby yielding di￿erent relations some of which are logical consequence relations. Since
di￿erent logical consequence relations can be obtained by varying the cases thatGTT quanti￿es
over, it follows that logical consequence is relative cases.
Notice that not just any old precisi￿cation of GTT quantifying over any old set of cases
yields a logical consequence relation. Rather, the relation is one of logical consequence just
in case it is necessary, formal, and normative (2006, p. 35). That is, for any argument whose
premisses and conclusion stand in this relation, it must be the case that: (i) it is impossible for
the premisses to be true but the conclusion false (2006, pp. 14–16); (ii) one goes wrong if one
believes the premisses but disbelieves the conclusion (2006, pp. 16–18); and (iii) the premisses
and conclusion of every argument of the same logical form also stand in this relation (2006,
pp. 18–23). For instance, take a precisi￿cation of GTT which only quanti￿es over cases in
which it is true that ‘Trump has solved Curry’s Paradox’. The relationship so de￿ned will hold
between any sentence whatsoever and ‘Trump has solved Curry’s Paradox’. Thus, this relation
cannot be logical as it is not normative: there is nothing amiss with one who believes that the
Australians lost the Great Emu War but disbelieves that Trump has solved Curry’s Paradox.
2Here we focus on the model-theoretic version of their pluralism. See Restall (2014) for the proof-theoretic
form.
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Turning to the speci￿cation relation, which kinds of cases yield logical consequence rela-
tions, and which logics are correct relative to these di￿erent relations? Beall & Restall argue that
there are at least three precisi￿cations of GTT that are necessary, normative, and formal, and
therefore conclude that “there is more than one relation of logical consequence” (2006, p. 25).
In particular, the precisi￿cations of GTT quantifying over complete and consistent Tarskian
models, over potentially incomplete but consistent constructions, and over potentially incom-
plete and inconsistent situations yield three di￿erent logical consequence relations. These three
relations are correctly codi￿ed by classical, intuitionistic, and a relevant logic, respectively.
3 DISTINCTION-RELATIVE PLURALISM
Building onTarski (1956a), Varzi (2002) contends that logics are correct relative towhere the dis-
tinction between logical and non-logical terms is drawn. According to the standard model-theoretic
account of logical consequence, an argument is valid i￿ it is necessarily truth-preserving in
virtue of its logical form and the meanings of the logical terms. Typically, the natural language
logical terms are taken to be ‘and’, ‘or’, ‘all’ and the like, but Varzi argues that there is no uniquely
correct place to draw this distinction. In fact, “every term can in principle be treated as a logical
term or a non-logical term” (2002, pp. 198–199). Consequently, one can obtain di￿erent log-
ical consequence relations – or, as Varzi calls them, ‘di￿erent senses of validity’ – by varying
where the distinction between logical and non-logical terms is drawn. In turn, di￿erent logics
are correct depending on where the distinction is drawn.3
To get an idea of what Varzi’s pluralism’s speci￿cation relation might look like, consider
the following example. We might draw the logical–non-logical distinction such that ‘and’, ‘or’,
‘not’, and ‘if’ are the only logical terms. Or we might draw it so that ‘Everything’ and ‘Some-
thing’ are also logical terms. Relative to the ￿rst distinction, ‘Something is ￿u￿y’ is not a logical
consequence of ‘Guinness is ￿u￿y’, but relative to the second it is. Accordingly, a propositional
3It is unclear whether Varzi himself would agree with this characterisation as he talks only of relativism and
makes no mention of correctness. However, I follow Shapiro (2014, pp. 49–57) in interpreting his and Tarski’s
position in this way. Moreover, Varzi’s pluralism also has a Carnapian component which allows the meanings of
logical terms to vary, but here we shall focus only on the ‘Tarskian fragment’ of his pluralism.
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logic will be correct relative to the ￿rst distinction but a ￿rst-order logic relative to the second.
Similar remarks apply for modal, epistemic, deontic logics and so on when expressions such as
‘Possible’, ‘Knows that’, and ‘Ought to’, are counted as logical terms.
4 TRUTHBEARER-RELATIVE PLURALISM
Russell (2008) maintains that logics are correct relative to the kind of truthbearers that arguments’
premisses and conclusions are taken to be. Consider the argument, ‘Water is water. Therefore:
Water is H2O’. Suppose that the premiss and conclusion are standard propositions – that is,
sets of possible worlds – and are therefore identical since both are necessary. Given that the
latter is not a logical consequence of the former, when the logical consequence relation’s relata
are standard propositions it cannot be re￿exive.4 But if the relata are taken to be hyperinten-
sional propositions, the premiss and conclusion express di￿erent propositions and the resulting
consequence relation may well be re￿exive.5
Accordingly, this pluralism’s speci￿cation relation will be such that when the truthbearers are
standard propositions the correct logic will be one with a non-re￿exive consequence relation,
but when the truthbearers are hyperintensional propositions the correct logic’s consequence
relation might be re￿exive. Russell also considers other truth-bearers – such as interpreted
sentences, Kaplanian characters, and statements – and argues that each has their own logic:
Is there room for, say, a logic of propositions? Or a logic of statements? If what is
important for validity is that in all cases where the premises are true, the conclusion is
true, then it makes sense to talk of validity for any kind of truth-bearer. Though it may be
that we normally only call arguments composed of a certain kind of truth-bearer valid,
the notion will be extendable to arguments composed of other things (2008, p. 607).
4That is, not every premiss entails itself.
5For an account of hyperintensional propositions employing impossible worlds, see Berto & Jago (2019).
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5 FRAMEWORK-RELATIVE PLURALISMS
Kouri Kissel (2018) builds upon the pluralism espoused by Rudolf Carnap (1959) by argu-
ing that logics are correct relative to linguistic frameworks. A linguistic framework is a vocabulary
coupled with a syntax and a set of rules specifying which inferences are permissible. The frame-
work itself is chosen on pragmatic grounds and, in particular, whether adopting the framework
is conducive to achieving our theoretical aims, whatever those might be.6 Naturally, the cor-
rect logic relative to a linguistic framework is determined by which inferences are permissible
within it, and this is encoded by the speci￿cation relation in the usual way. For instance, if ex
falso quodlibet, double negation elimination, disjunctive syllogism, and so on are permitted in a
linguistic framework, then the correct logic relative to this framework is classical.
Although Kouri Kissel endorses this Carnapian picture, there is one point of di￿erence con-
cerning the meanings of logical terms. Carnap maintained that the logical terms have di￿erent
meanings in di￿erent logics since they assign di￿erent truth-conditions and/or proof rules to
said terms:
[L]et any postulates and any rules of inference be chosen arbitrarily; then this choice,
whatever it may be, will determine what meaning is to be assigned to the fundamental
logical symbols (Carnap, 1959, p. xv).
By contrast, Kouri Kissel allows that “there are some contexts in which distinct logics have
logical terms that are synonymous” (2018, p. 578). Consider a context where a proponent of
a classical analysis system and a proponent of an intuitionistic analysis system are discussing
that they can both prove the same theorem. Kouri Kissel argues that since both participants
are talking about the same fundamental theorem, a negation featuring in the statement of the
theorem must have the same meanings even though classical and intuitionistic negations have
di￿erent truth-conditions.
6One might wonder whether this blurs the line between pluralism and instrumentalism insofar as the rules of
inference speci￿ed in a framework are chosen on purely pragmatic grounds. Although I am sympathetic to this, I




Blake-Turner & Russell (2018) and Field (2009a) argue that logics are correct relative to agents’
epistemic aims. Focussing on Blake-Turner & Russell’s account, from a set of premisses an agent
may aim to draw true, true and demonstrable, or true and relevant conclusions. Whether a
conclusion is a logical consequence of these premisses then depends on which of these aims the
agent has. For instance, if their aim is to draw true and demonstrable conclusions, then ‘
p
2 is
irrational’ is not a logical consequence of ‘It is not the case that
p
2 is rational’; but if their aim
was merely to draw true conclusions, then it would be.
The speci￿cation relation for Blake-Turner & Russell’s pluralism is as follows. When an
agent’s aim is to draw true conclusions, the correct logic is classical; when their aim is to draw
true and demonstrable conclusions, the correct logic is intuitionistic; and when their aim is to
draw true and relevant conclusions, the correct logic is a relevant logic (Blake-Turner & Russell,
2018, pp. 16–17). Something similar holds for Field’s pluralism, although this is not to say
that their pluralisms are identical – whereas Field thinks that logic is inherently normative for
reasoning, Blake-Turner & Russell deny this.7
7 STRUCTURE-RELATIVE PLURALISM
Shapiro (2014)maintains that logics are correct relative tomathematical structures or theories. The
rationale for this begins with a Hilbertian approach to mathematics on which “any consistent
axiomatisation characterises a structure, something at least potentially worthy of mathematical
study” (2014, p. 65). Of course, consistency is logic relative, and Shapiro argues that:
[T]here are a number of interesting and important mathematical theories that employ
a non-classical logic, and are rendered inconsistent if classical logic is imposed. This
suggests logical consequence is relative to a theory or a structure (2014, p. 3).
7Insofar as the rationale for whether a logic is correct relative to an aim seems to turn on whether it is conducive
to accomplishing said aim, one might wonder whether these pluralisms would be better described as instrumen-
talisms. Whilst I am inclined towards this line of thought, I shall continue to treat them as pluralisms.
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That is, a logic is correct relative to a mathematical theory if, at the very least, it renders the
theory consistent.8
One important implication of relativising logical consequence to mathematical structures is
that it means abandoning the formality of logical consequence (Shapiro, 2014, p. 96). Roughly,
logical consequence is said to be formal in the sense that, if an argument’s conclusion follows
logically from its premisses, then the same holds true of all arguments of the same logical form
irrespective of their premisses’ subject-matter. However, if di￿erent consequence relations hold
between sentences concerning di￿erent theories, then one argument might be valid but another
invalid despite sharing the same form.
To see how Shapiro’s pluralism’s speci￿cation relation works, let us consider a couple of
mathematical theories, Peano arithmetic and smooth in￿nitesimal analysis (SIA). Peano’s ax-
ioms of arithmetic de￿ne the natural numbers and their arithmetical properties. Following
Gentzen’s consistency proof, it is widely accepted that Peano’s axioms are consistent in ￿rst-
order classical logic, and therefore classical logic is correct relative to Peano arithmetic.9 By
contrast, SIA is a theory of in￿nitesimals – that is, non-zero numbers which are closer to zero
than any real number – which is intuitionistically consistent but classically inconsistent. To see
this, let a nilsquare be a number, r, such that r2 = 0. Within classical systems zero is the only
nilsquare, but in SIA zero is not the only nilsquare – that is:
¬8r(r2 = 0 ! r = 0)
Yet, at the same time, there are no nilsquares distinct from zero in SIA:
8r(r2 = 0 ! ¬(r 6= 0))
8Given that a legitimate theory, T, being Li-inconsistent is su￿cient for Li to be incorrect relative to T,
Shapiro is committed to Li-consistency being at least a necessary condition for Li to be correct relative to T.
Is Li-consistency also a su￿cient condition? Shapiro is equivocal on this point, and we return to it in Chapter 3.
9Of course, Gödel’s second incompleteness theorem demonstrates that the consistency of Peano arithmetic
cannot be proved in Peano arithmetic itself (or any weaker system). However, Gentzen proves the consistency of
Peano arithmetic using a system which is weaker than Peano arithmetic in some aspects but stronger in others.
See Smith (2013, Ch. 32) for a brief overview.
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These two claims are not intuitionistically inconsistent since ¬(r 6= 0) 6`I r = 0. However, as
soon as double-negation elimination is added contradiction quickly ensues, and so SIA is clas-
sically inconsistent. Within the Hilbertian tradition, if SIA is a legitimate mathematical theory
as Shapiro (2014, pp. 74–75) maintains, then it must be consistent. Accordingly, Shapiro’s
pluralism’s speci￿cation relation is such that intuitionistic logic is correct relative to SIA but
classical logic is not, though the latter is correct relative to Peano arithmetic.
8 DOMAIN-RELATIVE PLURALISMS
Domain-relative pluralists such as Bueno & Shalkowski (2009), Lynch (2009), and Pedersen
(2014) contend that logics are correct relative to domains of inquiry. Domains are individuated
according to their subject-matters, and common examples include the domains of mathematics,
macro-physical objects, and morality. Although di￿erent domain-relative pluralists carve up
the world into di￿erent domains, the basic idea is that these domains di￿er radically and so the
consequence relations holding between sentences about these domains di￿er. Since domain-
relative pluralists maintain that there are argument forms which are valid when their premisses
belong to one domain but invalid when they belong to another, domain-relative pluralists are
united in their rejection of the formality of logical consequence.
Lynch and Pedersen’s domain-relative logical pluralism is built atop their domain-relative
alethic pluralism, according to which di￿erent properties realise truth in di￿erent domains.10
Let us say that truth in a domain is epistemically constrained just in case a sentence belonging
to that domain is true i￿ it is superwarranted. A sentence, s, is superwarranted i￿ believing s is
warranted and remains warranted irrespective what additional information is acquired in the
future (Lynch, 2009, p. 38; Pedersen, 2014, pp. 263–264).
According to Lynch and Pedersen, in domains concerned with mind-independent entities,
such as electrons and stars, truth is not epistemically constrained but a matter of correspond-
10Although their pluralisms are not identical, I will talk as though they are because the di￿erences are immaterial
for present purposes.
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ing to reality.11 Suppose, as Pedersen (2014, pp. 273–274) does, that the mind-independent
world is complete: for any mind-independent object o and mind-independent property F, it is
determinate whether o is F or not. Resultantly, sentences about this domain like ‘o is F’ satisfy
the law of excluded middle, and so the consequence relation holding between them is such that
the law of excluded middle and double-negation elimination are valid. By contrast, truth is
epistemically constrained in domains concerned with mind-dependent entities, and Pedersen
cites the mathematical domain as a prime example. Since there are some sentences, such as
Goldbach’s Conjecture, such that belief in neither them nor their negations is presently super-
warranted, for these sentences the law of excluded middle fails and double-negation elimina-
tion is invalid (Pedersen, 2014, p. 266). Thus, Lynch and Pedersen’s pluralism’s speci￿cation
relation maps mind-independent domains to classical logic but mind-dependent domains to
intuitionistic logic.
What consequence relation holds between sentences about multiple domains? Take the ar-
gument, ‘If the Crown Jewels are locked in your safe, then what you did was illegal. The Crown
Jewels are locked in your safe. Therefore: What you did was illegal’. Since it concerns both
the arrangement of mind-independent physical objects and the legal status of certain actions,
it straddles the mind-independent and mind-dependent domains. This is the so-called problem
of mixed inferences, and Lynch’s (2009, pp. 99–102) general solution is as follows. The logical
consequence relation holding between sentences about di￿erent domains is the weakest of the
consequence relations holding between sentences in the individual domains concerned. And if
there is no uniquely weakest consequence relation, then the consequence relation is the inter-
section of the consequence relations that hold in the individual domains – that is, the argument
forms that are valid when reasoning across multiple domains are those which are valid in all
the domains in question. Thus, if an argument’s premisses belong to domains D1 and D2 and
logics L1 and L2 are correct relative to these domains, then the speci￿cation relation maps it
to whichever of L1 and L2 is weakest, or their intersection.
11An entity exists mind-independently i￿ it would continue to exist even if there were no minds, and mind-
dependently otherwise (Lynch, 2009, p. 33; Pedersen, 2014, pp. 272–273).
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By contrast, Bueno & Shalkowski (2009) carve the world up into three domains whose
subject-matters are the character of the world, claims made about the world, and epistemic states.
Sentences about this ￿rst domain make claims about how the world is or could be. Given Bueno
& Shalkowski’s assumption that “the world is both consistent and complete” (2009, p. 309),
the consequence relation that obtains between sentences about this domain satis￿es the laws of
excluded middle and non-contradiction (in addition to all the usual suspects), and so the correct
logic in this domain is classical.
But sometimes we reason not about the world itself but about claims made about the world.
And, unlike the world, claims made about the world need not be either consistent or complete.
For instance, an outdated database of Australian fauna might include the following inconsistent
entries: ‘Duck-billed platypuses are mammals’, ‘Duck-billed platypuses lay eggs’, and ‘Nomam-
mals lay eggs’. To avoid triviality, the logical consequence relation holding between sentences
about this domain cannot be explosive, and so the correct logic must be paraconsistent:
[T]o reason about these inconsistent claims. . . it needs to be possible for the inconsistent
claims not to trivialize our whole database. In other words, it makes perfect sense, in this
case, to adopt a logic in which the inconsistency of the claims under consideration does
not entail everything. It makes sense to use a paraconsistent logic (2009, p. 312).
Lastly, in the domain whose subject-matter is agents’ epistemic states, the consequence relation
will be one in which double-negation elimination and the law of excluded middle fail:
At most stages of the baseball season one might, in quite ordinary contexts, say: ‘I am
not certain that the Yankees will not win the World Series’. Quite clearly, suppose that a
hearer used a simple-minded version of the classically sanctioned double negation elim-
ination to infer that the speaker has, e￿ectively, claimed to be certain that the Yankees
would, indeed, win the World Series. The hearer would be guilty of not only conversa-
tional but also inferential error (2009, p. 315).
Thus, whilst Bueno & Shalkowski’s pluralism’s speci￿cation relation maps the domains of the
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character of the world and claims made about the character of the world to classical and para-
consistent logics, respectively, it maps the domain of epistemic states to intuitionistic logics.
Finally, although Bueno & Shalkowski do not address the issue of reasoning across domains,
nothing precludes them from adopting Lynch’s approach.
9 MEANING-RELATIVE PLURALISM
Haack (1978) maintains that logics are correct relative to the meanings of logical terms. Logical
terms are formal representations of their natural language counterparts, and focus on some of
their counterparts’ features whilst abstracting from others. This abstraction makes room for
there to be multiple correct logics. Although di￿erent logics give logical terms di￿erent mean-
ings by giving them di￿erent truth-conditions and/or proof rules, they may provide equally
correct formalisations by perspicuously representing di￿erent aspects of their natural language
counterparts:
Formalisation involves a certain abstraction from what are taken to be irrelevant or
unimportant features of informal discourse. . . And this leaves scope for, so to speak, al-
ternative formal projections of the same informal discourse; i.e. scope for the idea that,
for instance, material implication, strict implication, relevant implication, and other for-
mal conditionalsmight all have some claim to represent some aspect of ‘if’ (1978, p. 230)
Naturally, focussing on di￿erent aspects of natural language logical terms’ meanings yields dif-
ferent consequence relations relative to which di￿erent logics are correct. For instance, on
Haack’s account, both the material conditional and relevant implication represent di￿erent as-
pects of the meaning of ‘If’, and relative to the former classical logic is correct but relative to




This chapter argued that at the core of any pluralism lies two components: the independent
parameter to which logical consequence is relativised, and the speci￿cation relation which re-
lates each value the parameter can take to the logics which are correct relative to that value.




A Double Dose of Normativity
A time-honoured tradition has it that logic is normative for reasoning. In Kant’s words, “In
Logic we do not want to know how the understanding is and thinks, and how it has hitherto
proceeded in thinking, but how it ought to proceed in thinking” (Kant, 1885, p. 4). This chap-
ter argues that logic is doubly normative for reasoning as it constrains both the combinations of
beliefs that we may have and the methods by which we may form them. In doing so, it lays the
foundation for my central argument in favour of the upper bound thesis that there is at most
one correct logic – namely, that most pluralisms are inconsistent given that logic is doubly
normative for reasoning.
We begin in §2.1 by arguing for the following Incompleteness Thesis:
Incompleteness Thesis: The prevailing conception of the normativity of logic is incomplete
because it overlooks the fact that, in addition to constraining the com-
binations of beliefs that we may have, logic also constrains the methods
by which we may form them.
I then going on to explain why, following the seminal work of Gilbert Harman (1984, 1986), the
normativity of logic for reasoning in either sense turns on whether there are true bridge principles.
§2.2 recapitulates and builds upon the contributions of John MacFarlane (2004) and Florian
Steinberger (2019a, 2019c) to articulate validity bridge principles capturing the normativity of
logic for belief combinations. Finally, in §2.3 we enter unchartered waters and begin the task
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of formulating invalidity bridge principles that capture the normativity of logic for the methods
by which we form our beliefs.
1 THE INCOMPLETENESS THESIS
Tomotivate the claim that logic is doubly normative for reasoning, we begin with two examples
of reasoning gone awry:1
Suky: Suky correctly believes that there is a cat on the mat and that there is a dog on the log,
but fails to believe their conjunction.
Max: Max is curious about how the Greek tragedian Aeschylus died. He reasons: if an eagle
dropped a tortoise on Aeschylus’s head then Aeschylus is dead; Aeschylus is dead, so
an eagle dropped a tortoise on his head.
Both Suky’s andMax’s reasoning contain logical errors, albeit of di￿erent kinds. Suky’s reason-
ing is problematic because of the combination of beliefs that she has: she believes two conjuncts
but fails to believe the conjunction that they entail. By contrast, Max’s fault lies not in his com-
bination of beliefs – indeed, they are all true – but in the method by which he formed his belief,
namely, via the invalid deductive inference of a￿rming the consequent.
The existence of these two kinds of errors indicate that logic is doubly normative for reason-
ing. First, logic constrains the combinations of beliefs that agents may have. At the very least, one
should not disbelieve the logical consequences of one’s belief set and, in cases like Suky’s, one
should either believe said consequences or else revise one’s belief set. Second, logic constrains
the methods by which agents may form beliefs: one should not, as Max does, form beliefs via
invalid deductive inferences. Whereas the former has been widely recognised by the literature
on the normativity of logic, the latter has been ignored entirely.
In light of the work of Harman (1984, 1986), the claim that logic is normative for reasoning
in either sense faces a signi￿cant obstacle. Harman’s central insight was that deductive logic and
1As usual, reasoning is the process of forming and revising our doxastic attitudes via inference (Harman, 1984,
p. 107).
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a theory of reasoning are not one and the same, for they have entirely distinct subject-matters.
Whereas deductive logic concerns logical facts delineating static and non-psychological rela-
tions between sentences, a theory of reasoning consists of normative constraints governing how
agents ought to form and revise their beliefs (Harman, 1984, p. 107; 1986, pp. 3–4). For
instance, modus ponens – the logical fact that, ‘If A then B’ and ‘A’ entail ‘B’ makes no mention
of beliefs: it does not say that if one believes ‘If A then B’ and ‘A’ then one ought to believe
‘B’. Thus, logic cannot be normative for reasoning simply because logical facts are themselves
constraints on reasoning.
Disabused of the illusion that logical facts and normative constraints on reasoning are iden-
tical, a gap opens up between the two. For logic to be normative for reasoning in either way,
there must be true bridge principles – conditionals whose antecedents are logical facts and whose
consequents are the normative constraints on belief combinations or methods that these facts
induce (MacFarlane, 2004). Crucially, insofar as the existing literature has been exclusively pre-
occupied with bridge principles linking logical facts to constraints on belief combinations (e.g.
Field, 2009b; Harman, 1986; MacFarlane, 2004; Milne, 2009; Steinberger, 2019a, 2019c;
Streumer, 2007), the prevailing conception of the normativity of logic neglects its normativity
for methods of belief formation. Hence the Incompleteness Thesis. In the next two sections we
explore the bridge principles that together capture both dimensions of logic’s normativity.
2 VALIDITY BRIDGE PRINCIPLES
We begin with the bridge principles that relate logical facts to constraints on belief combina-
tions. Broadly speaking, there are two kinds of logical facts: validity facts of the form   |= ',
and invalidity facts of the form   6|=  . As such, our ￿rst task is to establish which kind of logical
fact induces constraints on the combinations of beliefs agents may have.
The constraint that Suky violates by believing both conjuncts but failing to believe their
conjunction is grounded in the fact that the conjuncts necessitate the truth of their conjunction.
As such, this constraint and other constraints on belief combinations must be induced by a
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validity fact since, given   6|=  alone,   necessitates the truth of neither  nor ¬ . Let us
call bridge principles relating validity facts to constraints on belief combinations validity bridge
principles. Thus, to say that logic is normative for belief combinations is to say that there is a true
validity bridge principle. The task of this section is to formulate such a principle. §§2.2.1–2.2.2
recapitulate the existing literature on validity bridge principles, focussing in particular upon the
contributions of John MacFarlane and Florian Steinberger. §§2.2.3–2.2.4 then proceed to
build upon these contributions to articulate validity bridge principles capturing the normativity
of logic for the combinations of beliefs we may have.
2.1 The MacFarlane Three-Step
We begin with the seminal work of John MacFarlane (2004). The importance of MacFarlane’s
contribution resides in his methodology for addressing the question of whether there are any
true validity bridge principles. Broadly speaking, MacFarlane proceeds in three stages. First,
he formulates a blueprint for validity bridge principles which renders explicit the ‘dimensions’
across which they can vary, thereby enabling the space of all the possible permutations to be
mapped out. Second, MacFarlane identi￿es the set of criteria that any true validity bridge
principle must satisfy. Finally, these criteria are applied to the various validity bridge principles
and conclusions are drawn about whether any are true.
Following Steinberger (2019a, p. 312), MacFarlane’s blueprint for validity bridge principles
can be generalised as:
VBPBP: If  (  |= '), then D(↵( ),  (')).
The antecedent of VBP states a validity fact or an agent’s doxastic attitude towards such a fact,
where   is a variable denoting said attitude that is empty when the antecedent is factual. VBP’s
consequent is a normative constraint on the agent’s doxastic attitudes, where D is a deontic
operator, and ↵ and   are the potentially distinct attitudes being constrained. The relation
between the two is that the antecedent is a triggering condition specifying when agents are
bound by the normative constraint given in the consequent.
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Di￿erent validity bridge principles can then be generated by varying the values taken by
VBP’s parameters:
1.  : Does the validity bridge principle have a factual antecedent in which   is empty, or
an attitudinal antecedent where   denotes a doxastic attitude? That is, are agents subject
to the normative constraints induced by the validity facts which actually obtain, or those
that they think obtain?2
2. ↵,  : Does the normative constraint govern agents’ beliefs or degrees of belief?
3. D: What kind of deontic operator does the normative constraint employ? Is it the inde-
feasible ‘ought to’ operator, the defeasible ‘has reason to’ operator, or the even weaker ‘is
permitted to’ operator?
4. D’s Scope: The normative constraint in VBP’s consequent is typically a conditional of the
form ↵( )    ('). What scope does the deontic operator take with respect to this con-
ditional? Does it embed into both the antecedent and consequent, just the consequent,
or does it take wide scope over the entire conditional?
5. Polarity: Does the normative constraint in the validity bridge principle’s consequent pos-
itively require that agents hold certain doxastic attitudes, or does it negatively preclude
them from holding speci￿c doxastic attitudes?
All in all, the variation of these parameters generates a space of seventy-two distinct validity
bridge principles. With the ￿rst step of MacFarlane’s method complete, we move to the second
stage of articulating the adequacy criteria. MacFarlane (2004, pp. 9–12) endorses the following
seven criteria.3
(1) Belief Revision. A true validity bridge principle must allow agents to revise their belief
set when it entails an absurdity rather than requiring that they believe the absurdity. It thereby
precludes a true validity bridge principle’s deontic operator from embedding into the normative
2I use ‘think’ as a placeholder for any of the doxastic attitudes to which   may refer.
3Criteria (1)–(4) are found in Harman (1986, Ch. 2) and MacFarlane (2004, p. 12) introduces (5)–(7).
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constraint’s consequent, as the constraint would then require that subject s believe an absurd
logical consequence of their belief set rather than allowing them to revise their initial beliefs.
(2) Excessive Demands. A true validity bridge principle cannot require cognitively limited
agents to believe all the logical consequences of their beliefs, since the deduction of many of
these consequences will be extremely complex and lies beyond their cognitive reach. Thus,
Excessive Demands requires validity bridge principles’ antecedents to be attitudinal since this
restricts the normative constraints to which an agent is subject to those induced by the validity
facts that they think obtain.
(3) Clutter Avoidance. The content of any given belief has in￿nitely many consequences,
many of which are in￿nitely long disjunctions that the agent has no reason to consider. Thus,
a true validity bridge principle cannot require that agents believe all the logical consequences
of their beliefs as this would clutter their ￿nite cognitive capacity. This can be avoided by
supplementing VBP’s antecedent with the clause ‘and s has reason to consider '’ so that agents
are only subject to the normative constraints induced by relevant validity facts.
(4) Priority Question. A true validity bridge principle must respect the fact that the normative
constraints induced by validity facts constrain our reasoning irrespective of whether we are
aware of them. According to MacFarlane, saying that we are only subject to the validity facts
that we think obtain get matters the wrong way round and has the unwanted consequence that:
The more ignorant we are of what follows logically from what, the freer we are
to believe whatever we please – however logically incoherent it is. But this looks
backwards. We seek logical knowledge so that we will know how we ought to revise
our beliefs: not just how we will be obligated to revise them when we acquire this
logical knowledge, but how we are obligated to revise them even now, in our state
of ignorance (MacFarlane, 2004, p. 12).
Since bridge principles’ antecedents delineate when agents are subject to the normative con-
straints on reasoning given in their consequents, Priority Question requires that their antecedents
be factual.
35
A Double Dose of Normativity
(5) Preface Paradox. In D. C. Makinson’s (1965) Preface Paradox, an author has meticu-
lously researched every sentence in a non-￿ction book she has written and therefore, given her
evidence, is rationally required to believe that each sentence is true. However, since she recog-
nises that there is strong inductive evidence for her fallibility, she is also rationally required to
believe that at least one sentence is false. Given the author is rationally required to believe both
that each sentence in her book is true and that at least one is false, a true validity bridge prin-
ciple should not require that she forgo either belief, despite their inconsistency. Thus, to satisfy
Preface Paradox, a validity bridge principle cannot employ the indefeasible ‘ought to’ operator.
(6) Strictness. A true validity bridge principle must indefeasibly require that agents either
believe the straightforward consequences of their belief sets or else forgo at least one of their
existing beliefs. For instance, if s believes ' and  , s is indefeasibly required to either believe
'^ , or else jettison their belief in at least one of the conjuncts. Therefore, Strictness demands
that validity bridge principles employ the indefeasible ‘ought to’ operator.
(7) Obtuseness. The normative constraint on reasoning given in a true validity bridge princi-
ple’s consequent must not merely forbid an agent who believes ' and  from disbelieving '^ ,
but must positively require that they believe ' ^  .
With the adequacy criteria formulated, we turn to step three of MacFarlane’s method: as-
certaining whether there are any validity bridge principles satisfying all the adequacy criteria.
Each criterion precludes at least one of a validity bridge principle’s parameters from taking cer-
tain values – for instance, Strictness precludes a validity bridge principle’s deontic operator from
taking any value other than ‘ought to’. As such, each criterion partitions the space of validity
bridge principles into two cells comprised of those validity bridge principles which satisfy it and
those which do not. Wemay think of the application of a criterion to the space of validity bridge
principles as eliminating the portion of the space coinciding with the latter cell. The question
of whether there are any true validity bridge principles can therefore be understood as follows:
once all the adequacy criteria have been applied to the space of validity bridge principles, which,
if any, remain uneliminated?
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It is here that MacFarlane comes unstuck. Once all the criteria have been applied, none
remain: there are no validity bridge principles satisfying all the criteria (MacFarlane, 2004,
pp. 12–13). Why is this? If two adequacy criteria con￿ict – that is, they demand that a sin-
gle parameter takes two di￿erent values – then the intersection of the sets of validity bridge
principles satisfying them both is empty. Consequently, any con￿icting adequacy criteria will
together eliminate the entirety of the space of validity bridge principles as inadequate. Thus,
we have the following necessary condition for a space of bridge principles, S, to contain an
adequate member:
Con￿ict-Free*: None of the adequacy criteria pertaining to S con￿ict.
Yet, despite MacFarlane’s adequacy criteria being fairly weak, there are two separate con￿icts
amongst them. First, between Excessive Demands and Priority Question: whereas Excessive De-
mands requires validity bridge principles to have attitudinal antecedents, Priority Question de-
mands that their antecedents be factual. Second, between Strictness and Preface Paradox: Strict-
ness favours principles featuring the indefeasible ‘ought to’ operator but Preface Paradox pulls in
the opposite direction. What to do?
2.2 Steinberger’s Tripartite Distinction
This is where the contributions made by Florian Steinberger (2019a, 2019c) enter the fray.
Steinberger aims to progress the debate by showing that bridge principles themselves are norms,
and there are three functionally distinct kinds of norm they may be:
(I) Evaluations. An evaluative norm states an objective and ideal standard of correctness.
It is objective since it is the standard of correctness that actually obtains as opposed
to that which is thought to obtain by a particular agent. And it is ideal because it
abstracts away from various limitations that those subject to it may have.
(II) Directives. A directive norm is a principle that guides ordinary agents’ actions.
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(III) Appraisals. An appraisal norm is a standard determining when ordinary agents’ con-
duct is worthy of praise or criticism (Steinberger, 2019a, p. 316; Steinberger, 2019c,
p. 16).
To see this distinction in action and why a given principle may be plausible when construed as
one kind of norm but not another, consider the following falsity norm for belief:
Falsity: If p is false, then s ought not to believe that p.
Falsity is a plausible evaluative norm – after all, if beliefs aim at truth then, from an objective
and ideal standpoint, it is incorrect to believe falsehoods. However, it is a deeply implausible
directive or appraisal norm. In the ￿rst instance, Falsity cannot serve as a directive because it does
not provide any guidance in scenarios where there is no way of knowing whether p is true or
false, and may direct agents to not believe p even when all their evidence points in the opposite
direction. Nor is Falsity a plausible appraisal norm because, supposing p is false, it would be
unfair to criticise an agent for believing p if they have no way of knowing that p is false or if all
the evidence available to them points towards p being true.
This distinction can be equally fruitfully applied to bridge principles. Bridge principles qua
evaluative norms determine whether our reasoning is correct or incorrect from an objective
and ideal standpoint; bridge principles qua directive norms provide us with guidance on how
to reason; and bridge principles qua appraisals determine when our reasoning is reprehensible
or praiseworthy as far as logic is concerned. Accordingly, there is not one space of validity
bridge principles but three, each comprised of the same set of principles but di￿erentiated by
the normative functions these principles perform. Due to space limitations, the remainder of
this chapter focusses solely upon evaluative and directive bridge principles.
Crucially, di￿erent sets of adequacy criteria apply to each of these three spaces. As Stein-
berger (2019c, p. 23) puts it, “Di￿erent normative roles invite di￿erent criteria of adequacy”. The
hope, then, is that disambiguating the three spaces will enable Con￿ict-Free* to be met for each
of them, since some of the criteria that were previously thought to con￿ict do not apply to the
same spaces. And this is exactly what happens.
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Belief Revision is relevant to both spaces of validity bridge principles (Steinberger, 2019c,
p. 24). If one’s belief set entails an absurdity then, from an objective and ideal standpoint, it is
incorrect to believe said absurdity rather than revising one’s initial belief set. Moreover, agents
should not be directed to believe the absurdity. Both Excessive Demands and Clutter Avoidance
are irrelevant to evaluative bridge principles but relevant to their directive counterparts (Stein-
berger, 2019c, pp. 23–24). Insofar as evaluative validity bridge principles are in the business
of stating ideal standards for correct reasoning, they abstract from our cognitive capacities and
therefore worries concerning their demandingness gain no purchase. By contrast, for a norm
to function as a directive and guide ordinary agents’ reasoning, it cannot direct agents to do that
of which they are incapable, such as believing all their belief sets’ logical consequences.
Priority Question only applies to the space of evaluative validity bridge principles (Stein-
berger, 2019c, p. 23). The reason for this is that Priority Question requires validity bridge prin-
ciples to capture what logic demands of us as opposed to what we think it demands of us. And
whilst this is appropriate for evaluative validity bridge principles which state objective standards
for reasoning, it is inappropriate for directive validity bridge principles which, to guide agents’
reasoning, must be sensitive to which validity facts they think obtain.
Preface Paradox applies to the space of directive validity bridge principles but not their eval-
uative counterparts (Steinberger, 2019c, pp. 24–27). Given that the author has fastidiously
researched each sentence in her book, she is rationally required to believe that each individual
sentence is true. Moreover, given the author has strong inductive evidence for her own falli-
bility, she is rationally required to believe that she has made at least one error. Accordingly,
a true directive validity bridge principle should not direct her to forgo either belief given that
she is rationally required by other non-logical doxastic norms to believe both. However, Pref-
ace Paradox is far less compelling as adequacy criterion for evaluative validity bridge principles.
The Preface Paradox only arises because we are non-ideal reasoners who lack the cognitive re-
sources to ascertain which of these beliefs is misplaced. However, an evaluative validity bridge
principle is in the business of stating an objective and ideal standard for correct reasoning and,
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from an objective and ideal standpoint, it surely is incorrect for the author to have inconsistent
beliefs, even if other norms require that she does so.
Strictness and Obtuseness both pertain to the spaces of evaluative and directive validity bridge
principles (Steinberger, 2019b, pp. 25–26). Recall Suky who believes that there is a cat on
the mat and that there is a dog on the log. From an objective and ideal standpoint, there is
something wrong with Suky’s reasoning if, whilst retaining her wholehearted beliefs in the con-
juncts, she were to either disbelieve their conjunction due to countervailing reasons or fail to
believe their conjunction. Similarly, if Suky recognises that her beliefs entail that there is a cat
on the mat and a dog on the log, a directive validity bridge principle should direct her to either
believe the conjunction or else forgo her belief in at least one of the conjuncts – even if she has
a countervailing reasons against believing the conjunction.
Steinberger’s ￿ndings for evaluative and directive validity bridge principles are summarised
in the table below. Recall that MacFarlane came unstuck because there were two con￿icts
amongst his adequacy criteria – between Excessive Demands and Priority Question, and between
Preface Paradox and Strictness – which eliminated the entirety of the space of validity bridge
principles as inadequate. Distinguishing between the spaces of evaluative and directive valid-
ity bridge principles relieves much of this tension as it transpires that, for the most part, these
con￿icting adequacy criteria do not apply to the same spaces.
Criterion Evaluations Directives
Belief Revision X X
Excessive Demands 7 X
Clutter Avoidance 7 X
Priority Question X 7
Preface Paradox 7 X
Strictness X X
Obtuseness X X
In the next two subsections these ￿ndings are used to identify true evaluative and directive
validity bridge principles; we begin with evaluations.
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2.3 Evaluative Validity Bridge Principles
Although Steinberger never applies his ￿ndings in search of a true evaluative validity bridge
principle, it is straightforward to see that his distinction clears the way for us to do so because
the space of evaluative validity bridge principles now satis￿es Con￿ict-Free*. Both the con￿ict
between Excessive Demands and Priority Question and that between Preface Paradox and Strictness
have been resolved since neither Excessive Demands nor Preface Paradox pertain to this space.
Thus, all that remains is to identify which permutations of MacFarlane’s blueprint satisfy the
criteria to which the space of evaluative validity bridge principles is subject – namely, Priority
Question, Strictness, Belief Revision, and Obtuseness.
In §2.2.1 we saw that di￿erent validity bridge principles can be obtained by varying the
￿ve parameters in MacFarlane’s blueprint: whether their antecedent is attitudinal or factual,
the kind deontic operator employed and its scope, the polarity of the normative constraint,
and whether the normative constraint governs agents’ beliefs or degrees of belief. We also saw
how each of the adequacy criteria constrains which values these parameters could take in a
true validity bridge principle. Now we know which adequacy criteria pertain to the space of
evaluative validity bridge principles, we can straightforwardly identify which permutations of
MacFarlane’s blueprint can serve as evaluative validity bridge principles.
By Priority Question, a true evaluative validity bridge principle’s antecedent must be factual
because objective standards are those induced by the logical facts that actually obtain as opposed
to those that we think obtain. Strictness requires the deontic operator to be the indefeasible ‘ought
to’ operator, whilst Belief Revision dictates that this operator must take wide scope over the bridge
principle’s consequent so as to allow agents to revise their beliefs when they entail absurdities.
Finally, Obtuseness ensures that the normative constraint has a positive polarity – that is, it must
not merely forbid agents from disbelieving their belief sets’ logical consequences, but must
positively require that they believe these consequences (or else revise their initial belief set).
The value of one parameter is not settled by these adequacy criteria: whether the normative
constraint governs agents’ outright beliefs or their credences. Supposing that logic induces
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constraints on our beliefs, the foregoing observations yield the following evaluative validity
bridge principle:
VBPE,B: If   |= ' then O(Bs    Bs').
That is, from an objective and ideal standpoint, if   |= ' then s ought to see to it that if they
believe   then they believe '.4 However, credence-based validity bridge principles have also
been proposed. For instance, letting   = { 1, . . . ,  n} and Cr( 1) be an agent’s credence in  1,
Field (2009b, p. 255) proposes:
VBPE,C: If   |= ' then Cr(')   Cr( 1 ^ . . . ^  n).5
This asserts that, from an objective and ideal standpoint, if   |= ' then one’s credence in the
conclusion, ', should be at least as great as one’s credence in the conjunction of the premisses,
 1 ^ . . . ^  n.
Which should we opt for? Does logic induce constraints governing our beliefs or our cre-
dences? This is a false dichotomy: nothing precludes logic from inducing constraints on both.
Indeed, as we have seen above, the adequacy criteria pertaining to the space of evaluative va-
lidity bridge principles leave this option open. That said, it is VBPE,B that will form an integral
part of the argument against pluralism constructed in the next chapter.6
4My use of the locution ‘see to it that’ bears no relation to STIT logic, and is merely being used to capture the
wide scope that the ‘ought to’ operator has over the conditional.
5Actually, Field ends up endorsing a slightly di￿erent principle, but I have used this one for ease of exposition
as it makes no di￿erence to the present discussion.
6Might VBPE,B and VBPE,C contradict one another in some cases, thereby forcing us to choose between them?
I think not. Given that credences and beliefs are distinct attitudes (even if one is more fundamental than the other),
for this worry to materialise there would have to be a connexion between credences and beliefs such that having
credences satisfying VBPE,C commits one to having a belief set inconsistent with that mandated by VBPE,B. Such
a connexion is articulated by the descriptive and normative variants of the Lockean Thesis (LT) – that s (ought
to) believe p i￿ their credence in p exceeds some threshold, ⌧ . However, there are compelling arguments against
both variants. According to Douven (2016), “The vast majority of philosophers take the [Lottery and Preface
Paradoxes] to show that the [normative] Lockean Thesis is to be given up” (e.g. Douven & Williamson (2006),
Kelp (2017), Lehrer (1990), Maher (1993), Smith (2010a), and Sta￿el (2017)). For objections to both variants
centring on naked statistical evidence, see Buchak (2014), Jackson (2018), Smith (2010b), and Sta￿el (2016,
2019b). For arguments that the descriptive LT fails due to the di￿ering functional roles of beliefs and credences,
see Buchak (2014), Fantl & McGrath (2009, Ch. 5), Friedman (2019), Jackson (2019), Ross & Schroeder (2014),
and Sta￿el (2019a). Finally, Weisberg (2020) presents evidence from cognitive psychology indicating that both
beliefs and credences are fundamental, and therefore that the descriptive LT is false.
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Thus, since it satis￿es all the relevant adequacy criteria, VBPE,B – henceforth, ‘VBPE’ – cap-
tures the normativity of logic for the combinations of beliefs we may have from an objective
and ideal standpoint. Returning to Suky, VBPE asserts that, from an objective and ideal stand-
point, she has gone wrong because she ought to either believe the conjunction or else rescind
her belief in at least one of the conjuncts. We now turn to the logical norms which guide our
reasoning.
2.4 Directive Validity Bridge Principles
Steinberger (2019a) is exclusively concerned with articulating a true directive validity bridge
principle, and therefore this subsection closely follows much of his argument.
As argued in §2.2.2, the space of directive validity bridge principles is subject to the Be-
lief Revision, Excessive Demands, Clutter Avoidance, Preface Paradox, Strictness, and Obtuseness ad-
equacy criteria. Unlike the space of evaluative validity bridge principles, then, the space of
directive validity bridge principles does not satisfy Con￿ict-Free* since both Preface Paradox and
Strictness pertain to it. Whereas Strictness requires the deontic operator to be the indefeasible
‘ought to’ operator, Preface Paradox demands that it be the defeasible ‘has reason to’ operator
so as to avoid the author being required to forgo either her belief that there is a mistake in the
book or that each individual sentence is correct.
The way forward here is, again, due to Steinberger (2019a, pp. 323–324). The intuition
behind Strictness, recall, is that when it comes to obvious consequences of an agent’s belief set
that they have reason to consider, agents should either modify their belief set or believe the
consequences. Rather than jettisoning Strictness altogether, Steinberger proposes that we can
capture the Strictness intuition using the defeasible ‘has reason to’ operator because it is quasi-
strict – in some contexts it behaves strictly and in others defeasibly – thereby allowing Strictness
and Preface Paradox to be simultaneously satis￿ed.
The basic observation with which this account begins is that how we weight reasons for
and against doing certain things varies across contexts. For instance, if your Chihuahua-loving
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boss asks if you like Chihuahuas, tactfulness takes priority over honesty and so the appropriate
answer is ‘Of course – they’re adorable! Do you have any photos?’. However, during a family
discussion about what breed of dog to get, honesty takes priority and so the appropriate answer
is ‘No, they’re small and yappy! How about a German Shepherd?’.
Likewise, the weightiness of the reason provided by a reasons-based directive validity bridge
principle for either modifying one’s initial belief set or believing its consequences is context-
variant. This enables such a principle to capture the intuition behind Strictness whilst satisfying
Preface Paradox. In most contexts, the reason that this principle provides for either modifying
one’s initial belief set or believing its consequences is su￿ciently weighty to outweigh any rea-
sons one might have for retaining one’s belief set but disbelieving one of its straightforward
consequences, thereby giving the appearance of indefeasibility and capturing the Strictness in-
tuition. However, there are some contexts in which the reason provided by the principle for
either modifying one’s initial belief set or believing its consequences can be outweighed by
countervailing reasons. One such context is provided by the Preface Paradox, where the rea-
sons provided by the author’s evidence and the demand for epistemic humility outweigh the
reason for consistency. Of course, ascertaining precisely when the reason for consistency is out-
weighed by other reasons is a tricky matter. However, an account of why and when competing
reasons outweigh one another lies well beyond the question of whether logic is normative, and
therefore need not be settled here.7
With Preface Paradox and Strictness out the way, we are free to apply the remaining adequacy
7Steinberger (2019a, pp. 323–324) himself distinguishes between many-premiss and few-premiss contexts,
arguing that in few-premiss contexts deductive reasons have lexical priority over other reasons, but may be out-
weighed in many-premiss contexts. My worry with this is that there seem to be many-premiss contexts in which
our obligations are strict. For instance, suppose that, for all n such that 1  n  10, 000, I believe n < (n + 1),
but I lack beliefs about whether n < (n+ i) when i   2. One day I discover the ‘greater than’ relation is transitive
which, together with my 9999 ‘n < (n + 1)’ beliefs, entails 1 < 10, 000. Despite this being a many-premiss
context, Strictness applies: I am indefeasibly required to believe 1 < 10, 000, rather than merely having a reason to
do so. Moreover, there are few-premiss contexts in which Strictness does not apply. The classical sceptical paradox
only has two premisses, an instance of the closure principle and another stating that one does not know one is not
in a sceptical scenario. Yet, as with the Preface Paradox, I am rationally permitted – if not required – to believe
both premisses and the negation of the paradoxical conclusion. And therefore, as with the Preface Paradox, a true
validity bridge principle should not require that I believe the paradoxical conclusion or else forgo my belief in either
premiss, though it may plausibly assert that I have reason to do so.
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criteria and ascertain which permutations of MacFarlane’s blueprint can serve as directive va-
lidity bridge principles. As was the case for evaluative validity bridge principles, Belief Revision
and Obtuseness require that the deontic operator takes wide scope over the normative constraint
whose polarity is positive. This leaves Clutter Avoidance and Overdemandingness. A true directive
validity bridge principle should not direct us to believe all of the in￿nitelymany consequences of
our belief sets – even those which are obvious – since many of these consequences are pointless
disjunctions that we have no reason to consider. Thus, its antecedent should be supplemented
with the clause, ‘and s has reason to consider or considers '’.
Overdemandingness requires that a directive bridge principle does not direct agents to do that
of which they are incapable, such as abiding by the normative constraints induced by valid-
ity facts lying beyond their cognitive reach. Such worries are avoided by principles that have
an attitudinal antecedent, so that agents are only subject to the constraints induced by validity
facts which they bear some attitude towards. We must, however, be careful about which at-
titude features in the antecedent. As Steinberger (2019a, pp. 324–325) points out, were the
attitude belief then those agents who lack beliefs about which arguments are valid – perhaps
because they lack the requisite concepts – would not be directed by logical norms. To avoid
this implausible result, the attitude should be one that does not presuppose explicit belief or
possession of the requisite concepts. For convenience I follow Steinberger in opting for ‘In s’s
best estimation. . . ’.
Putting all this together, the following directive validity bridge principle satis￿es all the rel-
evant adequacy criteria:
VBPD: If in s’s best estimation   |= ' and s has reasons to consider or considers ', then
R(Bs    Bs').
That is, if in s’s best estimation   |= ', and s has reason to consider ', or does consider ', then
s has reason to see to it that if they believe   then they believe '. Returning to Suky, VBPD
directs her to either believe the conjunction of forgo her belief in at least one conjunct unless
she has Preface Paradox-like reasons against doing so, which she does not.
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Thus, VBPE and VBPD together capture the normativity of logic for belief combinations,
with the former laying down objective and ideal standards and the latter providing guidance to
ordinary agents on how to manage their beliefs. With these principles in place, we now turn to
the bridge principles which capture the normativity of logic for the methods by which we may
form our beliefs.
3 INVALIDITY BRIDGE PRINCIPLES
We began in §2.1 by highlighting that, in addition to the combinations of beliefs that agents
may have, logic also constrains the methods by which they may form them. This was illustrated
by Max, whose reasoning was logically erroneous because he formed his belief that an eagle
dropped a tortoise on Aeschylus’ head by a￿rming the consequent. Since the problem with
Max’s reasoning is that it is invalid, the constraint he violates must be induced by an invalidity
fact of the form   6|= '. Let us call bridge principles relating invalidity facts to the constraints
on methods of belief formation that they induce invalidity bridge principles.
This section enters unchartered waters and sets about articulating invalidity bridge principles
which capture the normativity of logic for methods of belief formation. To do this, we will
employ MacFarlane’s method and Steinberger’s tripartite distinction. §2.3.1 enacts the ￿rst
step of MacFarlane’s method by articulating a blueprint for invalidity bridge principles. §2.3.2
completes the second step by ascertaining the relevant adequacy criteria and whether they apply
to the space of evaluative or directive invalidity bridge principles, or both. §2.3.3 begins the
third step by identifying themethod of belief formation governed by invalidity bridge principles
of any kind. Finally, §§2.3.4–2.3.5 complete the third step by articulating the evaluative and
directive invalidity bridge principles satisfying the relevant adequacy criteria, respectively.
3.1 A Blueprint for Invalidity Bridge Principles
To articulate a blueprint for invalidity bridge principles we must ￿rst say something more pre-
cise about the nature of the normative constraints induced by invalidity facts. In particular,
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which methods of belief formation do they govern? A natural answer is that the invalidity fact
  6|=  forbids one from forming the belief that  via deduction from  .8 Letting M be an
appropriate speci￿cation of deduction qua method of belief formation, this thought yields the
following blueprint:
IBPBP: If  (  6|=  ), then D¬(M).
That is, if   6|=  , or s thinks   6|=  , then s is forbidden from or has a reason against forming
the belief that  via methodM . Invalidity bridge principles therefore admit of four dimensions
of variation:
1.  : Does the invalidity bridge principle have a factual antecedent in which   is empty, or
an attitudinal antecedent? That is, are agents subject to the normative constraints induced
by the invalidity facts which actually obtain, or those that they think obtain?
2. D: Is the deontic operator ‘ought to’, ‘has reason to’, or ‘is permitted to’?
3. ¬ Scope: Should ¬ take wide or narrow scope with respect to the deontic operator? That
is, should an invalidity bridge principle’s consequent be ¬D(M), and assert it is not the
case that s ought to or has a reason to form the belief that  by deduction from  ? Or
should it be D¬(M), and assert s is forbidden from or has a reason against forming the
belief that  by deduction from  ?
4. M: How is the proscribed method of belief formation, deduction, to be speci￿ed?
By varying the values that these four parameters take, we can generate the spaces of evaluative
and directive invalidity bridge principles – albeit indeterminately insofar as I have not cata-
logued the number of possible ways of specifying deduction. However, this will su￿ce for now
and we turn to the adequacy criteria relevant to invalidity bridge principles.
8The question of whether incorrect deduction should qualify as deduction in the ￿rst place is addressed in
§2.3.3. For now I use ‘deduction’ as a placeholder.
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3.2 Adequacy Criteria for Invalidity Bridge Principles
This subsection identi￿es the adequacy criteria relevant to invalidity bridge principles and as-
certains which of these criteria are relevant to the spaces of evaluative and directive invalidity
bridge principles. A natural place at which to begin this task is with the adequacy criteria per-
taining to validity bridge principles – though given that validity and invalidity bridge principles
induce di￿erent kinds of constraints on reasoning, we should expect di￿erent sets of adequacy
criteria to pertain to them.
Invalidity bridge principles forbid agents from forming beliefs in particular ways and, cru-
cially, do not require agents to have any particular belief combinations. Thus, there is no risk of
an invalidity bridge principle committing one to believing absurdities, having a cluttered belief
set, contravening the norms giving rise to the Preface Paradox, or to being logically obtuse. Ac-
cordingly, none of Belief Revision, Clutter Avoidance, Preface Paradox, and Obtuseness are relevant
to invalidity bridge principles. This leaves Excessive Demands, Priority Question, and Strictness.
Beginning with Excessive Demands, can it be overly demanding to forbid agents from form-
ing beliefs in a particular way? Validity bridge principles could be overly demanding because,
to believe the logical consequences of one’s belief set one must ￿rst ascertain what they are, and
many of the requisite deductions are beyond our cognitive abilities. Although deductive proofs
of invalidity facts may be as laborious as proofs of validity facts, one need not have ascertained
all the propositions not entailed by   to not invalidly deduce them from  . Nonetheless, inva-
lidity bridge principles might be overly demanding in another way. Depending on how liable
humans are to forming beliefs via invalid deduction, it may be overly demanding to require that
agents not form the belief that  via deduction from   when they do not think   6|=  obtains. I
will assume humans are prone to reasoning invalidly, and therefore Excessive Demands pertains
to invalidity bridge principles.9
Priority Question asserts that the normative constraints on reasoning induced by logical facts
9I invite those who are more sanguine about our capacity to reason validly to jettison this criterion as it makes
no di￿erence to which invalidity bridge principles are endorsed in §§2.3.4–2.3.5.
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bind us irrespective of whether we think said facts obtain. Accordingly, this criterion applies
equally to invalidity bridge principles: the constraints on methods of belief formation induced
by invalidity facts constrain our reasoning irrespective of whether we think these facts obtain.
Finally, Strictness, which asserts that the normative constraints on reasoning induced by logic
are indefeasible, also applies to invalidity bridge principles. One is forbidden from deducing
 from   if one knows that   6|=  irrespective of any countervailing reasons that one may
have. So much for the criteria which applied to validity bridge principles. Are there additional
criteria that a true invalidity bridge principle must satisfy?
On the face of it, there is at least onemore. Although   6|=  should induce a normative con-
straint that forbids agents from forming the belief that  via deduction from  , this constraint
should not forbid agents from forming the belief that  via alternative methods – in particular,
via non-deductive inference from  . For instance, ‘The sun will rise tomorrow morning’ is not
entailed by ‘The sun has risen every previous morning’, but a true invalidity bridge principle
cannot forbid agents from forming a belief in the former via inductive inference from the latter.
Let us call this criterion Alternative Methods.
Thus, we have four adequacy criteria: Priority Question, Excessive Demands, Strictness, and
Alternative Methods. Our next task is to clarify which of these criteria apply to the spaces of
evaluative and directive invalidity bridge principles. Priority Question, Excessive Demands, and
Strictness apply to evaluative and directive invalidity bridge principles just as they did to their
validity counterparts, and do so for the same reasons (see §2.2.2). Priority Question applies to
evaluative but not directive invalidity bridge principles because, although objective and ideal
standards of reasoning obtain independently of what we think they are, directive norms must
be sensitive to agents’ beliefs about which arguments are invalid if they are to provide guidance.
The reverse is true of Excessive Demands as directives should be sensitive to agents’ limitations
but evaluative norms should not. Strictness, meanwhile, applies to both. From an objective and
ideal standpoint, it is wrong to form beliefs via invalid reasoning irrespective of any countervail-
ing reasons that one may have for doing so. Similarly, at least in cases where the agent thinks
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that an argument is invalid, they should be directed to not form a belief in its conclusion via an
invalid deductive inference from its premisses regardless of any reasons that they may have for
doing otherwise. Alternative Methods also applies to evaluative and directive invalidity bridge
principles alike. For supposing that   6|=  but   provides non-deductive support for  , it is
neither incorrect for s to form the belief that  via non-deductive inference from  , nor should
they be directed not to do so.
These ￿ndings are summarised in the table below:
Criterion Evaluations Directives
Priority Question X 7
Excessive Demands 7 X
Strictness X X
Alternative Methods X X
This subsection and the one preceding it have identi￿ed a blueprint for invalidity bridge princi-
ples and the criteria for assessing the adequacy of its permutations, thereby completing the ￿rst
and second steps of MacFarlane’s method. We now embark upon the ￿nal step of determining
whether there are any permutations of IBPBP satisfying all the relevant adequacy criteria.
3.3 The Prohibited Method
Although it is clear that invalidity bridge principles constrain the method of forming beliefs
via deduction, IBPBP leaves open the question of how this method should be speci￿ed. Since
evaluative and directive invalidity bridge principles both constrain deduction, this subsection
settles the ‘value’ taken byM in invalidity bridge principles of both kinds.
A natural way of trying to cash out the idea that we are forbidden from or have reason not
to form beliefs via invalid inferences is that agents are forbidden from or have reason not to
believe  because they believe that   and   |=  . Let A denote the ‘in virtue of’ relation such
that p A q reads ‘In virtue of p, q’, and let B be the binary predicate ‘. . . believes that. . . ’. We
may then capture this suggestion as follows:
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IBPA: If  (  6|=  ), then D¬(Bs(  ^ (  |=  )) A Bs( )).
That is, if   6|=  , or s thinks   6|=  , then s ought not (or has reason not to) believe  because
they believe   and   |=  . Permutations of this blueprint run little risk of violating Alterna-
tive Methods since an agent who comes to believe that the sun will rise tomorrow morning via
induction does not do so because they believe that this is entailed by the fact that the sun has
risen every previous morning.
This blueprint must, however, be rejected because it cannot form the basis of a true direc-
tive norm, as it should be able to. To be a directive norm, its antecedent must be attitudinal,
yielding something along the lines of: If Bs(  6|=  ), then D¬(Bs(  ^ (  |=  )) A Bs( )).
However, unless s believes or bears some other attitude towards both   6|=  and   |=  , this
constraint is vacuous. Since a directive norm should guide our reasoning even when we lack
these contradictory beliefs, an alternative speci￿cation of deduction must be found.
I endorse the following proposal. Let F be the ternary predicate ‘. . . forms the belief that. . . via
method. . . ’ andm  be the method of forming a belief via deduction from  . We can then up-
date IBPBP as follows:
IBP*BP: If  (  6|=  ), then D¬(Fs m ).
That is, if   6|=  , or s thinks   6|=  , then s is forbidden from or has a reason against forming
the belief that  via deduction from  .
The central issue here is how m, the method of forming beliefs via deduction, is individu-
ated. Many distinctions between di￿erent ways of individuating methods have been drawn in
the epistemology literature, but the one of relevance here is between fallibilist and infallibilist
individuations. A method of belief formation is individuated fallibly just in case it is possible
to form false beliefs via that method. By contrast, when individuated infallibly, methods are
said to be perfectly reliable or success-entailing since forming beliefs via that method always yields,
at the very least, true belief (Brown, 2018, p. 37; Lasonen-Aarnio, 2010, p. 8; Williamson,
2000, p. 182). For instance, perception may be fallibly individuated as having the perceptual
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experience that p, or infallibly as seeing that p, where seeing that p requires that p causes the
perceptual experience. The former individuation is fallibilist because it is possible to form the
false belief that p even if one has the perceptual experience that p if, say, one is hallucinating. By
contrast, the latter individuation is infallibilist because it is impossible to form the false belief
that p by seeing that p because seeing that p requires p to be the case.
Given that valid deduction is necessarily truth-preserving, an individuation of deduction on
which only valid deductive inferences qualify as tokens of deduction is an infallibilist individu-
ation, since any belief formed via this method is true conditional on the premiss beliefs being
true. By contrast, on a fallibilist individuation of deduction, forming beliefs via invalid deduc-
tive inferences may qualify as tokens of deduction and so a belief formed via deduction may
not be true even when the premiss beliefs are because the agent may have made a mistake and
reasoned invalidly.
Crucially, on pain of vacuity, deduction must be individuated fallibly in IBP*BP. To see why,
suppose that a relevant logic is the one true logic and   6|=R  . By IBP*BP, the normative con-
straint induced by this invalidity fact states that agents are forbidden from or have reason not
to form the belief that  via deduction from  . Were deduction individuated infallibly, IBP*BP
would be vacuous as it would forbid them from (or provide a reason against) doing the im-
possible: namely, forming the belief that  via relevantly valid inference from  . Fortunately,
fallibilist method individuation is a mainstream position in contemporary epistemology – en-
dorsed by, inter alia, Goldman (1979, 1986), Nozick (1981), and Sosa (1991) – and cogent
arguments have been given in its favour.10
First, infallibilist method individuation divorces methods’ reliability from ordinary agents’
cognitive capacities, which should not be the case given epistemology aims to understand how
and when ordinary agents have knowledge (Sosa, 1991, Ch. 13). To see how this argument can
be wielded against infallibilist individuations of deduction, suppose that Ruth is an impeccable
10Even if one thinks that deduction ought to be individuated infallibly, onemight still accept an amended version
of IBP*BP on which m denotes a monotonic inferential process rather than deduction. Given other inferential
processes such as induction and abduction are non-monotonic, this variant would still satisfy Alternative Methods.
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logician whilst Jacques is deductively inept. On an infallibilist individuation of deduction, none
of the instances in which Jacques reasons invalidly qualify as tokens of deduction, and there-
fore the reliability of forming beliefs via deduction for him is unattenuated by his deductive
incompetence. Thus, given an infallibilist individuation, forming beliefs via deduction is an
equally reliable method of belief formation for the two of them, despite Ruth’s pro￿ciency and
Jacques’ ineptitude. Since this is “absurd” (1991, p. 234), Sosa concludes methods ought to be
individuated fallibly.11
A second argument against infallibilist method individuation centres on the phenomenon
of epistemic defeat, where a belief loses an epistemic status such as justi￿cation or knowledge
(Lasonen-Aarnio, 2010, p. 1). For instance, suppose that, on the basis of a reliable testimony,
I come to know that ￿amingos are not born pink and only become pink because their diet
contains a naturally occurring pink dye. If I later encounter a world-renowned zoologist who
mistakenly testi￿es that this is actually a myth then, assuming that I have no other justi￿cation
for my belief, it ceases to be knowledge because the zoologist’s testimony defeats the initial
justi￿cation. Epistemic defeat has played a central role in epistemology during the post-Gettier
era, and is regarded as part of “epistemic orthodoxy” (Brown, 2018, p. 103). Despite this,
infallibilist method individuation disallows epistemic defeat as a belief that is initially produced
via a perfectly reliable method cannot cease to be justi￿ed, even in the presence of defeating
evidence (Brown, 2018, pp. 115–177; Lasonen-Aarnio, 2010).
This argument can be straightforwardly converted into an argument against an infallibilist
individuation of deduction. Suppose I justi￿ably and correctly believe a set of propositions
which entail that ￿amingos are not born pink, and form this belief via deduction. As in the
previous case, if a world-renowned zoologist subsequently tells me this is wrong, my belief is
no longer justi￿ed or quali￿es as knowledge. However, this verdict cannot be accommodated
11Sosa presents a further argument in favour of individuating deduction fallibly, namely, it is possible for a belief
to be justi￿ed even when produced via an invalid deductive inference: “Take again a logician gifted with excellent
deductive powers who goes through a relatively simple proof and somehow fails for once to detect an invalidating
￿aw. Might he not be justi￿ed still in believing the (false) conclusion on the basis of his inference from the (true)
premises? And are we not thereby forced to admit the fallibility of deduction?” (1991, p. 232).
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if deduction is individuated infallibly. Thus, not only does an infallibilist method individua-
tion sever the tie between agents’ deductive aptitude and the reliability of forming beliefs via
deduction, it also ￿ies in the face of epistemic orthodoxy.
Accordingly, in what follows, I take m to denote a fallibilist individuation of deduction.
Moreover, any fallibilist individuation of deduction employed in epistemology will not count
instances of forming beliefs via non-deductive methods as tokens of deduction. Thus, when
m is an fallibilist individuation of deduction, IBP*BP is both substantive and satis￿es Alternative
Methods. I will therefore remain neutral on exactly how deduction is internally individuated,
and invite the reader to plug in their preferred fallibilist account of method individuation.12
Having clari￿ed how the prohibited method of belief formation must be speci￿ed, we are ￿-
nally ready to ascend the summit and ascertain which variants of IBP*BP can serve as evaluative
or directive invalidity bridge principles.
3.4 Evaluative Invalidity Bridge Principles
With Alternative Methods satis￿ed, all that remains to be done is to apply the remaining relevant
adequacy criteria to the space of evaluative invalidity bridge principles – which, recall from
§2.3.2, are Priority Question and Strictness. In doing so we settle the values that must be taken
by IBP*BP’s remaining parameters – namely, whether its antecedent is factual or attitudinal,
its deontic operator, and the scope of the negation with respect to this operator – and thereby
identify a true evaluative invalidity bridge principle.
Priority Question favours a factual antecedent in order to re￿ect the fact that we are subject to
the normative constraints induced by invalidity facts irrespective of whether we think these facts
obtain. Strictness, on the other hand, is doubly relevant to invalidity bridge principles. First, as
before, it recommends that the deontic operator be the indefeasible ‘ought to’ operator (O).
Second, Strictness favours the negation taking narrow scope with respect to the deontic operator
12I favour Sosa’s (1991) individuation on which a belief is formed via deduction is one produced by the faculty
of deduction. The existence of a distinct deductive faculty is corroborated by recent ￿ndings in neuropsychology
– see Coetzee & Monti (2018).
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so that, given   6|=  , agents are forbidden from deducing  from  , rather than the normative
constraint merely saying that it is not the case that agents ought to deduce  from  .
Putting all this together yields the following evaluative invalidity bridge principle:
IBPE: If   6|=  , then O¬(Fs m ).
That is, if   does not entail  , then s is forbidden from forming the belief that  via deduction
from  . Recall Max, who formed his belief that an eagle dropped a tortoise on Aeschylus’ head
by a￿rming the consequent. IBPE states that, from an objective and ideal standpoint, Max’s
reasoning is incorrect because this belief’s content is not entailed by the sentences from which
he deduced it.
3.5 Directive Invalidity Bridge Principles
With directive invalidity bridge principles, matters are somewhat di￿erent. Priority Question
is irrelevant to directives, whilst Excessive Demands joins Strictness as the remaining adequacy
criteria. Since Strictness applies just as it did to evaluative invalidity bridge principles, this leaves
Excessive Demands.
Excessive Demands and the normative function of directive invalidity bridge principles both
dictate that their triggering conditions be cognitively accessible, and therefore that their an-
tecedents be attitudinal. This still leaves open the question of what attitude   should be. Per the
discussion of directive validity bridge principles in §2.2.4,   must refer to an attitude that does
not presuppose explicit belief or possession of the requisite concepts so as to avoid entailing that
the logically uninitiated are not subject to logical norms. Again, I follow Steinberger in opting
for ‘In s’s best estimation. . . ’. Thus, the following directive invalidity bridge principle satis￿es
all the relevant adequacy criteria:
IBPD: If in s’s best estimation   6|=  , then O¬(Fs m ).
This asserts that, if in s’s best estimation   does not entail , then s is forbidden from forming the
belief that  via deduction from  . Returning to Max, and assuming that in his best estimation
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a￿rming the consequent is invalid, IBPD directs him not to form the belief that an eagle dropped
a tortoise on Aeschylus’ head via deduction from ‘If an eagle dropped a tortoise on Aeschylus’
head, then Aeschylus is dead’ and ‘Aeschylus is dead’.
CONCLUSION
This chapter began in §2.1 by defending the Incompleteness Thesis that the prevailing conception
of logic’s normativity is incomplete because, in addition to constraining the combination of beliefs
that we may have, logic also constrains the methods by which we may form them. The rest
of the chapter then set about articulating the bridge principles which together captured both
dimensions of logic’s normativity in the evaluative and directive senses. §2.2 identi￿ed two
validity bridge principles capturing the normativity of logic for belief combinations, VBPE and
VBPD. §2.3 then broached the hitherto unexplored terrain of invalidity bridge principles, and
argued that IBPE and IBPD captured the normativity of logic for methods of belief formation.
The next chapter uses the fact that logic is doubly normative for reasoning to establish the




Double Trouble for Logical Pluralists
This chapter begins the defence of the upper bound thesis that there is at most one correct logic.
It does so by showing that, given logic is doubly normative for reasoning, almost all of the logical
pluralists’ proposals for cashing out the claim that there is more than one correct logic entail
contradictions. That is, this chapter argues for the following Inconsistency Thesis:
Inconsistency Thesis: Given that logic is doubly normative for reasoning, almost all the exist-
ing logical pluralisms are inconsistent.
Let us call the argument for this thesis the normative contradiction argument (NCA). The basic idea
behind NCA is that, given logic is doubly normative, most pluralisms entail logically contradic-
tory claims about how one ought to reason when one ought to believe some set of propositions,
 , and ' follows from   on one of the pluralist’s logics but not another.
Here’s the plan. §3.1 reviews two objections to logical pluralism based on the normativity of
logic – namely, the upwards collapse objection due to Priest (2006a, p. 203) and Read (2006,
pp. 194–195), and Kellen’s (2020) early version of NCA – and argues that neither succeed.
§3.2 introduces a further principle needed to get NCA o￿ the ground before formulating NCA.
§3.3 ascertains which of the pluralisms introduced in Chapter 1 succumb to NCA. We ￿nish
in §3.4 by considering a number of replies on the pluralists’ behalves, and argue that none
succeed.
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1 PLURALISM AND THE NORMATIVITY OF LOGIC: THE STORY SO FAR
Perhaps the most well-known objection to logical pluralism based on the normativity of logic is
the upwards collapse objection propounded by Keefe (2014, pp. 1384–1385), Priest (2006a,
p. 203), and Read (2006, pp. 194–195) which goes like this:
[S]uppose there really are two equally good accounts of deductive validity, K1 and K2,
that   follows from ↵ according to K1 but not K2, and we know that ↵ is true. Is  
true?. . . It follows K1-ly that   is true, but not K2-ly. Should we, or should we not con-
clude that   is true? The answer seems clear: K1 trumps K2. . .K1 answers a crucial
question which K2 does not (Read, 2006, pp. 194–195).1
Since the strongest of the pluralist’s logics – if there is a uniquely strongest one – trumps all the
others, the pluralist’s position collapses upwards to the strongest logic. Notice, however, that
none of this requires logic to be normative. The objection begins with the thesis that one of our
epistemic goals is to have true beliefs. SinceK1 tells us as a matter of fact that   is true whereasK2
does not, it follows that K1 is superior to K2 in advancing this aim. Hence, K1 trumps K2, with
no bridge principles anywhere to be seen. Thus, although the collapse objection to pluralism
may succeed, it does not demonstrate that pluralism is inconsistent with the normativity of
logic.2
Kellen (2020) provides a di￿erent normativity objection to pluralism. Like NCA, Kellen’s
argument aims to establish this conclusion by showing that pluralism gives rise to inconsistent
claims about how agents ought to reason (2020, p. 268). However, as we shall now see, his
argument is invalid.
Kellen’s argument begins with the following validity bridge principle:
1Steinberger (2019b) also endorses this criticism, whilst Caret (2017) provides a response.
2I am pessimistic about its prospects for success. At most, it demonstrates that the strongest of the pluralist’s
logics is the most useful for advancing the aim of having true beliefs. But the pluralist’s position is not that there
are multiple equally useful logics. It is that there are multiple correct logics, where a logicLi is correct i￿ all and only
valid natural language arguments have Li-valid formal counterparts, and correctness so construed has nothing to
do with usefulness.
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VBPK: If   |= ', then Bs    O(Bs') (2020, p. 267).3
That is, if   |= ', then s ought to believe ' if they believe  . Kellen then has us consider a
pluralist who maintains that classical and intuitionistic logic are both correct, and believes ¬¬'.
Taking the argument from ¬¬' to ', he argues:
Because the argument is classically valid, and classical logic is normative in our reason-
ing, she seemingly ought to believe [']. On the other hand, her other logic demurs from
the validity of the above argument. . . intuitionistic logic, which again is normative in our
reasoning, says she need not believe ['] (2020, p. 267).
Since it both is and is not the case that s ought to believe ', Kellen concludes that logical plural-
ism is false. As things stand, however, Kellen’s argument is invalid. Granted, given VBPK, that
s ought to believe ' follows from the conjunction of ¬¬' |=C ' and s believes ¬¬'. However,
in moving from VBPK and the conjunction of ¬¬' 6|=I ' and s believes ¬¬' to it is not the case
that s ought to believe ', Kellen has denied the antecedent.
The following remedy suggests itself: the missing ingredient is an invalidity bridge principle.
Since an invalidity bridge principle’s antecedent is an invalidity fact, together with ¬¬' 6|=I ',
such a principle would entail a normative constraint on the agent’s reasoning. Provided this
constraint is the contradictory of the constraint entailed by the validity bridge principle and
¬¬' |=C ', it will have been shown that logical pluralism is inconsistent. Thus, the prospects
for a normativity objection to pluralism are dim if logic is only thought to constrain the com-
binations of beliefs that we may have. However, there is hope for showing that pluralism is
inconsistent given that logic is doubly normative for reasoning, as argued in the previous chap-
ter. And this brings us to NCA.
3That VBPK di￿ers from the validity bridge principles of the previous chapter is unimportant for the ensuing
criticism.
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2 THE NORMATIVE CONTRADICTION ARGUMENT
NCA aims to demonstrate that a wide variety of pluralisms are inconsistent because, given that
logic is doubly normative for reasoning, they entail logically contradictory claims about how
agents ought to reason whenever two of their logics con￿ict over an argument’s validity. This
contradiction can then be used in a reductio against these pluralisms, thereby establishing the
Inconsistency Thesis. Before we can articulate NCA, however, some further details are needed.
2.1 Which Bridge Principles?
As stated, NCA begins with a validity and an invalidity bridge principle that together capture
both dimensions of logic’s normativity. But are these the evaluative bridge principles stating
which belief combinations and methods of belief formation are permissible from an objective
and ideal standpoint? Or the directive bridge principles which guide agents’ selection of belief
combinations and methods of belief formation?
We will start from the evaluative validity and invalidity bridge principles articulated in the
previous chapter. In §2.2.3 I argued that the correct evaluative validity bridge principle is
VBPE:
VBPE: If   |= ' then O(Bs    Bs').
That is, if   |= ' then s ought to see to it that if they believe   then they believe '. And in
§2.3.4 I argued that the correct evaluative invalidity bridge principle is IBPE:
IBPE: If   6|=  , then O¬(Fs m ).
That is, if   6|=  then s is forbidden from forming the belief that  via deduction from  .
It is worth highlighting at the outset that although NCA relies on logic being doubly norma-
tive for reasoning, it is somewhat independent of VBPE and IBPE being the correct evaluative
validity and invalidity bridge principles. Bridge principles are typically intended to be unre-
stricted – for instance, the constraint in a validity bridge principle’s consequent is supposed to
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hold for any  , ' such that   |= '. However, forNCA to get o￿ the ground, all that is required is
for VBPE and IBPE to hold for a very narrow range of arguments. This is because NCA aims to
show that many pluralisms entail contradictions when two of the pluralist’s logics con￿ict over
an argument’s validity. And since these con￿icts can arise for arguments whose conclusions are
both of interest to the agent and easily deducible from their premisses – like basic disjunctive
syllogisms – VBPE and IBPE only need to hold in these ‘simple’ cases for NCA to proceed.
This further increases VBPE’s and IBPE’s plausibility – after all, it is hardly disputable that,
from an objective and ideal standpoint, an agent ought to believe the straightforward logical
consequences of their belief set that are of interest to them (or else revise their belief set). More
importantly, however, it also renders them plausible as directive norms. For instance, the prin-
ciple problem with VBPE qua directive was that, by requiring that we believe all the logical
consequences of our beliefs (or else revise them), it is too demanding, abiding by it would clutter
our minds with irrelevancies, and it ran roughshod over the author’s obligations in the Preface
Paradox. However, these worries are dispelled by restricting VBPE to ‘simple’ non-paradoxical
cases in which the consequences are limited to those which the agent has reason to consider and
which follow straightforwardly from their belief set. So although NCA begins with VBPE and
IBPE, the normative contradiction which NCA derives from them manifests itself both at the
level of objective and ideal oughts but also at the level of action-guiding oughts.
2.2 Transmission
The strategy of showing that pluralism is inconsistent with the normativity of logic by teasing
out a contradiction from VBPE, IBPE, and pluralism immediately runs into a problem: VBPE’s
and IBPE’s consequents are not contradictories. Whereas the normative constraint in VBPE’s
consequent says that s ought to see to it that if they believe   then they believe ', IBPE’s con-
sequent says that s is forbidden from forming the belief that ' via deduction from  . To jump
this hurdle, we require a principle that somehow links the fact that one ought to have a belief
to its being permissible to form it via deduction.
61
Double Trouble for Logical Pluralists
Principles delineating how oughts transmit from ends to the means by which they can be
accomplished – so-called instrumental transmission principles – are familiar from the literature
on instrumental rationality (see Kolodny (2018) for an overview). The following ‘epistemic’
transmission principle ￿ts the bill:
Transmission: If s ought to believe ' and m is a reliable method by which s can form the
belief that ', then s is permitted to form the belief that ' via m.
Besides its intuitive plausibility, Transmission satis￿es the two desiderata that Kolodny argues an
instrumental transmission principle must satisfy. First, the means which the principle permits
one (or requires, or gives reason) to employmust increase the probability of one accomplishing the
end in question (2018, pp. 734–735). Second, the means must not be super￿uous in the sense
that part of the permitted means alone is su￿cient to accomplish the end (2018, pp. 747–
748). For example, if my aim is to make my dog wag his tail and petting him is a su￿cient
means to doing so, petting him whilst telling him a joke is a super￿uous means. Transmission
satis￿es the ￿rst desideratum because employing a reliable method to form a belief is a su￿cient
means to doing so. And it does not permit one to employ super￿uous means because no part
of employing a reliable method to form a new belief is su￿cient for doing so.
Moreover, Transmission’s inclusion of the reliability clause renders it impervious to the crit-
icism that the means it permits one to employ are objectionable in some sense. Consider the
more general instrumental transmission principle that Transmission resembles, namely: ‘If one
ought to E, and M-ing is a su￿cient means to E-ing, then it is permissible to M’. This can be
objected to on the grounds that a mass population cull is a su￿cient means to reducing CO2
emissions, yet even if one ought to reduce CO2 emissions one is forbidden from culling peo-
ple. However, the inclusion of the reliability clause protects Transmission from the analogous
objection. If Bobby ought to believe that the earth is not ￿at and consulting the tea leaves is a
su￿cient means for him to do so, Transmission does not entail that it is permissible to consult
the tea leaves since this is not a reliable method of belief formation. With Transmission in place,
we are ￿nally ready to articulate NCA.
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2.3 The Normative Contradiction Argument Articulated
NCA can be informally stated as follows. Take a simple argument from   to ', like a disjunctive
syllogism, whose premisses s ought to believe. Suppose that logics L1 and L2 are correct and
the argument is L1-valid but L2-invalid. Since s ought to believe   and   |=L1 ', by VBPE it
follows that s ought to believe '. Given thatL1 is correct, forming the belief that ' viaL1-valid
deduction from   is a reliable method for s. In conjunction with Transmission this entails that it
is permissible for s to form the belief that ' via deduction from  . However, since L2 is also
correct and   6|=L2 ', by IBPE it follows that s is forbidden from forming the belief that ' via
deduction  . Contradiction. Thus L1 and L2 cannot both be correct.
More formally:
(1) If L1 is correct, then: If   |=L1 ' then O(Bs    Bs'). (Normativity)
(2) If L2 is correct, then: If   6|=L2 ' then O¬(Fs'm ). (Normativity)
(3) L1 and L2 are correct. (Pluralism)
(4) If   |=L1 ' then O(Bs    Bs'). (1,3, MP)
(5) If   6|=L2 ' then O¬(Fs'm ). (2,3, MP)
(6) If O(Bs') and m  is a reliable method by which s can form the
belief that ', then ¬O¬(Fs'm ).
(Transmission)
(7)   |=L1 '. (Assumption)
(8)   6|=L2 '. (Assumption)
(9) O(Bs ). (Assumption)
(10) m  is a reliable method by which s can form the belief that '. (Pluralism)
(11) O(Bs    Bs'). (4,7, MP)
(12) O(Bs'). (9,11, MP)
(13) ¬O¬(Fs'm ). (6,10,12, MP)
(14) O¬(Fs'm ). (5,8, MP)
(15) L1 and L2 are not correct. (3,13,14, RAA)
Thus, given that logic is doubly normative for reasoning, logical pluralism is inconsistent be-
cause it entails logical contradictions whenever an adept reasoner ought to believe some set of
propositions,  , and ' follows from   according to one of the correct logics but not the other.
Hence the Inconsistency Thesis.
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3 IS ANYONE HURT?
This section articulates a necessary and su￿cient condition for a pluralism to be susceptible to
NCA before arguing that a wide range of pluralisms satisfy this condition.
NCA shows that, given logic is doubly normative for reasoning, if there are two logics that
di￿er over an argument’s validity then accepting both logics as correct with respect to that ar-
gument entails logically contradictory claims about how agents ought to reason. Accordingly,
the following condition for a pluralism to be susceptible to NCA suggests itself:
Susceptible: A pluralism on which logicsL1 andL2 are correct is susceptible toNCA i￿ there
is an argument from set of premisses   to conclusion ', such that:
(i)   |=L1 '.
(ii)   6|=L2 '.
(iii) L1 and L2 are correct with respect to the argument from   to '.
Recall from §1.1 that pluralists maintain that logics are correct relative to an independent pa-
rameter,P. Accordingly, there are two ways that multiple con￿icting logics could end up being
correct with respect to a single argument. First, the pluralism may be a one-many pluralism on
which the argument determines a single value for P , p1, but there are multiple con￿icting




Figure 3.1: One-many pluralism.
Second, the pluralism may be a many-one pluralism on which the argument does not determine
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a unique value for P , and instead P takes multiple values, say, p1 and p2, relative to which




Figure 3.2: Many-one pluralism.
We can now use this typology to determine which of the pluralisms presently on o￿er are
vulnerable to NCA.4
Case-Relative Pluralism. Beall & Restall (2006) argue that logics are correct relative to cases, so
that classical logic is correct when cases are Tarskian models, intuitionistic logic when cases are
constructions, and relevant logics when cases are situations. Crucially, Beall & Restall endorse
the formality of logic (2006, pp. 18–23) – that is, the logics they endorse are correct across
all domains of inquiry – and they “do not take logical consequence to be relative to languages,
communities of inquiry, contexts, or anything else” (2006, p. 88).5 Accordingly, for any given
argument, cases can be models, constructions, or situations, and so any of their logics can be
correctly applied to any given argument. Accordingly, theirs is a many-one pluralism.6
Distinction-Relative Pluralism. On Varzi’s (2002) pluralism, logics are correct relative to where
the distinction between logical and non-logical terms is drawn. Since any termmay in principle
be treated as a logical term, for any given argument the logical–non-logical distinction can be
drawn in multiple places relative to which di￿erent logics are correct. Thus, Varzi’s pluralism
is many-one.
4Since none of the pluralisms presently on o￿er are many-many, I have set aside this possibility.
5That is, anything else bar cases.
6The same goes for Restall’s (2014) proof-theoretic version of their pluralism.
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Truthbearer-Relative Pluralism. Russell (2008) maintains that logics are correct relative to what
kinds of truthbearers arguments’ premisses and conclusions are taken to be. Crucially, Russell
states that any argument can be understood as being comprised of interpreted sentences, Ka-
planian characters, or propositions. For instance, in relation to the argument, ‘Gillian Russell
is in Ban￿. Therefore: I am in Ban￿’, she writes:
If one simply stipulates that arguments are made up of sentences. . . [then] that argument
is valid, or invalid, relative to di￿erent interpretations, or even, less platitudinously, the
question of its validity depends on the depth of the interpretation intended. Assign
mere characters to the sentences, and it is possible for the premises to be true and the
conclusion false, so the argument is not valid. Assign propositions to them (relative to
the context in which this paper was presented) and that is no longer possible, and so the
argument is valid. That looks like a stripe of logical pluralism (2008, p. 609).
It follows that Russell’s pluralism is a many-one pluralism since, for a given argument, it can
be legitimately construed as being comprised of di￿erent kinds of truthbearers, and di￿erent
logics are correct depending on the truthbearers one has in mind.
Framework-Relative Pluralism. Kouri Kissel (2018) argues that logics are correct relative to lin-
guistic frameworks, which are in turn chosen on pragmatic grounds according to which is best
suited for achieving a given theoretical aim. Both the criteria for framework selection – such as
“convenience, fruitfulness, and simplicity” (Carnap, 1963, p. 66) – and how they are weighted
against one another leave plenty of room for multiple frameworks employing di￿erent logics
to be equally good for accomplishing a theoretical aim. Steinberger (2016, p. 650) echoes this
point: “[I]t is plausible that there is no one framework that best negotiates these demands. It
may well be the case that many frameworks perform equally well”. Since there are theoretical
aims relative to which two linguistic frameworks with di￿erent logics are equally appropriate,
multiple logics are correct relative to arguments encountered during the course of pursuing this
aim. Thus, Kouri Kissel’s pluralism is many-one. We now turn to one-many pluralisms.
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Aim-Relative Pluralisms. Field (2009a) and Blake-Turner &Russell (2018) both argue that logics
are correct relative to one’s epistemic goals. Field’s pluralism is a one-many pluralism because he
allows that “it isn’t obvious that there need be a uniquely best logic for a given goal” (Field,
2009a, p. 356). I am also inclined to say Blake-Turner &Russell’s (2018) pluralism is one-many.
Given that there are many relevant and intermediate logics, if one’s aim is to draw true and
relevant or true and demonstrable conclusions from a set of premisses, then there are multiple
logics which further this aim equally well. However, since they do not explicitly address this
point, this suggestion is somewhat speculative.
Structure-Relative Pluralism. Shapiro (2014) maintains that logics are correct relative to mathe-
matical structures. A logicLi is correct relative to a mathematical theory if, at the very least, the
theory is Li-consistent. There are also grounds for thinking that Shapiro’s pluralism is a one-
many pluralism. To see why, recall that Shapiro argues that classical logic is incorrect relative
to smooth in￿nitesimal analysis (SIA) because SIA is classically inconsistent. Thus, at the very
least, a theory, T, being Li-consistent is necessary for Li to be correct relative to T. Shapiro is
equivocal on the matter of whether Li-consistency is also su￿cient for Li to be correct rela-
tive to T. At points he implies that it is su￿cient, such as when he states that “the weaker the
logic, the more theories that are consistent, and thus legitimate” (2014, p. 67). However, at
other points he says that only “the strongest logic possible that renders the target principles
consistent” is correct relative to those principles (i.e. theory).7
Suppose that T being Li-consistent is su￿cient for Li to be correct relative to T. Given
that the Peano axioms are classically consistent and intuitionistic logic is a sublogic of classical
logic, they are also intuitionistically consistent. Thus, both classical and intuitionistic logic are
correct when reasoning about a single theory, making his pluralism one-many. Now suppose that
only the strongest logic on which T is consistent is correct relative to T. In general, there is no
7It is unclear if this latter option is compatible with Shapiro’s pluralism. One of his central claims is that
intuitionistic logic is correct relative to SIA. But if only the strongest logic on which a theory is consistent is correct
relative to that theory, then intuitionistic logic is not correct relative to SIA because there are intermediate logics
stronger than intuitionistic logic on which SIA is consistent.
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guarantee that there is a uniquely strongest logic on which T is consistent. Rather, there might
be multiple logics on which T is consistent but none of which is stronger than the other. For
instance, a theory might be consistent on multiple intermediate logics that can only be partially
ordered according to their strength, and so there are multiple ‘strongest logics’ on which the
theory is consistent. Thus, there will be multiple logics that are correct when reasoning about
this theory, thereby ensuring that Shapiro’s pluralism is one-many regardless of whether all logics
or only the strongest logics on which a theory is consistent are correct relative to it.
Domain-Relative Pluralisms. Bueno & Shalkowski (2009) and Lynch (2009) both contend that
logics are correct relative to domains of inquiry, although they carve up these domains di￿er-
ently. Bueno & Shalkowski’s pluralism is a one-many pluralism because they admit that “often
several such logics would be adequate to reason about the objects in a given domain” (Bueno &
Shalkowski, 2009, p. 312).8
However, Lynch’s pluralism is immune toNCA. Recall that Lynch’s domain-relative logical
pluralism is built atop his domain-relative alethic pluralism. Since he states that “there can be
at at best only one property that manifests truth for every domain” (2009, p. 80), I think it
fair to say that his pluralism cannot be one-many as this precludes there being more than one
correct logic per domain.9 Nor is Lynch’s pluralism a many-one pluralism. One might think
it is because there are arguments whose premisses belong to multiple domains and, for these
arguments, all the logics which are correct relative to these domains can be correctly applied
to the argument. But this rests upon a misunderstanding of Lynch’s position. Suppose an
argument’s premisses belong to domains D1 and D2, and logics L1 and L2, respectively, are
correct relative to these domains. Rather than P taking two values corresponding to D1 and
D2 and therefore bothL1 andL2 being correct with respect to the argument, P takes a single
8The vulnerability of Bueno & Shalkowski’s and Shapiro’s pluralisms to NCA despite both rejecting the for-
mality of logic falsi￿es Kouri Kissel & Shapiro’s (2020, p. 391) contention that pluralists can inoculate themselves
against normativity objections by jettisoning formality. After all, even if not all the logics that are correct relative
to a value ofP can be correctly applied to any argument irrespective of its premisses’ subject-matter, there might
still be two logics that can be correctly applied to a single argument, which is all that NCA requires.
9The same holds for Pedersen’s (2014) domain-relative pluralism.
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value corresponding toD1^D2. In such situations, Lynch’s modesty principle comes into play,
according to which the correct logic relative toD1^D2 is whichever ofL1 andL2 is weakest (or,
if neither is weaker than the other, their intersection) (2009, p. 100). Thus, Lynch’s pluralism
is not many-one either, and therefore safe from NCA.
Meaning-Relative Pluralism. Haack (1978, pp. 230–231) maintains that logics are correct rela-
tive to themeanings of their logical terms. By giving logical terms di￿erent truth-conditions and/or
proof rules, di￿erent logics give logical terms di￿erent meanings; provided these meanings re-
spect the central features of the corresponding natural language logical terms, the resulting
logic is correct. Although Haack’s pluralism appears to be a many-one pluralism because the
meanings of the natural language logical terms in an argument’s premisses underdetermine the
correct formalisation, this is not so. Crucially, L1 and L2 will only clash over an argument’s
validity when its premisses employ at least one natural language logical term whose formal
counterparts in L1 and L2 are assigned di￿erent truth-conditions or proof rules. Yet, because
the logics assign di￿erent meanings to logical terms, the argument which isL1-valid has di￿er-
ent premisses to the argument which is L2-invalid. Thus, on Haack’s pluralism there cannot
be an argument from   to ' satisfying Susceptibility, thereby inoculating it against NCA.
Thus, if logic is doubly normative for reasoning, NCA will have shown that almost all of the
existing pluralisms are inconsistent – that is, unless the pluralist can ￿nd some reply to NCA. It
is to these that we now turn.
4 REPLIES AND REJOINDERS
Reply 1. The pluralist can avoid contradiction by rejecting VBPE or IBPE in favour of a bridge
principle from which no contradiction can be derived. Indeed, one might think that Beall &
Restall can adopt the latter strategy since they seem to endorse the following validity bridge
principle: If   |= ', then s is forbidden from believing   and ¬' (2006, p. 16). This cannot be
used to obtain a contradiction because, in conjunction with   |= ', it does not follow that an
69
Double Trouble for Logical Pluralists
agent who ought to believe   must also believe ' as they are permitted to stay neutral on '.
Rejoinder. Rejecting VBPE is not a straightforward matter because it satis￿es all the relevant
adequacy criteria and, as an evaluative norm, it is inoculated against criticisms such as that it
is overdemanding (see §2.2.2). Furthermore, as we noted in §3.2.1, even if VBPE does not
hold unrestrictedly, all NCA requires is the far weaker claim that VBPE holds for the straight-
forward logical consequences of agents’ belief sets that are of interest to them. Finally, Beall &
Restall’s bridge principle is problematic because, unlike VBPE, it does not satisfy all the rele-
vant adequacy criteria. Indeed, their principle violates Obtuseness: due to its negative polarity,
it incorrectly states that, from an objective and ideal standpoint, there is nothing amiss with an
agent who refuses to take a stance on a conjunction whilst believing both conjuncts.
Rejecting IBPE runs into similar problems. An invalidity bridge principle qua evaluation
must employ the indefeasible ‘forbidden to’ operator as opposed to a defeasible reasons-based
operator because, from an objective and ideal standpoint, there is something wrong with an
agent who forms a belief via an invalid inference irrespective of their reasons for doing so. Fi-
nally, it is unlikely that adopting an entirely di￿erent invalidity bridge principle would help.
This principle would still state that agents are forbidden from forming beliefs via invalid infer-
ences, albeit in a di￿erent way to IBPE, and there is no reason to think that NCA could not be
recon￿gured to deliver the same conclusion.
Reply 2. NCA is invalid because it equivocates with respect to the disputed argument’s pre-
misses and conclusions. Since di￿erent logics give di￿erent truth-conditions to logical terms,
the meanings of logical terms changes between logics. Thus, (13) and (14) are not contradicto-
ries since they permit/forbid agents from deducing ' from di￿erent sets of premisses.
Rejoinder. This reply relies on the Quinean ‘change in logic, change in meaning’ thesis (CLCM)
and, as far as it goes, is correct. As acknowledged previously, Haack’s (1978) meaning-relative
pluralism accepts CLCM which renders it immune from NCA. However, as I will now argue,
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this response is limited in scope and therefore NCA remains of interest.
First o￿, pluralists like Beall & Restall (2006, p. 79) and Field (2009a, p. 345) explicitly
disavow CLCM and therefore cannot use this reply. Second, some pluralists, including Shapiro
(2014, p. 154) and Kouri Kissel (2018, p. 578), maintain that, while CLCM holds in general,
in some contexts logical terms have the same meanings in di￿erent logics. For NCA to apply to
these pluralisms all that is required is the addition of a premiss stating that the subject is in such
a context. Third, this move will not help pluralists such as Varzi (2002) and Russell (2008) be-
cause both allow con￿icts to arise between logics which do not assign di￿erent truth-conditions
to their logical terms. On the one hand, Varzi’s pluralism allows con￿icts over an argument’s
validity to arise because the logics count di￿erent terms as logical rather than because they give
the same logical terms di￿erent meanings.10 On the other hand, Russell’s pluralism allows con-
￿icts over an argument’s validity to arise even though its premisses and conclusion feature no
logical terms. Recall from §1.4 that, according to Russell’s pluralism, the logical consequence
relation holding between standard propositions is not re￿exive but that the relation holding be-
tween hyperintensional propositions is. The corresponding logics will therefore con￿ict over
the validity of an argument whose premiss and conclusion are identical but feature no logi-
cal terms. Finally, adopting CLCM alongside the claim that natural language logical terms are
polysemous is su￿cient to establish a variety of logical pluralism – namely, Haack’s meaning-
relative pluralism. Thus, the cost of adopting CLCM to proponents of other pluralisms is high:
they remain pluralists, but their own pluralism is rendered obsolete in the process.
Reply 3. NCA is invalid because it equivocates with respect to the permitted and forbidden
methods of belief formation, which are indexed to the logics in question. Thus, s is permitted
to form the belief that ' via L1-deduction from  , m ,L1 , but forbidden from forming the
belief that ' via L2-deduction from  , m ,L2. Accordingly, (13) and (14) read:
(13’) ¬O¬(Fs'm ,L1)
10Note that designating a term ‘logical’ does not change its meaning, but simply means that this meaning is held
constant when evaluating arguments’ validity.
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(14’) O¬(Fs'm ,L2)
This renders the reductio invalid because (13’) and (14’) are not contradictories.
Rejoinder. This reply relies on a bridge principle of the following form being true:
IBPLi : If   6|= ' then O¬(Fs'mLi)
Whether IBPLi is true turns on how Li-deduction is individuated. Since deduction must be
individuated fallibly, Li-deduction cannot simply be to form a belief via a Li-valid inference.
Perhaps the most natural way to fallibly individuate logic-indexed methods of belief forma-
tion is according to the intentions of the reasoner. Roughly, s forms the belief that ' via Li-
deduction from   just in case s intends to infer ' from   via the rules of Li-valid deduction.
However, this has the deleterious consequence that, from an objective and ideal standpoint,
there is nothing logically wrong with Max’s reasoning when he a￿rms the consequent. Sup-
pose that he, like most laypersons, has neither encountered any of the pluralist’s logics nor
been ‘socialised’ into accepting a particular logic. Then, for all Li, Max cannot form beliefs
via Li-deduction because he cannot have the requisite intention. Consequently, Max forming
his belief by a￿rming the consequent is not a token of any kind of deduction and therefore his
reasoning cannot be logically erroneous because it cannot violate any instance of IBPLi. That
is, indexing deduction as a method of belief formation to logics yields the falsehood that, from
an objective and ideal standpoint, there is nothing wrong with Max’s reasoning.
Reply 4. The argument is invalid because it equivocates with respect to the deontic operators,
which di￿er as they are indexed to the logics in question. So (13) and (14) are:
(13”) ¬OL1¬(Fs'm )
(14”) OL2¬(Fs'm )
Since (13”) and (14”) are not contradictories, the reductio is invalid.
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Rejoinder. Since other paradoxes arising from con￿icting norms cannot be resolved in this way,
neither can this one. Take the Preface Paradox, where an author rationally believes each sen-
tence in her book. Deductive norms require her to believe their conjunction, but inductive
norms require her to believe their conjunction’s negation as she has made mistakes before.
Given that this con￿ict cannot be satisfactorily resolved by simply distinguishing between de-
ductive and inductive oughts, a fortiori one cannot legitimately resolve con￿icts between di￿er-
ent deductive norms in this way either.11
Reply 5. Maybe logical pluralism entails contradictory normative claims, but normative contra-
dictions cannot be used in reductios. After all, we are frequently subject to con￿icting moral and
epistemic requirements, as illustrated by moral dilemmas and the Preface Paradox.
Rejoinder. Not only does this response contravene the idea that logic is formal, it cannot appeal
to moral and epistemic dilemmas as ‘companions-in-guilt’ because neither involve logically
contradictory obligations. For instance, in such dilemmas, one usually either has an obligation
to   and an obligation to  but cannot do both; or else one is both required to and forbidden
from  -ing, as in the Preface Paradox. However, as Ruth Marcus (1980) highlighted, neither
case involves a logical contradiction because the negation ofO  is ¬O , notO orO¬ . These
con￿icting obligations only entail contradictions in conjunction with further deontic principles,
and friends of dilemmas deny these principles precisely to avoid logical contradiction.
Reply 6. Perhaps your argument does show that many logical pluralisms are inconsistent given
that logic is doubly normative. But Russell (2020) has persuasively argued that logic is not
normative and therefore this conclusion is of little importance.
Rejoinder. To see why NCA is immune from Russell’s argument, let us distinguish between
two questions that one can ask about the normativity of logic. First, is logic normative for
11Strictly speaking, unlike NCA, the Preface Paradox does not involve logically contradictory norms but this is
inconsequential to the point being made here.
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reasoning? To answer a￿rmatively is merely to say that there are true bridge principles of
either kind. Second, is logic inherently normative for reasoning? To answer a￿rmatively is not
only to say that there are true bridge principles, but that these principles are true in virtue of the
logical consequence relation itself being normative. Crucially, logic can be normative in the ￿rst
weaker sense but not the second stronger sense because bridge principles may be true in virtue
of the normativity of truth rather than because the consequence relation itself is normative.
Indeed, this is precisely what Russell argues: ‘[It is only] in conjunction with common normative
commitments concerning truth and falsity [that] logics. . . have normative consequences’ (2020,
p. 380). But since NCA merely requires that VBPE and IBPE be true – that is, it only requires
that logic be normative in the weaker but not the stronger sense – it is impervious to Russell’s
argument that logic is not strongly normative. Thus, Russell’s conclusion that “logical pluralists
needn’t worry about objections from the normativity of logic – logic isn’t normative” (2020,
p. 387) is mistaken. Many pluralists should be worried by NCA.
Reply 7. NCA uses reductio ad absurdum to move from the contradictory normative claims to
the conclusion that L1 and L2 are not both correct. But the pluralist can easily sidestep this
conclusion by simply claiming that the correct metalogic is a paraconsistent logic that invalidates
reductio ad absurdum.
Rejoinder. Notice that this reply forces the pluralist to reject the formality of logic as it com-
mits them to a domain-relative pluralism on which only paraconsistent logics are correct in the
metalogical domain. As such, this avenue of response is simply incompatible with many plu-
ralisms, which allow that explosive logics are correct in metalogical settings. This might happen
because they a￿rm the formality of logic whilst accepting that some explosive logics are correct
(e.g. Beall & Restall, 2006, pp. 18–23; Blake-Turner & Russell, 2018, p. 14; Field, 2009a,
p. 256). Or it might happen irrespective of whether formality is endorsed because, in metalog-
ical settings, the parameter, P , to which they relativise correctness may take a value for which
an explosive logic is correct. Taking Varzi’s (2002) pluralism as an example, in metalogical con-
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texts we may draw the distinction between logical and non-logical terms so that classical logic
is correct in the metalogical domain and thus the argument remains valid.12
Moreover, even if the correct metalogic is paraconsistent and so reductio is invalid, it remains
truth-preserving provided that none of the premisses are dialetheias – in Priest’s (2006) ter-
minology, reductio is quasi-valid. Since there is no reason to think that any of NCA’s premisses
are dialetheias and consistency is the default position even amongst paraconsistent logicians,
the argument remains truth-preserving (albeit not solely in virtue of its logical form). Conse-
quently, even if the only correct metalogics are paraconsistent, provided NCA’s premisses are
true as I have argued, so too is its conclusion.
CONCLUSION
This chapter began the defence of the upper bound thesis that there is at most one correct logic.
I argued for the Inconsistency Thesis that, given logic is doubly normative for reasoning, almost
all of the pluralists’ proposals for cashing out the claim that there is more than one correct logic
are inconsistent, thus spelling double trouble for these pluralists. To show this, I constructed the
normative contradiction argument (NCA). NCA demonstrated that most pluralisms entail logically
contradictory claims about how subjects ought to reason whenever they ought to believe some
set of propositions,  , and ' follows from   according to one of the correct logics but not
another. Finally, a number of replies were considered on the pluralists’ behalves and found
wanting. Nonetheless, inNCA’s wake two species of pluralism are still alive and kicking: namely,
Lynch’s domain-relative pluralism and Haack’s meaning-relative pluralism. Accordingly, if we
are to fully justify the upper bound thesis, something must be said about why these pluralisms
are either untenable or not pluralisms at all, and this is the subject of the next chapter.
12Note that this is quite compatible with some paraconsistent logics also being correct in the metalogical domain




The normative contradiction argument of the previous chapter went a long way to defending the
upper bound thesis that there is at most one correct logic. However, two pluralisms remained
viable in its wake, namely, Haack’s meaning-relative pluralism and some domain-relative plu-
ralisms. This chapter completes the defence of the upper bound thesis by suggesting that the
arguments pro￿erred by neither kind of pluralist demonstrate that there is more than one cor-
rect logic. By necessity this chapter will be extremely brief, and the arguments are intended
to be sketches rather than decisive. §4.1 considers Haack’s meaning relative pluralism, whilst
§4.2 tackles the domain-relative pluralisms.
1 MEANING-RELATIVE PLURALISM
On Haack’s (1978) pluralism, logics are correct relative to the meanings of logical terms. As
described in §1.9, Haack’s pluralism originates in the claim that natural language logical terms
like ‘or’ and ‘if’ are ambiguous – that is, in Haack’s parlance, they have multiple ‘aspects’. For
instance, on one aspect of ‘if’, ‘If A then B’ is true just in case ‘not-A or B’ is also. But a second
aspect of ‘if’ requires that a true conditional’s antecedent to be relevant to its consequent, and
so ‘If 5G masts cause coronavirus then Australia lost the Great Emu War’ is false despite ‘5G
masts do not cause coronavirus or Australia lost the Great EmuWar’ being true. These di￿erent
aspects can then be represented by di￿erent logical terms as found in formal logics:
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[F]or instance, material implication, strict implication, relevant implication, and other
formal conditionals might all have some claim to represent some aspect of ‘if’ (1978,
p. 230).
A logic is correct, then, just in case its logical terms correctly represent an aspect of their nat-
ural language counterparts, and di￿erent logics are correct depending on which of the natural
language logical terms’ aspects its logical terms represent. Persisting with the above example,
the aspect of ‘if’ on which ‘If A then B’ is equivalent to ‘not-A or B’ is correctly represented by
the material conditional,  , relative to which classical logic is correct. However, the aspect of
‘if’ which incorporates relevance is correctly represented by a relevant conditional,!, relative
to which a relevant logic is correct.
However, that there is more than one correct logic does not follow from natural language
logical terms being ambiguous and having multiple aspects. Supposing that ‘if’ really is am-
biguous between two distinct natural language logical terms, the appropriate response is not
endorse two logics each of which includes a conditional representing only one aspect. Rather,
the appropriate response is to include both ‘ ’ and ‘!’ as separate logical terms within a sin-
gle logic – just as we do for other distinct natural language logical terms like ‘and’ and ‘or’. In
relation to a di￿erent pluralism, Graham Priest puts the point thus:1
[I]t may be argued that vernacular negation sometimes means classical negation and
sometimes means intuitionistic negation. But if this were right, we would have two le-
gitimate meanings of negation, and the correct way to treat this formally would be to
have two corresponding negation signs in the formal language. . . In exactly this way, it
is often argued that the English conditional is ambiguous, between the subjunctive and
indicative. This does not cause us to change logics, we simply have a formal language
with two conditional symbols, say   and >, and use both (2006a, pp. 198–199).
Including multiple logical terms within a single logic is the correct response because a logic
1The pluralism in question that espoused by Newton da Costa (1997), which I have omitted because da Costa’s
paper is in French et je ne parle pas français.
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which does not include a logical term for each of the disambiguations of each natural language
logical term cannot be correct. For example, take a valid natural language argument in which
‘if’ should be disambiguated as a material conditional, and is rendered invalid when ‘if’ is un-
derstood as a relevant conditional. If ‘if’ is ambiguous as Haack claims, then a relevant logic
cannot be correct because such an argument lacks a formally valid counterpart in said relevant
logic. Thus, even if natural language logical terms are ambiguous as Haack maintains, this does
not provide a reason to think that there is more than one correct logic.
2 DOMAIN-RELATIVE PLURALISMS
As we saw in §1.8, the basic idea behind Lynch and Pedersen’s domain-relative pluralism is that,
owing to the di￿ering natures of entities belonging to di￿erent domains, whether an argument is
truth-preserving is domain sensitive.2 For instance, mind-independent and mind-dependent
entities are very di￿erent and, in virtue of these di￿erences, double-negation elimination is
truth-preserving when reasoning about the former but not the latter. From here, Lynch and
Pedersen go on to conclude that classical logic is correct in themind-independent domain whilst
intuitionistic logic is correct in the mind-dependent domain.
Monists can agree with the domain-relative pluralist’s observation that di￿erent arguments
are truth-preserving in di￿erent domains whilst resisting their conclusion that di￿erent logics
are correct in these domains. This is because, unlike domain-relative pluralists, monists a￿rm
the formality of logical consequence. Logical consequence is said to be formal in the sense that
valid arguments not only preserve truth but do so solely in virtue of their logical form, and so if an
argument is valid then every argument of the same form is too regardless of their premisses’
subject-matter.3 Since domain-relative pluralists claim that some arguments are valid in some
domains but not others, they explicitly disavow the formality of logical consequence. By con-
trast, monists are champions of logical orthodoxy and not only a￿rm the formality of logical
2For present purposes, we can set aside the fact that the relationship between the nature of a domain’s entities
and the correct logic for that domain is mediated by the property that realises truth in that domain.
3How exactly formality is to be spelt out is somewhat controversial, and for more detailed discussions see
MacFarlane (2000), Novaes (2011), Sagi (2015), Sher (1991, 1996, 2001, 2010), and Tarski (1986).
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consequence, but take it to be constitutive of logical consequence – a tradition beginning at least
with Kant (1787) and passing through Frege (1879), Russell (1914), and Tarski (1956a, 1986)
to contemporary adherents such as McGee (1996), Sher (1991, 1996, 2001, 2010), and van
Benthem (1989).
Supposing that logical consequence is formal, pluralism does not follow from the domain-
relative pluralist’s observation that di￿erent arguments are truth-preserving in di￿erent do-
mains. Rather, all that follows is that the only arguments which are valid are those which the
domain-relative pluralist accepts as valid in all domains, and those which fail to preserve truth
in some domains are invalid.4 Accordingly, the one true logic is the logic which validates all and
only those arguments that are validated by all the domain-relative pluralist’s logics – that is, the
one true logic is the intersection of all the domain-speci￿c logics. For instance, on Lynch’s and
Pedersen’s domain-relative pluralisms, classical and intuitionistic logic are correct in the mind-
independent and mind-dependent domains, and so insisting upon the formality of logic simply
results in their intersection – namely, intuitionistic logic – being the one true logic. Thus, at
the very least, the domain-relative pluralist’s arguments will be unpersuasive to those who, like
monists, a￿rm the formality of logic; and if formality is constitutive of logic as so many have
thought, then domain-relative pluralisms immediately collapse into monism.5
Lynch (2009, p. 103) anticipates a version of this reply, and responds as follows:
[I]n domains which, according to this suggestion, nonetheless appear classical – and
therefore abide by LEM – LEM must be true for some non-logical reason. And one
might wonder what that reason might be.
However, Lynch does not say why this cannot be explained in exactly same way as he explains
why classical logic holds in the mind-independent domain, namely, in terms of the nature of
4Of course, even if an argument is invalid this does not mean we should not use it when reasoning about a
domain in which it preserves truth. Such arguments can, in Priest’s (2006a, p. 198) idiom, be “recovered en-
thymematically”.
5Some commentators have suggested that the dispute at this point is entirely verbal as it simply concerns
which arguments are to be labelled valid (e.g. Shapiro, 2014, pp. 93–94). However, if one thinks that formality is
constitutive of logic, as the monist does, then this dispute is no more verbal than one concerning whether whales
are mammals or ￿sh.
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mind-independent entities. A potentially more serious worry is that, by insisting that the one
true logic is the intersection of all the domain-relative pluralist’s logics, the monist inadvertently
commits themselves to a version of logical nihilism on which there are no (or very few) valid
arguments. Steinberger puts the point as follows:
According to [the monist], the only bona ￿de laws of logic are those that hold good in
all domains. But here’s the rub: scarcely any logical principle has gone unchallenged
in one context or another. Hence, if for su￿ciently many domains our best overall
theory requires weakening our logic, the monist runs the risk of ￿nding herself with an
unworkably weak or even empty consequence relation. Call this the Objection From the
Threat of Logical Nihilism (2019b, p. 16).6
However, there are good reasons for thinking that this threat is fairly minimal. First, none of
the extant domain-relative pluralisms countenance enough domains with su￿ciently di￿erent
logics for this threat to materialise – as we have seen, the intersection of Lynch’s and Pedersen’s
domain-speci￿c logics is not empty, but is intuitionistic logic.
Second, this threat is somewhat exaggerated because, when advancing the threat of nihilism,
pluralists sometimes postulate additional domains governed by more exotic logics, but do little
to substantiate these suggestions. For instance, Bueno & Shalkowski (2009, p. 300) and Kouri
Kissel & Shapiro (2020, p. 392) both mention in passing that nihilism threatens monists be-
cause – in addition to there being domains governed by classical, intuitionistic, and relevant
logics – a quantum logic governs the quantum domain. This inclusion would drastically empty
the intersection of the domain-speci￿c logics because quantum logics invalidate laws that hold
in all these other logics, notably, the distributivity laws.7 However, neither provides this sug-
gestion with any support. Indeed, much of the contemporary discussion of quantum logics
denies that the distributivity laws actually fail when reasoning about quantum phenomena, and
6Versions of this objection are given by Bueno & Shalkowski (2009, pp. 299–300) and Kouri Kissel & Shapiro
(2020, p. 392).
7Namely, ' ^ ( _  ) |= (' ^  ) _ (' ^  ) and ' _ ( ^  ) |= (' _  ) ^ (' _  ).
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instead contends that they only appear to fail because we are unable to simultaneously observe
particles’ positions and momentum. As Wilce (2017, §2.2) puts it:
[Quantummechanics’] non-classical ‘logic’ simply re￿ects the fact that not all observable
phenomena can be observed simultaneously. . . but [this] in no way requires any deep
shift in our understanding of logic (see also Dalla Chiara & Giuntini, 2002, p. 225;
Gibbins, 1987, Ch. 10).
Of course, some do think that quantum phenomena require us to revise our logics (e.g. French
& Krause, 2006, Ch. 8). However, unless domain-relative pluralists can provide decisive rea-
sons in favour of this approach to quantum logic – and more generally, until more is done to
demonstrate that the world is comprised of many domains governed by logics so di￿erent that
their intersection is empty – the threat of nihilism to monists remains academic.
Finally, it is doubtful that there could be a plausible domain-relative pluralism for which the
threat of nihilism arises. This is because insisting upon the formality of logic only threatens
monists with nihilism when the intersection of the domain-speci￿c logics is empty. But this
very feature renders such a domain-relative pluralism incapable of accounting for our ability to
validly reason across di￿erent domains. Let us call such a domain-relative pluralism promiscuous,
since it must countenance many di￿erent domains governed by radically di￿erent logics for
their intersection to be empty.
Recall from §1.8 that the problem of which arguments are valid and which logics are correct
when reasoning across multiple domains is the problem of mixed inferences. Domain-relative
pluralists take this worry very seriously – indeed, Lynch (2006, p. 85) labels it “the fundamental
worry” facing domain-relative pluralists – because they take it as given that we are able to validly
reason across domains and that our ability to do so is paramount to our pursuit of knowledge.
Lynch’s (2009, p. 102) solution was to adopt themodesty principle: an argument whose premisses
belong to multiple domains is valid i￿ it is valid in all the domains to which its premisses belong,
and so the correct logic for reasoning across multiple domains is the intersection of the domain-
speci￿c logics in play.
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However, the promiscuous domain-relative pluralist cannot commandeer Lynch’s solution
to account for our ability to reason validly across domains. By countenancing domains whose
logics’ intersections are close to empty or empty, the promiscuous domain-relative pluralist
increases the likelihood that an argument whose premisses belong to multiple domains is in-
valid. And by countenancingmore domains than Lynch or Pedersen, the promiscuous domain-
relative pluralist increases the likelihood that a given argument’s premisses belong to multiple
domains. Together these two factors conspire against the promiscuous domain-relative plural-
ist being able to account for the validity of many arguments which, as other domain-relative
pluralists have acknowledged, are so central to acquiring knowledge.
Moreover, potential alternative solutions to the problem of mixed inferences are of little
help to the promiscuous domain-relative pluralist. One solution is that all the logics corre-
sponding to the domains to which an argument’s premisses belong are correct. But this means
that multiple logics can be correctly applied to a single argument and therefore, by the norma-
tive contradiction argument, such a pluralism is inconsistent. Another solution is that, when
reasoning across domains, only the strongest of the corresponding domain-speci￿c logics is cor-
rect. However, as argued by Steinberger (2019b, p. 14), this causes the domain-relative plural-
ism to collapse upwards into monism. To see how, suppose that intuitionistic logic is correct in
the mathematical domain and classical logic is correct in all other domains. Letting ' be some
mathematical proposition, given that intuitionistic logic is correct in the mathematical domain,
¬¬' 6|= '. But if the correct logic when reasoning across multiple domains is the strongest
logic, we can show that ¬¬' |= ' and thereby show that classical logic holds in the mathemat-
ical domain. Suppose ¬¬'. By disjunction introduction, it follows that ¬¬' _  , where  is a
random non-mathematical falsehood. Classical logic is correct relative to ¬¬' _  because it
is the strongest of the two logics corresponding to the domains to which the disjuncts belong.
Thus, from ¬¬' _  we can infer ' _  since they are classically equivalent. Given that, ex
hypothesi,  is false, it follows by disjunctive syllogism that '. Consequently, double-negation
elimination holds in the mathematical domain, and the domain-relative pluralism has collapsed
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into a monism in which classical logic is correct in all domains.
In summary, even if monists accept domain-relative pluralists’ claims about which argu-
ments are truth-preserving in which domains, their endorsement of the widely-held view that
formality is constitutive of logical consequence entails that the one true logic is the intersection
of the domain-speci￿c logics. Moreover, I have argued that making this move does not threaten
the monist with nihilism. This was because the extant domain-relative pluralisms do not sub-
stantiate the claim that many domains are governed by radically di￿erent logics and, even if
there were such a pluralism, it would be implausible because it is unable to resolve the problem
of mixed inferences.
CONCLUSION
The aim of the ￿rst part of this thesis has been to defend the upper bound thesis that the number
of correct logics is at most one. This chapter has tackled the two remaining logical pluralisms
that resisted the normative contradiction argument’s advances – Haack’s meaning-relative plu-
ralism and the domain-relative pluralism of Lynch and Pedersen. Regarding Haack’s meaning-
relative pluralism, I suggested that monists can accommodate her claim that natural language
logical terms are ambiguous by including logical terms for each of the natural language log-
ical terms’ disambiguations. Similarly, I argued that monists can accommodate much of the
domain-relative pluralist’s insights by insisting upon the formality of logic and maintaining
that the only valid arguments are the ones which are valid across all domains, and can do so
without collapsing into nihilism. With the defence of the upper bound thesis now complete,
the monist is halfway towards the holy grail of establishing that there is but one true logic. All
that remains is to defend the lower bound thesis that there is at least one correct logic against







Our strategy for defending logical monism is to defend two intermediate theses which together
entail that there is one true logic. Namely, the upper bound thesis that there is at most one correct
logic, and the lower bound thesis that there is at least one correct logic. Part I defended the upper
bound thesis, and Part II now aims to defend the lower bound thesis.
Part II is based upon the recognition that the following two claims must hold for the lower
bound thesis to be true. First, the non-emptiness claim that the logical consequence relation
proper is non-empty. That is, given our de￿nition of correctness, for there to be at least one
correct logic with a non-empty consequence relation, the logical consequence relation proper
cannot be empty. Second, the existence claim that, supposing there are valid natural language ar-
guments, there actually is at least one logic in which all and only these arguments have formally
valid counterparts.
This chapter and the next defend the non-emptiness and existence claims, each of which has
recently come under ￿re from logical nihilists who deny them precisely because they think that
there are no correct logics. The non-emptiness claim that the logical consequence relation is
non-empty – or, equivalently, that there are laws of logic – is disputed by Gillian Russell (2017,
2018a, 2018b). Russell maintains that there are no laws of logic – a position which we shall
call obliterative nihilism – because there are counterexamples to even the most basic of putative
logical laws, such as conjunction introduction and identity. The existence claim is contested by
Aaron Cotnoir (2018), and we shall call the resulting position pessimistic nihilism. Cotnoir claims
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that there cannot be a correct logic despite there being valid natural language arguments because
the properties that a logic’s consequence relation must instantiate to be correct, along with the
inherent limitations of formal languages, preclude every valid natural language argument from
having a Li-valid formal counterpart.
This chapter aims to vindicate the non-emptiness claim by showing that, pace Russell, the
consequence relation is non-empty and there are logical laws. §5.1 explains why the non-
emptiness claimmust be true for there to be at least one correct logic before introducing obliter-
ative nihilism. §5.2 presents Russell’s counterexamples to conjunction introduction and iden-
tity, whilst §5.3 defuses them. I then go on the o￿ensive, and the remainder of the chapter
employs an anti-exceptionalist stance towards logic to construct an abductive argument for the
existence of certain logical laws. §5.4 introduces anti-exceptionalism and abduction, whilst
§5.5 presents the evidence which §5.6 argues is better explained by the hypothesis that there
are logical laws than by the hypothesis that there are none.
1 PRELIMINARIES
As usual, for a logic to be correct it must satisfy:
Correct: Li is correct i￿, for any P, C: C is a logical consequence of P i￿ T (C) is a Li-
consequence of T (P ).
That is, forLi to be correct, every valid natural language argument must have aLi-valid formal
counterpart and, more importantly for present purposes, everyLi-valid argument in the formal
language must be the formal counterpart of a valid natural language argument. Consequently,
since we are only counting structures with non-empty consequence relations as logics, for at
least one logic to be correct there must be valid natural language arguments. That is, the lower
bound thesis can only be true if the non-emptiness claim is true.
Lately, however, the non-emptiness claim – and consequently the idea that there are any
correct logics – has come under attack from Russell’s (2017, 2018a, 2018b) obliterative ni-
hilism. According to the obliterative nihilist:
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[T]he extension of the relation of logical consequence is empty; there is no pairing of
premises and conclusion such that the second is a logical consequence of the ￿rst (2018a,
pp. 310–311).
Before we elucidate the obliterative nihilist’s arguments for this radical conclusion, a couple of
preliminary remarks are needed. A point that will raise its head throughout this chapter is that,
despite their repudiation of valid arguments, obliterative nihilists accept that many individual
arguments are necessarily truth-preserving – that is, it is impossible for their premisses to be
true but their conclusions false. For instance, regarding the argument, ‘If snow is white then
grass is green. Snow is white. Therefore: Grass is green’, Russell writes:
[T]his instance of modus ponens might be perfectly acceptable to the nihilist – in the
sense that the truth of the premises guarantees [my emphasis] that of the conclusion –
even if she believes that modus ponens is not a law of logic, thanks to some recherché
counterexamples. . . To claim that modus ponens is logically valid is to make a claim of
great generality, whereas to claim that the above argument preserves truth is merely to
claim that some instance of modus ponens is good (2017, pp. 126–127).
Indeed, the obliterative nihilist’s admission of necessarily truth-preserving arguments is central
to the tenability of their position as it enables them to explain away why arguments like the
following appear valid:
Dogs: Guinness is a collie. Oscar is a Labrador. Therefore: Guinness is a collie and Oscar
is a Labrador
Namely, Dogs appears valid because it is necessarily truth-preserving and most arguments of
the same form are too. More generally, so-called laws like conjunction introduction and modus
ponens appear valid because almost all of their instances are necessarily truth-preserving.
Second, a terminological matter needs clarifying. When arguing for obliterative nihilism,
Russell primarily frames her position as “the view that there are no laws of logic” (2018a, p. 308).
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Logical laws are expressed via so-called entailment sentences of the form ‘P entails C’, where P
is a set of natural language sentences and C is a single natural language sentence.1 For instance,
the law of conjunction introduction states: for any natural language sentences A, B: A, B entails
A and B.2 Thus, by stating that there are no laws of logic, the obliterative nihilist is saying that
all such entailment sentences are false: “For any arbitrary set of premises and conclusion, the
nihilist holds that the premises do not entail that conclusion” (Russell, 2018b, p. 340). This, of
course, is equivalent to saying that the logical consequence relation is empty. Accordingly, the
non-emptiness claim may be rephrased as stating that there are laws of logic. The next section
outlines the obliterative nihilist’s argument against this claim.
2 THE COUNTEREXAMPLES
To demonstrate that there are no laws of logic by presenting a counterexample to every putative
logical law is a Herculean undertaking. To cut this task down to size Russell focusses on a pair
of extremely basic alleged logical laws, conjunction introduction and identity:
Conjunction Introduction: A, B entails A and B.
Identity: A entails A.
The obliterative nihilist’s central argument against the non-emptiness claim is that there are
counterexamples to both, and “if this is the case for laws as basic as identity and conjunction
introduction, then nothing is safe: logical nihilism could well be true” (Russell, 2018a, p. 315).
These counterexamples revolve around two relatively unknown sentences called ‘SOLO’
and ‘PREM’.What is unique about SOLO and PREM is that their truth-conditions are sensitive
to the linguistic context in which they occur:
T-CSOLO: SOLO is true i￿ it occurs as an atomic sentence; false otherwise.
1Russell (2018a, p. 311) says that “a law of logic takes the form:   |= '”, where   and ' are (sets of) sentences
in the formal language. However, I take sentences of this form to be formal representations of logical laws in the
same way that |=Li is a formal representation of the logical consequence relation proper.
2Henceforth I leave the quanti￿cation over natural language sentences implicit.
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T-CPREM: PREM is true i￿ it occurs as a premiss in an argument; false otherwise.
They can then be used to give counterexamples to both Conjunction Introduction and Identity:
Conjunction-Counter: SOLO. Guinness is a collie. Therefore: SOLO and Guinness is a
collie.
Identity-Counter: PREM. Therefore: PREM.
Given SOLO’s truth-conditions and that Guinness is indeed a collie, Conjunction-Counter has
true premisses and a false conclusion because SOLO is false whenever it is part of a com-
pound sentence, like a conjunction. Thus, although most instances of conjunction introduction
are necessarily truth-preserving, Conjunction Introduction cannot be a law because it has non-
truth-preserving instances. Similarly, Identity fails because PREM’s truth-conditions ensure
that Identity-Counter has a true premiss but a false conclusion. Given that Conjunction Intro-
duction and Identity are logical laws if any are, a fortiori there are no laws and the consequence
relation is empty.3
One line of response to these couterexamples is to argue, as Bogdan Dicher (2020, p. 7)
does, that SOLO and PREM do not entirely empty the consequence relation as they must if
they are to establish obliterative nihilism. For instance, the argument, ‘Guinness is a collie.
Therefore: It is not the case that PREM’ comes out as valid because, given PREM’s truth-
conditions, its negation must be true whenever it is an argument’s conclusion. Thus, Dicher
concludes, “emptying the consequence relation is slightly trickier than it seems at ￿rst blush”
(2020, p. 8). This, I submit, is too concessive a response to the obliterative nihilist. Conjunction
Introduction and Identity are extremely basic laws that hold in virtually every widely accepted
logic; we should not abandon them – and all the logics which validate them – without a ￿ght.
3I have set aside Russell’s (2018a, pp. 313–315) argument that allowing the consequence relation to quantify
over cases in which sentences can be both true and false or neither invalidates laws such as excluded middle and
non-contradiction. Since this only weakens our logic as far as the logic of ￿rst-degree entailment (FDE) and exam-
ples of the style discussed here could also be used to invalidate the classical laws rejected by FDE, this component
of Russell’s argument is super￿uous.
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The next section argues that Russell’s overarching strategy for generating counterexamples to
basic logical laws cannot empty the consequence relation at all.
3 COUNTEREXAMPLES DEFUSED
Recall that the logical consequence relation holds between sets of natural language sentences and a
logic’s formal representation of this relation holds between sets of sentences in the logic’s formal
language. So too for the laws of logic: an instance of a law of logic is not a formal argument but
a natural language argument exhibiting the relevant form. The importance of this distinction now
crystallises: to show that Conjunction Introduction and Identity are not logical laws, the obliterative
nihilist must show that there are instances of both laws – that is, natural language arguments
of the appropriate forms – that fail to preserve truth. But Russell has done no such thing, for
SOLO and PREM are not natural language sentences and therefore Conjunction-Counter and
Identity-Counter cannot be instances of Conjunction Introduction and Identity.4
Rather, to invalidate Conjunction Introduction and Identity, the obliterative nihilist requires
natural language sentences whose truth-conditions emulate SOLO’s and PREM’s. Two obvious
candidates are:
SOLO*: This sentence is atomic.
PREM*: This sentence is a premiss.
The original arguments against Conjunction Introduction and Identity can then be reconstructed
by substituting SOLO* and PREM* for SOLO and PREM:
Conjunction-Counter*: This sentence is atomic. Guinness is a collie. Therefore: This sen-
tence is atomic and Guinness is a collie.
Identity-Counter*: This sentence is a premiss. Therefore: This sentence is a premiss.
4Dicher (2020, p. 8) seems to make a similar point in passing, but does not go on to consider natural language
sentences that might mimic SOLO and PREM.
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The sentence ‘This sentence is atomic’ is atomic and therefore true, but ‘This sentence is atomic
and Guinness is a collie’ is non-atomic and therefore false. Thus, Conjunction-Counter* is a
counterexample to Conjunction Introduction since it is an instance of this law that has true pre-
misses but a false conclusion. Similarly, Identity-Counter* is a counterexample to Identity since
it is an instance of Identity and, given that the premiss token of ‘This sentence is a premiss’ is a
premiss but the conclusion token is not, it has a true premiss but a false conclusion. So it seems
that Russell’s original argument is una￿ected by pointing out that SOLO and PREM are not
natural language sentences because natural language sentences displaying the same sensitivity
to linguistic context can be easily identi￿ed.
But this is too quick. To see where Conjunction-Counter* and Identity-Counter* go astray,
consider the following arguments:
Beer: My beer has a head. Guinness is a collie. Therefore: My beer has a head andGuinness
is a collie.
Umbrella: This is an umbrella. Therefore: This is an umbrella.
Suppose that the premiss occurrence of ‘head’ in Beer refers to the frothy layer of foam but
the conclusion occurrence refers to the part of an organism that usually houses its eyes and
ears. And suppose that the premiss occurrence of ‘This’ in Umbrella refers to an umbrella but
the conclusion occurrence of ‘This’ refers to an emu. So understood, both Beer and Umbrella
have true premisses and false conclusions. But do they invalidate Conjunction Introduction and
Identity?
The answer, of course, is that they do not. Take Beer. Although the premiss and conclusion
occurrences of ‘My beer has a head’ are tokens of the same orthographic type, given that ‘head’ is
being used to refer to two di￿erent things, they are distinct sentences with distinct meanings.
That is, they are tokens of distinct interpereted sentence types since they contain expressions which
refer to di￿erent things.5 Accordingly, the ￿rst premiss and conclusion are more perspicuously
5Note that the same point can be made if the relata of the logical consequence relation proper are propositions
instead of interpreted sentences.
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stated as, ‘My beer has a head1’ and ‘My beer has a head2 and Guinness is a collie’. But now
Beer is not an instance of Conjunction Introduction as it has the form, ‘A. B. Therefore: C and B’.
So too for Umbrella. Since ‘This’ refers to di￿erent things in the premiss and conclusion, they
are distinct sentences despite being tokens of the same orthographic type. Thus, Umbrella is not
an instance of Identity – rather, it has the form, ‘A. Therefore: B’. The remainder of this section
argues that if Beer and Umbrella do not invalidate Conjunction Introduction and Identity then, for
exactly the same reasons, nor do any natural language renderings of SOLO and PREM.
Returning to Conjunction-Counter* and Identity-Counter*, careful attention needs to paid to
what the premiss and conclusion occurrences of ‘This’ refer to. To see the problem, consider
Conjunction-Counter*. For this argument to have true premisses and a false conclusion, the
premiss occurrence of ‘This’ must refer to the sentence, ‘This sentence is an atomic sentence’
but the conclusion occurrence of ‘This’ must refer to the sentence, ‘This sentence is an atomic
sentence and Guinness is a collie’. Were both the premiss and conclusion occurrences of ‘This’
to refer to the sentence, ‘This sentence is an atomic sentence’ then both the premisses and
conclusion would be true. Conversely, were both the premiss and conclusion occurrences of
‘This’ to refer to the sentence, ‘This sentence is an atomic sentence and Guinness is a collie’
then the conclusion would be false but so is one of the premisses. Either way, we do not have a
counterexample to Conjunction Introduction. As such, Conjunction-Counter* succeeds only if the
two occurrences of ‘This’ refer di￿erently.
The same point holds mutatis mutandis for Identity-Counter*, although this is partially ob-
scured by the premiss and conclusion being tokens of the same orthographic type. For Identity-
Counter* to have a true premiss but a false conclusion, the premiss and conclusion occurrences
of ‘This’ must refer to distinct tokens. The premiss occurrence must refer to the premiss token
of ‘This sentence is a premiss’ but the conclusion occurrence must refer to the conclusion token.
Were both occurrences of ‘This’ to refer to the premiss token then both the premiss and con-
clusion would be true. Conversely, if both occurrences of ‘This’ were to refer to the conclusion
token then both the premiss and conclusion would be false. Again, either way we do not have
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an instance of Identity that fails to preserve truth. Thus, Identity-Counter*’s success also relies
upon the two occurrences of ‘This’ referring di￿erently.
However, as was the case with Beer and Umbrella, allowing an expression to refer di￿erently
between the premisses and conclusion bars Conjunction-Counter* and Identity-Counter* from
being counterexamples to Conjunction Introduction and Identity. Since ‘This’ refers di￿erently, it
follows that the premiss and conclusion tokens of SOLO* and PREM* in Conjunction-Counter*
and Identity-Counter* respectively are not tokens of the same sentence type. That is, Conjunction-
Counter* and Identity-Counter* are more perspicuously stated as:
Conjunction-Counter*: This1 sentence is atomic. Guinness is a collie. Therefore: This2 sen-
tence is atomic and Guinness is a collie.
Identity-Counter*: This1 sentence is a premiss. Therefore: This2 sentence is a premiss.
But now neither argument is an instance of Conjunction Introduction or Identity, and therefore
neither can be counterexamples to either law. Given that ‘This1 sentence is atomic’ and ‘This2
sentence is atomic’ are distinct sentences, Conjunction-Counter* has the form ‘A. B. Therefore:
C and B’ and so is not an instance of Conjunction Introduction. And given that ‘This1 sentence
is a premiss’ and ‘This2 sentence is a premiss’ are distinct, Identity-Counter* has the form ‘A.
Therefore: B’ and so is not an instance of Identity. Thus, the most obvious natural language
counterparts of SOLO and PREM are not counterexamples to Conjunction Introduction and
Identity.
Of course, this only shows that one attempt at providing natural language equivalents to
SOLO and PREM fails. However, it is di￿cult to see how Russell’s recipe for constructing
counterexamples could succeed because the foregoing problem generalises. Suppose that the
obliterative nihilist wishes to construct a counterexample to a law, L. To succeed, the counterex-
ample must satisfy two constraints: it must have true premisses but a false conclusion, and it
must be an instance of L. Russell’s recipe begins by identifying a property, P, possessed by the
premisses of an instance of L but not by the conclusion. In the counterexample to Conjunction
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Introduction this property was being an atomic sentence and for Identity it was being a premiss.
To obtain a sentence, A, that is true when it occurs as a premiss in an instance of L but false
when it occurs as a conclusion, Amust be such that each of its tokens ascribes P to itself. In turn,
to ascribe P to itself A needs to self-refer, and must therefore include an indexical expression
like ‘This’ or a de￿nite description such as ‘The sentence. . .’.6 A counterexample can then be
obtained by constructing an instance of L in which A appears in the premisses and the con-
clusion. However, there is good reason to think that the counterexamples this recipe produces
cannot satisfy both constraints.
Suppose that self-reference is achieved via an indexical expression like ‘This sentence’. To
satisfy the ￿rst constraint, A’s premiss token must be true but its conclusion token false. Given
that the premisses of an instance of L are P but the conclusion is not, for A’s premiss token to be
true but its conclusion token false, the indexical in the premiss token must refer to the premiss
token but the indexical in the conclusion token must refer to the conclusion token. But if the
indexical is referring to di￿erent things then A’s premiss and conclusion tokens are di￿erent
sentences. And as we saw in relation to Conjunction Introduction and Identity, A’s premiss and
conclusion tokens being di￿erent sentences precludes the argument from being an instance of
L, thereby violating the second constraint.
Attempts at using de￿nite descriptions to attain self-reference fare no better, albeit for dif-
ferent reasons. To self-refer via a de￿nite description, A must take the general form, ‘The
sentence with property X is P’ where X is the property featuring in the de￿nite description that
is satis￿ed by A and, as before, P is the property possessed by premisses of an instance of L but
not by the conclusion. On any account of de￿nite descriptions, for a sentence of the form ‘The
sentence with property X is P’ to be true, the de￿nite description ‘The sentence with property
X’ must be satis￿ed by at least one sentence that is P. Thus, to satisfy the ￿rst constraint – that
6Could one attain self-reference in natural language without employing an indexical or de￿nite description?
It is controversial whether there are examples of non-indexical self-reference in natural language. The most fa-
mous example is Quine’s Paradox, “Yields a falsehood when appended by its quotation’ yields a falsehood when
appended by its quotation’ (Quine, 1976, p. 9). However, since ‘its quotation’ is short for ‘the quotation of it’ and
‘it’ is widely taken to be an indexical (e.g. Kaplan, 1989, p. 489), this is not so. I therefore set this possibility aside.
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is, for A’s premiss token to be true but its conclusion token false – the premiss occurrence of
the de￿nite description must be satis￿ed by A’s premiss token, but the conclusion occurrence of
the de￿nite description cannot be satis￿ed by A’s premiss token.7
However, the satisfaction of this condition – and therefore the ￿rst constraint – is pre-
cluded by the fact that both the premiss and conclusion occurrences of the de￿nite description
are tokens of the same de￿nite description type. Given they are of the same type, barring any
semantically relevant changes in context, any sentence satisfying the premiss occurrence satis-
￿es the conclusion occurrence and vice versa. Consequently, if A’s premiss token is true as the
￿rst constraint requires, then A’s premiss token satis￿es the not only the premiss occurrence of
the de￿nite description but also the conclusion occurrence, thereby rendering A’s conclusion
token true in violation of the ￿rst constraint. One could in principle satisfy the ￿rst constraint
by changing the context so that the premiss occurrence of the de￿nite description refers to A’s
premiss token but the conclusion occurrence refers to the conclusion token. Since the former is
P but the latter is not, the resulting argument would have a true premiss but a false conclusion.
However, just as two tokens of ‘This is an umbrella’ are distinct sentences when the context is
shifted so that ‘This’ refers to an umbrella in one but an emu in the other, so too for de￿nite
descriptions. Thus, shifting the context so the de￿nite description’s premiss and conclusion oc-
currences refer di￿erently yields distinct sentences, thereby precluding the resulting argument
from being an instance of L and thus violating the second constraint.
Accordingly, it is doubtful that there can be counterexamples to Conjunction Introduction and
Identity of the kind that Russell originally had in mind. As such, we may conclude that the
obliterative nihilist’s attack on the non-emptiness claim is unsuccessful.
7One might wonder whether one could obtain an appropriate self-referential natural language sentence using
Gödel coding, whereby distinct sentences are mapped to distinct integers, their Gödel numbers. Suppose that the
Gödel number of the sentence ‘The sentence with Gödel number g is a premiss’ is g. We then have the following
counterexample to Identity: ‘The sentence with Gödel number g is a premiss. Therefore: The sentence with Gödel
number g is a premiss’. However, for the premiss to be true, the de￿nite description ‘The sentence with Gödel
number g’ must refer to the sentence type as there are many tokens satisfying the description. But since this type
does occur as a premiss, the conclusion is true, thereby violating the ￿rst constraint.
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4 ANTI-EXCEPTIONALISM & ABDUCTION
It is one thing to demonstrate that the obliterative nihilist has not undermined the non-emptiness
claim, but quite another to show that it is true – that is, without tacitly relying on the claim
that the burden of proof lies with the obliterative nihilist. This remainder of this chapter em-
ploys an anti-exceptionalist stance towards logic to construct an abductive argument for the
existence of certain basic logical laws. Although my primary purpose is to provide a positive
argument for the non-emptiness claim, in doing so I also hope to show that anti-exceptionalism
is perfectly compatible with the piecemeal justi￿cation of individual logical laws – something
that many contemporary anti-exceptionalists have denied. This section brie￿y outlines anti-
exceptionalism and the structure of abductive arguments, and §5.5 presents a body of evidence
which §5.6 argues is better explained by the hypothesis that there are logical laws than by the
hypothesis that there are none.
Our starting point is the anti-exceptionalist stance towards logic, according to which:
Logic isn’t special. Its theories are continuous with science; its method continuous with
scienti￿c method. Logic isn’t a priori, nor are its truths analytic truths. Logical theories
are revisable, and if they are revised, they are revised on the same grounds as scienti￿c
theories (Hjortland, 2017, p. 632).8
Given that scienti￿c theories are revised and justi￿ed abductively, this is to say that logical the-
ories are too (Williamson, 2017, p. 334). Hitherto, anti-exceptionalists have used abduction
to justify entire logical theories – for instance, Williamson (2017) and Priest (2006a) use ab-
duction to justify classical and a paraconsistent logic, respectively. Indeed, a number of anti-
exceptionalists take their position’s de￿ning feature to be that it is logical theories that are jus-
ti￿ed abductively as opposed to individual laws:
[C]on￿rmational holism is part of the account. A logical theory is con￿rmed en bloc, not
8Anti-exceptionalists include Hjortland (2017, 2019), Priest (2006a, 2014, 2016), Quine (1951, 1986), and
Williamson (2013, 2017). Crucially, Russell (2014, 2015, 2019) also endorses anti-exceptionalism.
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by individual con￿rmation of logical laws (Hjortland, 2019, p. 256).9
However, this chapter employs abduction in a novel way to atomistically justify particular logical
laws such as Conjunction Introduction and Identity, thereby both demonstrating that the logical
consequence relation is non-empty and challenging this component of anti-exceptionalism.
First, however, we turn to the nature of abduction.
Abduction – or ‘inference to the best explanation’ – is a form of ampliative inference ubiq-
uitous in both ordinary and scienti￿c reasoning, in which one reasons from a body of evidence
to the hypothesis which best explains that evidence. For instance, suppose that I ￿nd ‘Clean
me!’ written in the dirt on the family car. Three hypotheses which explain this evidence are
that Mum did it, that the dirt miraculously landed on the car in that pattern, and that my mis-
chievous younger brother Max did it. I conclude that the culprit is Max. This inference cannot
be deductive because my evidence does not entail that he did it, but nor can it be inductive be-
cause this has never happened before. Rather, I reach this conclusion because it o￿ers a better
explanation of the evidence than the alternatives – after all, the handwriting looks like his and
it is exactly the kind of joke Max would pull.
More generally, letting e be some evidence and h1, h2, . . . , hn be competing hypotheses pur-
porting to explain e, abductive arguments take the form:
e
h1 is a better explanation of e than any of h2, . . . , hn
) h1
What is it for one hypothesis to be a better explanation of some evidence than another? Ex-
planatory goodness is cashed out in terms of the so-called explanatory virtues and, roughly speak-
ing, one explanation is better than another if it instantiates these virtues to a greater degree than
its competitors. Whilst di￿erent proponents of abduction give di￿erent albeit largely overlap-
ping lists of the explanatory virtues, we will concentrate on the virtues of explanatory power,
9In a similar vein, Russell states: “The heart of the abductivist approach consists in two claims. The ￿rst is
holism about the justi￿cation of logic: it is entire logics – rather than isolated claims of consequence – that are
justi￿ed (or not)” (2019, p. 550) and, “One view that is incompatible with abductivism is a view on which individual




A hypothesis’ explanatory power over some evidence, the explanandum, is its “ability to de-
crease the degree to which we ￿nd the explanandum surprising” (Schupbach & Sprenger, 2011,
p. 108). That is, the less surprising the evidence is given the assumption that the hypothesis is
true, the greater the power that hypothesis has over the evidence. For instance, General Rela-
tivity has more explanatory power over evidence concerning the gravitational de￿ection of light
by the sun than Newton’s theory of gravity. Whereas General Relativity predicts almost exactly
the observed de￿ection, Newton’s theory predicts only half the observed amount and therefore
the evidence is less surprising given the former than the latter.11
When de￿ning simplicity it is important to distinguish between syntactic simplicity and onto-
logical simplicity. Syntactic simplicity refers to the number of adjustable parameters a hypothesis
uses to explain the evidence, whereas ontological simplicity refers to the number and kind of
entities that a hypothesis postulates (Sober, 2002, pp. 16–17). Since the obliterative nihilist
and friends of logical laws are not committed to any entities that the other is not, it is syntactic
simplicity that is relevant here.12 To see syntactic simplicity in action, suppose that we have two
hypotheses that aim to explain the incidence of lung cancer in a population. The ￿rst explains
this in terms of individuals’ cigarette consumption, whilst the second explains it in terms of
their cigarette consumption and the number of games of tiddlywinks they have won. Assuming
that both o￿er equally powerful explanations of the evidence, syntactic simplicity demands that
we prefer the former over the latter as it explains the evidence using one fewer parameter.
The degree of uni￿cation exhibited by a hypothesis is the extent to which that hypothe-
10Some have endorsed additional virtues – for instance, Psillos (2002, p. 615) includes a hypothesis’ ￿t with
background data whilst Lipton (2004, p. 122) includes the extent to which a hypothesis provides a precise mech-
anism explaining the evidence. I focus on power, simplicity, and uni￿cation because they are common to all the
various lists of virtues (see Cabrera (2017, p. 1249) for an overview), have received most attention within the liter-
ature on abduction, and have been de￿ned most precisely. Moreover, there are compelling arguments that power,
simplicity, and uni￿cation have con￿rmational import whereas other virtues are purely pragmatic (see Cabrera
(2017, pp. 1254–1255)).
11For arguments that explanatory power has con￿rmational import, see Crupi & Tentori (2012), Schupbach &
Sprenger (2011), and Schupbach (2017).
12For arguments that syntactic simplicity has con￿rmational import, see Forster & Sober (1994), Sober (2015,
Ch.2), and Cabrera (2017, p. 1252).
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sis “provides a uni￿ed account of what might otherwise seem to be independent phenomena”
(Myrvold, 2003, p. 399). That is, a unifying hypothesis is one which is able to provide the
same explanation of seemingly independent pieces of evidence, and the more unifying a hy-
pothesis is, the better. For example, Newton’s theory of planetary motion was more unifying
than Kepler’s because Newton’s theory gives the same explanation of both the evidence that we
have about the motion of objects on Earth and the motions of celestial bodies, whereas Kepler’s
theory cannot.13
With these virtues to hand it becomes apparent that there are three ways that one hypothesis,
h1, can outpoint another, h2, on the abductive score board. First, h1might strictly dominate h2 by
possessing all the explanatory virtues to a higher degree than h2. Alternatively, h1 might weakly
dominate h2 by possessing the all the explanatory virtues to at least the same degree as h2 and
at least one to a higher degree. Finally, there might be some virtues on which h1 scores more
highly than h2 and vice versa but, given the relative importance of the virtues and the margins by
which h1 and h2 outpoint one another, h1 is the better hypothesis all things considered. In what
follows, I establish the non-emptiness claim by demonstrating that the hypothesis that there are
logical laws weakly dominates any of the hypotheses available to the obliterative nihilist.
5 THE EVIDENCE
What is the evidence that the hypothesis that there are logical laws is supposed to better explain
than the hypothesis that there are no such laws? To narrow down this question andmakematters
more concrete, we will focus on constructing an abductive argument forConjunction Introduction,
although the ensuing argument can easily be adapted to establish other basic laws like Identity.
As we saw in §5.1, it is integral to the plausibility of the obliterative nihilist’s position that
they admit that arguments likeDogs are necessarily truth-preserving. This admission forms the
basis of the evidence used in the ensuing abductive argument. More speci￿cally, we will focus
on two pieces of evidence. First, not only are there in￿nitely many instances of Conjunction
13For arguments that uni￿cation has con￿rmational import, see Myrvold (2003, 2017) and Schupbach (2005).
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Introduction that are necessarily truth-preserving, but many of these instances are necessarily
truth-preserving despite sharing little in common except their form. Consider the arguments:
Grass is green. Snow is white. Therefore: Snow is white and grass is green.
Two is even or two is odd. There is no set of all non-self-membered sets. Therefore: Two
is even or two is odd and there is no set of all non-self-membered sets.
Both arguments are necessarily truth-preserving despite their conjuncts having completely dif-
ferent logical forms, truth-conditions, and subject-matters. Indeed, the only properties that
these arguments share, besides being instances of Conjunction Introduction, are those that they
must instantiate to be arguments in the ￿rst place, such as being composed of declarative nat-
ural language sentences.14 Let an argument’s non-form properties be all the properties that it
may instantiate besides its form and the properties which it must instantiate to be an argument.
Accordingly, the non-form properties of an instance of Conjunction Introduction will include its
subject-matter, its conjuncts’ logical forms, its conjuncts’ truth-conditions and the like. Our ￿rst
piece of evidence, then, is that there is an in￿nite number of necessarily truth-preserving instances of
Conjunction Introduction, many of which share no non-form properties.
Our second piece of evidence concerns the lack of counterexamples to Conjunction Introduc-
tion. Although §5.3 demonstrated that Russell’s counterexamples cannot succeed, we have not
shown that there cannot be any counterexamples to Conjunction Introduction because we have
not shown that every strategy for generating counterexamples cannot succeed. Indeed, if we
had, there would be no need for an abductive argument supporting Conjunction Introduction.
Consequently, we may not include in our evidence that there are no counterexamples whatso-
ever to Conjunction Introduction. However, given that Russell’s counterexamples falter and in the
absence of any other counterexamples, we may include in our evidence that there are no known
counterexamples to Conjunction Introduction.




Crucially, the obliterative nihilist already accepts the ￿rst piece of evidence and must accept
the second piece in light of the arguments of §5.3. The obliterative nihilist is committed to
accepting the ￿rst piece of evidence by their strategy for explaining away the fact that arguments
like Dogs appear to be valid, as outlined in §5.1. Namely, Dogs seems valid because it and
almost all arguments of the same form are necessarily truth-preserving. Consequently, if the
ensuing abductive argument is successful, even obliterative nihilists will have to endorse the
non-emptiness claim – unless, of course, they can point to a ￿aw in its reasoning.15
6 THE ABDUCTION
This section argues that the hypothesis that Conjunction Introduction is a logical law better ex-
plains the foregoing evidence than any hypothesis available to the obliterative nihilist, thereby
showing that Conjunction Introduction is a logical law and that the non-emptiness claim is true.
Let hCI be the hypothesis that Conjunction Introduction is a logical law:
hCI : A, B entails A and B.
Crucially, hCI gives a straightforward explanation of our evidence that there are in￿nitely many
necessarily truth-preserving instances of Conjunction Introduction, many of which share no non-
form properties, and there are no known counterexamples. Supposing that Conjunction In-
troduction is a law, it follows that all arguments of the form ‘A. B. Therefore: A and B’ are
necessarily truth-preserving. In turn, this is explained in terms of the fact that the meaning of
‘and’ is su￿cient for an argument of this form to be necessarily truth-preserving, regardless of
its premisses’ subject-matter and any other non-form properties that it may instantiate. More-
over, this explanation is powerful, simple, and unifying. It is powerful because the evidence
is entirely unsurprising given that instantiating this form and the meaning of ‘and’ is su￿cient
15This is to say that our evidence satis￿es the principle of evidence neutrality articulated by Williamson (2007,
p. 210). Although Williamson himself rejects evidence neutrality, he readily admits that arguments employing
neutral evidence will be more dialectically e￿ective: “Relying on a premise one’s opponents have already refused
to accept tends to be dialectically useless. They will probably deny that it constitutes evidence; one’s argument will
make no headway” (2007, p. 210).
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for, and thus guarantees, necessary truth-preservation. It is simple because hCI explains this
evidence using a single parameter, namely, an argument’s form. And it is unifying because, for
any two instances of Conjunction Introduction that share no non-form properties, hCI provides
the same explanation of the seemingly independent facts that both instances are necessarily
truth-preserving.
What hypotheses can the obliterative nihilist use to explain this evidence? Besides giving no
explanation whatsoever – and thereby rendering the fact that there are in￿nitely many neces-
sarily truth-preserving instances of Conjunction Introduction a miracle of cataclysmic proportions
– there are two varieties of explanatory hypotheses available to them. The ￿rst variety we shall
call the ‘Form + X’ variety. Although the obliterative nihilist cannot say that the instances ofCon-
junction Introduction are necessarily truth-preserving solely in virtue of their logical form, they
can say that they are necessarily truth-preserving in virtue of their form plus their instantiating
some non-form properties.16 The only other option on the table is hypotheses of the ‘X’ variety,
which explain the necessary truth-preservingness of the instances of Conjunction Introduction
solely in terms of their instantiating some non-form properties.17 Di￿erent versions of both varieties
can then be obtained by varying which non-form properties are used to explain the evidence.
I will leave open which properties these are because I hope to show that, regardless of which
properties the obliterative nihilist chooses, their hypothesis is explanatorily inferior to hCI .
We begin with the Form + X variety. This variety comes in two species depending on
whether, in addition Conjunction Introduction’s instances’ form, they appeal to one non-form
property, x, or multiple non-form properties, x1, x2, . . . , xn, to explain the evidence. Call a
hypothesis of the ￿rst kind hF+x, and one of the second kind hF+X . According to hF+x, in-
16Might they appeal to properties other than non-form properties? The only other properties that the obliter-
ative nihilist can appeal to are those that arguments must instantiate to be arguments, such as being composed of
declarative natural language sentences, and these are of no help. For one thing, since all arguments must instantiate
these properties, claiming that being an instance of Conjunction Introduction and instantiating them is su￿cient to
be necessarily truth-preserving entails admitting that there cannot be counterexamples to Conjunction Introduction,
which is the exact opposite of what the obliterative nihilist wants to say.
17Again, appealing to properties such as being composed of declarative natural language sentences is of no use,
albeit for a di￿erent reason. Claiming that instantiating the properties that an argument must instantiate to be an
argument is su￿cient to be necessarily truth-preserving ensures that all arguments are necessarily truth-preserving.
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stances of Conjunction Introduction are necessarily truth-preserving in virtue of their logical form
and instantiating x, whilst hF+X asserts that instances of Conjunction Introduction are necessarily
truth-preserving in virtue of their logical form and instantiating one or more of x1, x2, . . . , xn.
Naturally, adopting hF+x or hF+X requires the obliterative nihilist to be able to tell a story
about how an argument’s logical form and its instantiating x, or one or more of x1, x2, . . . , xn,
are jointly (but not individually) su￿cient for an argument to be necessarily truth-preserving.
For the sake of argument let us assume that such a story can be told.
The problem with hF+x is that there are instances of Conjunction Introduction sharing no
non-form properties. Thus, for any non-form property x, there will be some instances that
lack x but are necessarily truth-preserving, and these will fall outside the scope of the nihilist’s
explanation. Consequently, hCI has greater explanatory power over the evidence than hF+x,
because it is less surprising that non-x instances of Conjunction Introduction are necessarily truth-
preserving given hCI than hF+x. Moreover, hCI is simpler because it explains the evidence solely
in terms of the instances’ logical form whereas hF+x employs an additional parameter, whether
or not an instance is x. Finally, hCI is more unifying than hF+x because, for any two instances of
Conjunction Introduction that share no non-form properties and one of which is x, hCI provides a
single explanation of the fact that both instances are necessarily truth-preserving whereas hF+x
is unable to do so. As such, hCI strictly dominates hF+x.
The obliterative nihilist could try to circumvent hF+x’s lack of explanatory power by switch-
ing to hF+X , according to which instances of Conjunction Introduction are necessarily truth-
preserving in virtue of their logical form and instantiating one or more of x1, x2, . . . , xn. Pro-
vided that x1, x2, . . . , xn cover the set of all instances of Conjunction Introduction, so that every
instance instantiates at least one of x1, x2, . . . , xn, then hF+X can in principle explain why each
and every one is necessarily truth-preserving. Consequently, hF+X will be no less powerful than
hCI . However, hF+X is no panacea: it is both less simple and less unifying than hCI . It is less
simple because hCI employs a single parameter – namely, logical form– to explain the evidence
whereas hF+X employs n+1 parameters. Furthermore, hF+X is a less unifying explanation than
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hCI because, for any two instances of Conjunction Introduction that share no non-form proper-
ties, hCI explains the seemingly independent facts that both are necessarily truth-preserving in
terms of their being instances of Conjunction Introduction. By contrast, hF+X is unable to do so:
given the two instances share no non-form properties, the necessary truth-preservingness of
each instance must be explained in terms of their form plus the instantiation of di￿erent sets
of non-form properties. Thus, hCI weakly dominates hF+X . Consequently, no matter which
version of the Form + X variety the obliterative nihilist plucks for – that is, regardless of how
many and which non-form properties the nihilist’s hypothesis appeals to in addition to form –
their explanation is at least weakly dominated by hCI .
Turning to hypotheses of the X variety, we can make the same basic distinction between
those which appeal to one non-form property, x, ormultiple non-form properties, x1, x2, . . . , xn,
to explain the evidence. Call a hypothesis of the ￿rst kind hx, and one of the second kind hX . hx
says that instances of Conjunction Introduction are necessarily truth-preserving solely in virtue of
instantiating x, whilst hX asserts that instances of Conjunction Introduction are necessarily truth-
preserving in virtue of instantiating one or more of x1, x2, . . . , xn. Again, let us assume that
the obliterative nihilist is able to show why instantiating x, or at least one of x1, x2, . . . , xn, is
su￿cient for an instance of Conjunction Introduction to be necessarily truth-preserving.
Since both hx and hX ￿aws are almost identical to those of hF+x and hF+X , respectively, I
shall be brief. hCI weakly dominates hx because, although they are equally simple as they both
employ a single parameter to explain the evidence, hx is both less powerful and unifying than
hCI due to the existence of non-x instances of Conjunction Introduction. hCI weakly dominates
hX because, although they are equally powerful, hX is less simple and unifying than hCI as it
employs more parameters to explain the evidence and cannot give the same explanation of the
fact that instances of Conjunction Introduction sharing no non-form properties are necessarily
truth-preserving. Again, since this follows without making any assumptions about which non-
form properties the obliterative nihilist employed in their explanation, hCI weakly dominates
every species of the X variety.
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Thus, the hypothesis that Conjunction Introduction is a logical law weakly dominates every
variant of the two varieties of explanatory hypotheses available to the obliterative nihilist. It
therefore follows via abduction that Conjunction Introduction is a law of logic, and the non-
emptiness claim is thereby vindicated. Moreover, as highlighted in §5.5, since the nihilist
accepts the evidence from which this argument proceeded, they have little option but to ac-
cept this conclusion. Finally, although we have focussed on Conjunction Introduction, there is no
reason to suppose that the same style of abductive argument could not be constructed for other
basic logical laws like Identity, but also conjunction elimination, disjunction introduction and
elimination, modus ponens, and the like. However, it is unlikely that the same approach could
be extended to further laws such as double-negation elimination and explosion whilst remain-
ing dialectically e￿ective because it is more contentious whether there are counterexamples to
them. This might lead one to worry that although the non-emptiness claim is true, the logical
consequence relation proper is unpalatably weak. However, such worries are misguided be-
cause these more controversial laws may be true even though a dialectically e￿ective abductive
argument cannot be given in their favour. Moreover, given that our aim is to establish that there
is one true logic without taking a stance on which logic it is, all that matters for present purposes
is that the non-emptiness claim is true, which we have shown.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has defended the non-emptiness claim from Russell’s obliterative nihilism. Rus-
sell motivates the claim that the consequence relation is empty by presenting counterexamples
to Conjunction Introduction and Identity. In reply, I argued that the counterexamples are unsuc-
cessful because they are either not instances of the laws that they were intended to invalidate
or, if they are, they lack the true premisses and false conclusions required to invalidate them. I
then provided a positive abductive argument in the non-emptiness claim’s favour. Unlike exist-
ing applications of abduction by anti-exceptionalists, this abductive argument could be used to
justify logical laws piecemeal rather than entire logics. In particular, I argued that the hypothe-
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sis that Conjunction Introduction is a logical law better explains evidence about which arguments
are necessarily truth-preserving than any of the hypotheses available to the obliterative nihilist.
Since analogous abductive arguments can be used to establish other logical laws, it follows that
the logical consequence relation is far from empty. Nonetheless, it does not follow from the
non-emptiness claim that there is at least one correct logic because there might not actually be
a logic that validates all and only valid natural language arguments – that is, the existence claim




To defend the lower bound thesis that there is at least one correct logic, two intermediate claims
needed justifying. First, the non-emptiness claim that the logical consequence relation proper is
non-empty and there are valid arguments (or, equivalently, that there are logical laws). Second,
the existence claim that there actually is at least one logic which correctly codi￿es the non-empty
consequence relation. Although the non-emptiness claim was established in the previous chap-
ter, this does not guarantee the existence claim because it might not be possible for there to be
a logic in which every valid natural language has a formally valid counterpart.
This is precisely the position endorsed by pessimistic nihilists such as Cotnoir (2018). Ac-
cording to pessimistic nihilists, the existence claim is false despite there being valid natural
language arguments because, for any logic Li, there are valid natural language arguments that
cannot haveLi-valid formal counterparts. Cotnoir deploys two groups of arguments in support
of this claim. First, the arguments from diversity, according to which a correct logic’s consequence
relationmust instantiate certain properties such as necessity and formality, but doing so imposes
strictures upon its consequence relation that preclude it from validating every valid natural lan-
guage argument. Second, the arguments from expressive limitations, which show that there are
natural language sentences that cannot be translated into formal languages, and therefore any
valid natural language argument in which they feature as premisses cannot have a formal coun-
terpart, let alone one which is Li-valid. The purpose of this chapter is to defend the existence
claim against these arguments, and thereby complete the defence of the lower bound thesis that
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there is at least one correct logic.
§6.1 outlines the common structure of the arguments from diversity and my responses to
them, whilst §§6.2–6.3 present and neutralise both the necessity and formality variants. The
same pattern is then repeated for the arguments from expressive limitations. §6.4 provides an
overview of their structure and that of my responses, before §§6.5–6.7 expound and disarm all
three variants.
1 AN OVERVIEW OF THE ARGUMENTS FROM DIVERSITY
The arguments from diversity can all be understood as dilemmas with the following structure.
Both begin with an adequacy condition, A, which states that, for any Li, if Li is correct then
|=Li must instantiate a property such as necessity or formality. They then proceed to show
that ifLi satis￿es A and |=Li instantiates the property, then there are valid arguments that lack
Li-valid formal counterparts. Thus, Li is incorrect if it satis￿es A and incorrect if it does not,
and therefore the existence claim is false because there cannot be a correct logic.
Let us say that a logic,Li, undergenerates i￿ not all valid natural language arguments haveLi-
valid formal counterparts. Accordingly, the arguments from diversity’s structure is as follows:
(1) For all Li: Either Li satis￿es A or Li does not satisfy A.
(2) For all Li: If Li does not satisfy A then Li is incorrect.
(3) For all Li: If Li satis￿es A then Li undergenerates.
(4) For all Li: Li is incorrect.
Premiss (1) merely states that for any given logic, it either satis￿es A or it does not – that is, its
consequence relation either instantiates the relevant property or it does not. Premiss (2), which
we shall call the adequacy constraint, merely restates that a necessary condition for a logic to be
correct is that it satis￿es A. Crucially, both these premisses will be accepted by the monist. Even
those who reject the law of excluded middle will ￿nd (1) palatable since it does not possess any
of the features that result in this law failing, such as denotation failure, vagueness, or e￿ective
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undecidability. Almost all monists will accept (2) because the adequacy conditions which Cot-
noir’s arguments employ state that for Li to be correct, |=Li must instantiate a property which
is widely taken to be constitutive of logical consequence, such as necessity or formality. As Gila
Sher puts it:
[The] pretheoretic notion of logical consequence involves two intuitive ideas: the idea
that logical consequence is necessary and the idea that logical consequence is formal. These
ideas play the role of adequacy conditions: an adequate de￿nition of logical consequence
yields only consequences that are necessary and formal (1996, p. 654).
Thus, the crux of the arguments from diversity is (3), which we shall call their incompatibility pre-
miss. According to the incompatibility premiss,Li satisfying A ensures thatLi undergenerates
because instantiating the property delineated in A imposes strictures upon |=Li that preclude
Li from validating every valid natural language argument. Both variants of the arguments from
diversity support their incompatibility premisses in similar ways. They begin by introducing a
pluralist claim and then demonstrate that natural language arguments of a certain form cannot
have Li-valid formal counterparts if Li is to satisfy A in light of this pluralist claim. However,
since natural language arguments of this form are valid, it thereby follows that if Li satis￿es A
then it undergenerates, as stated by the incompatibility premiss.
Since my responses to both arguments take the same form it is worth outlining their struc-
ture here as well. Although the most obvious line of response is to challenge the pluralist claim
used to establish the incompatibility premiss, this is not the tack I shall take. Rather, I contend
that Cotnoir’s strategy for establishing the incompatibility premiss su￿ers from a structural ￿aw
which ensures that it cannot succeed by its own lights. More speci￿cally, I demonstrate that the
argument used to show that certain valid natural language arguments cannot have Li-valid
formal counterparts when Li satis￿es A simultaneously undercuts the claim that the original
natural language arguments are valid. Thus, it has not been shown that ifLi satis￿es A thenLi
undergenerates because it transpires that, by the nihilist’s own argument, the natural language
argument that lacks a Li-valid formal counterpart is itself invalid. Since the pessimistic ni-
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hilist’s arguments for the incompatibility premisses falter, the arguments from diversity cannot
substantiate the conclusion that there cannot be a correct logic, and so pose little threat to the
existence claim.
2 THE NECESSITY ARGUMENT FROM DIVERSITY
Cotnoir’s ￿rst argument from diversity centres on the fact that one of the logical consequence
relation’s constitutive features is that it is necessary. If a conclusion is a logical consequence of
a set of premisses, the truth of the premisses necessitate the truth of the conclusion – that is,
it is impossible for the premisses to be true but the conclusion false. This yields the necessity
adequacy constraint: if logic Li is correct, then |=Li must be necessary in the sense that, for
any  , ', if h ,'i 2 |=Li then every case in which   is true so is '.
The necessity argument from diversity can then be stated as the following instance of the
foregoing template:
(1N) |=Li is necessary or |=Li is not necessary.
(2N) If |=Li is not necessary, then Li is incorrect.
(3N) If |=Li is necessary, then Li undergenerates.
(4N) Therefore, Li is incorrect.
As mentioned above, the bone of contention is the incompatibility premiss, (3N). The rationale
for (3N) is that, for it to be impossible for   to be true but ' false whenever   |=Li ', |=Li
must quantify over all possible cases. If it did not, and the excluded case were one in which
  is true but ' false, then Li-validity would not be necessarily truth-preserving. As Bueno &
Shalkowski put it:
The point of quantifying over a domain of cases is to capture the idea that there is a
logical, that is, necessary, connection between the premisses and conclusions of valid
arguments. . . In order to guarantee that because something holds in every case it holds
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necessarily, we need to ensure not only that it indeed holds in all cases, but also that it
holds in all possible cases (2009, p. 306).
Next, the pluralist claim is introduced. Cotnoir piggybacks on Beall & Restall’s (2006) argu-
ment that complete and consistent Tarskian models, consistent but (potentially) incomplete
constructions, and (potentially) incomplete and inconsistent situations are all possible cases.
Consequently, if |=Li is necessary then it must quantify over models, constructions, and situ-
ations. However, if |=Li quanti￿es over them all – that is, Li is the intersection of classical,
intuitionistic, and a relevant logic – thenLi will be extremely weak. Indeed, Cotnoir contends
that it will be too weak to be correct:
[I]t seems clear that the logic resulting from quantifying over all such cases is still going
to be far too weak to adequately account for natural language inference (2018, p. 307).
For instance, if |=Li quanti￿es over inconsistent situations, ' _  ,¬' 6|=Li  since there are
situations in which ' is both true and false, and  is false only. Consequently, Li is too weak
to be correct because the formal counterpart of any natural language disjunctive syllogism is
Li-invalid, yet there are valid natural language disjunctive syllogisms, such as:
Fox: Either the fox went left or the fox went right. The fox did not go left. Therefore: The
fox went right.
Accordingly, if |=Li is necessary and quanti￿es over all possible cases – including models, con-
structions, and situations – then there are valid arguments, like Fox, lacking Li-valid formal
counterparts. That is, if Li satis￿es the necessity adequacy constraint then it undergenerates
and is incorrect, thereby establishing (3N), the incompatibility premiss. Since Li is incorrect
if it satis￿es the necessity adequacy constraint and incorrect if it does not, it follows that Li is
incorrect and there cannot be a correct logic.
Having outlined the necessity argument from diversity, we may now apply the blueprint
articulated in §6.1 to show why it falters. Namely, the nihilist fails to show that Li undergen-
erates when |=Li is necessary because the very argument used to show that Fox lacks aLi-valid
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formal counterpart simultaneously undermines Fox’s validity. According to Cotnoir, Fox lacks
aLi-valid formal counterpart because inconsistent situations are genuine cases. The key point
argued for below is that, regardless of how cases are understood, if inconsistent situations are
genuine cases then it is logically possible for a sentence and its negation to be true. Given that it
is logically impossible for a valid natural language argument’s premisses to be true but its conclu-
sion false, it thereby follows that if inconsistent situations are genuine cases then Fox is invalid
as it is logically possible for its premisses to be true but its conclusion false.1
Following Etchemendy (1990, 2010), cases can be understood representationally or interpre-
tationally. On the representational account, cases are “mathematical models of logically possi-
ble [my emphasis] ways the world, or relevant portions of the world, might be or might have
been” (Etchemendy, 2010, p. 287). That is, understood representationally, cases vary the non-
linguistic facts but the meanings of logical and non-logical terms alike are held constant. By
contrast, on the interpretational account, cases are interpretations of a language’s non-logical
vocabulary which vary the meanings of non-logical terms, whilst the meanings of logical terms
and all the non-linguistic facts remain as they are in the actual world. Moreover, these interpre-
tations are uniform insofar as every token of a non-logical term is assigned the same meaning.
On the representational account, the only cases which a logic’s consequence relation should
quantify over are those that represent genuine logical possibilities – after all, quantifying over
cases representing logical impossibilities will result in valid arguments lacking formally valid
counterparts. Accordingly, if inconsistent situations – such as the one used to show that Fox’s
formal counterpart is Li-invalid – genuinely are cases as Cotnoir claims, then they must rep-
resent logically possible ways that relevant portions of the world might be.2 However, if it is
logically possible for a sentence to be both true and false, then Fox is invalid as it is logically
possible for its premisses to be true and its conclusion false.
1This response does not hinge on disjunctive syllogisms being the valid arguments which lackLi-valid formal
counterparts.
2Even if paraconsistent logicians must admit that it is logically possible that there are true contradictions they
need not say that it is metaphysically possible (let alone actually so), just as it is logically but not metaphysically
possible for water not to be H2O.
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On the interpretational account, admitting that there are inconsistent cases not only com-
mits one to the logical possibility of true contradictions, but to there being true contradictions
in the actual world (Asmus, 2012, pp. 12–14). To see this, suppose that there is a case in which
Fa^¬Fa is true – that is, there is an assignment of semantic values on which both Fa and ¬Fa
are true, where the semantic values for predicates and individual constants are properties and
objects. Since all tokens of the same type are assigned the same semantic value, for Fa ^ ¬Fa
to be true in this case, there must be a single object that both does and does not instantiate some
property. And since the non-linguistic facts remain unchanged between the actual world and
this case, this is to say that there is an object in the actual world that both does and does not
instantiate a single property. But if contradictions are actual then they are logically possible,
and again Fox is invalid.
Thus, Cotnoir’s argument for the necessity argument’s incompatibility premiss undercuts
itself because the natural language argument that it has shown to lack a Li-valid formal coun-
terpart is, by the argument’s own lights, invalid. Since it has not been shown that Li satisfying
the necessity adequacy constraint ensures that there are valid natural language arguments that
lackLi-valid formal counterparts, it has not been shown that there cannot be correct logics and
the existence claim remains unscathed.
3 THE FORMALITY ARGUMENT FROM DIVERSITY
The second argument from diversity turns on another constitutive feature of logical conse-
quence, that of formality. If an argument’s conclusion is a logical consequence of its premisses,
then the truth of the premisses not only necessitate the truth of the conclusion, but they do so
solely in virtue of their logical form. Thus, if an argument is valid, then all arguments of the same
form are too. This yields the formality adequacy constraint: if logic Li is correct then |=Li
must be formal in the sense that, for any  , ', if   |=Li ', then every argument of the same
form is also a member of |=Li.
The formality argument from diversity can then be stated as follows:
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(1F) |=Li is formal or |=Li is not formal.
(2F) If |=Li is not formal, then Li is incorrect.
(3F) If |=Li is formal, then Li is incorrect.
(4F) Therefore, Li is incorrect.
Again, we concentrate on the incompatibility premiss, (3F). The rationale for (3F) is that, for
|=Li to be formal, it must be the case that if   |=Li ' then every argument of the same form
is a member of |=Li. At this point, a claim made by domain-relative pluralists is introduced:
di￿erent arguments are valid in di￿erent domains of inquiry. For instance, on Lynch’s domain-
relative pluralism, double-negation elimination is valid in domains where truth is not epistem-
ically constrained, such as the realm of medium sized objects, but invalid in domains where
truth is epistemically constrained, such as the realm of mathematics. If this is right then the
￿rst of the two arguments below is valid but the second is not:
Bottle: It is not the case that my water bottle is not blue. Therefore: My water bottle is blue.
Root: It is not the case that
p
2 is rational. Therefore:
p
2 is irrational.
Accordingly, intuitionistic logic is correct in domains where truth is epistemically constrained
and classical logic is correct in domains where it is not (Lynch, 2009, p. 95). Consequently, if
Li satis￿es the formality adequacy constraint then the only principles which are Li-valid are
those which hold across all domains – that is, to satisfy the formality adequacy constraint, Li
must be the intersection of all the di￿erent logics which hold in all the various domains.
However, since very few logical principles are valid across all domains, if |=Li is formal
then Li will be too weak to be correct. For instance, if |=Li is formal and there are some
domains in which double-negation elimination fails, then ¬¬' 6|=Li '. Consequently, the
formal counterpart of any natural language argument employing double-negation elimination
isLi-invalid. However, given that Bottle is valid, if |=Li is formal then there are valid arguments
lacking Li-valid formal counterparts. That is, if Li satis￿es the formality adequacy constraint
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then it undergenerates and is incorrect, thereby establishing (3F), the incompatibility premiss.
SinceLi is incorrect if it satis￿es the formality adequacy constraint and incorrect if it does not,
it follows that Li is incorrect and pessimistic nihilism prevails.3
As with the previous argument from diversity, I contend that the argument used to reach
this conclusion undermines the claim that Bottle is valid. To see this, recall that the reason
why |=Li must be formal if Li is to be correct is that the logical consequence relation proper
is formal. That is, a natural language argument’s conclusion, C, is a logical consequence of its
premisses, P, i￿ it is impossible for P to be true but C false in virtue of its logical form. Given that
Bottle and Root have the same form, it follows from the formality of the logical consequence
relation proper that both are valid or neither are. Since, ex hypothesi, Root is invalid, it follows
that Bottle is too. However, if Bottle is invalid then it has not been shown that if Li satis￿es
the formality adequacy constraint then there is a valid natural language argument which lacks
a Li-valid formal counterpart.
Thus, Cotnoir’s argument for the incompatibility premiss undercuts itself because the argu-
ment used to show that certain valid natural language arguments cannot have Li-valid formal
counterparts simultaneously undermines the validity of said natural language arguments. As
such, the formality argument from diversity falters and the existence claim remains intact.
4 AN OVERVIEW OF THE ARGUMENTS FROM EXPRESSIVE LIMITATIONS
The arguments from expressive limitations all aim to show that there cannot be a correct logic
because, for any logic, the inherent limitations of formal languages preclude every valid natural
language argument from having a formally valid counterpart in that logic. This is because
there are natural language sentences that cannot be translated into any formal language, and
so any valid natural language argument which includes these sentences are premisses cannot
3Note that Cotnoir’s argument is distinct from the threat of nihilism discussed in §4.2. The latter sought to show
that the logical consequence relation proper is empty because logical consequence is formal and no arguments are
valid in all domains. Thus, if it were cogent – contrary to what I argued – this argument would support Russell’s
obliterative nihilism, not Cotnoir’s pessimistic nihilism. By contrast, Cotnoir’s argument is that there are valid
natural language arguments which do not preserve truth in all domains, and so a logic which validates only those
arguments that hold in all domains will be too weak to be correct.
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have a formal counterpart, let alone one which isLi-valid. Thus, there cannot be a logic which
validates all and only valid natural language arguments, and the existence claim is false.
Let us say that a formal language is adequate to natural language i￿ every natural language
sentence can be translated into a formal language sentence with the same content – that is, every
natural language sentence has a formal counterpart. The arguments from expressive limitations
all take the following form:
(1) If no formal language is adequate to natural language then, for all Li, Li is incorrect.
(2) No formal language is adequate to natural language.
(3) For all Li, Li is incorrect.
Since (1) follows straightforwardly from the meaning of ‘adequate’ and our de￿nition of what
it is for a logic to be correct, the arguments from expressive limitations stand and fall with
(2). In support of (2), the arguments from expressive limitations introduce certain features that
can be exhibited by natural language sentences, such as including the predicate ‘. . . is true’. A
paradox is then used to demonstrate that no formal language sentence can have the feature in
question on pain of contradiction. It thereby follows that there are natural language sentences
which cannot be translated into any formal language, and therefore that no formal language is
adequate to natural language.
In each case, one avenue of response is to deny premiss (2) and argue that formal languages
can exhibit the feature in question. However, this is not an avenue we shall go down. Rather,
my responses to the arguments from expressive limitations will, to some extent, mirror the
responses given to the arguments from diversity in that my strategy will be to use the nihilist’s
reasoning against them. More speci￿cally, I contend that the same paradoxes that the nihilist
uses to show that formal language sentences cannot have some feature on pain of contradiction
can also be used to show that natural language sentences cannot have this same feature on pain
of contradiction. Accordingly, if the fact that a language can only exhibit some feature on
pain of contradiction is su￿cient to show that it cannot exhibit that feature – as Cotnoir must
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maintain – then neither formal nor natural languages can exhibit it. Conversely, if the fact that
a language can only exhibit some feature on pain of contradiction is not su￿cient to show that
it cannot exhibit that feature then, in the absence of further argument, both formal and natural
languages can exhibit it. Either way, it has not been shown that there are natural language
sentences that cannot be translated into the formal language, and therefore we have no grounds
for thinking (2) is true.
It is crucial to acknowledge at the outset that the main bene￿t of this strategy is that it does
not commit one to taking a stance on whether either natural or formal languages can exhibit
the feature in question. The point is merely that, irrespective of whether they can, Cotnoir’s
arguments do not establish that formal languages cannot exhibit the feature but natural lan-
guages can. In what follows, we consider three features which Cotnoir argues are had by natu-
ral languages but lacked by formal languages: that they have their own truth predicates, validity
predicates, and unrestricted quanti￿ers.4
5 THE EXPRESSIVE LIMITATIONS ARGUMENT FROM SEMANTIC CLOSURE I
The ￿rst argument from expressive limitations concerns semantic closure. A language, L, is se-
mantically closed just in case it can express its own semantic concepts, such as truth and satis-
faction, and therefore all truths about L can be expressed in L – that is, a semantic theory of
L can be stated in L. For instance, English is widely taken to be semantically closed because
it contains its own truth, satisfaction, and validity predicates, and we can therefore express the
truth-conditions of English sentences in English.
Cotnoir (2018, p. 310) then argues as follows:
(1SC) Natural languages are semantically closed.
(2SC) No formal language is semantically closed.
4Cotnoir (2018, pp. 317–318) also argues that natural languages can exhibit vagueness whereas formal lan-
guages cannot, and so natural language sentences employing vague predicates cannot be translated into formal
languages. However, since Cotnoir does not say why existing approaches to vagueness – such as epistemicism or
supervaluationist and fuzzy logics – are inadequate, I have left this argument aside.
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(3SC) Therefore: No formal language is adequate to natural language.
In support of (1SC) Cotnoir highlights that it is obvious that English can express its own semantic
concepts – that is, we can talk about English in English. For instance, “Snow is white’ is true’
is a perfectly meaningful English sentence. The justi￿cation for (2SC) is that a formal language
cannot be semantically closed on pain of inconsistency. More speci￿cally, Cotnoir argues that
a formal language cannot contain its own truth or validity predicates because doing so leads to
contradiction. It follows that no formal language is adequate to natural language – that is, there
are natural language sentences employing the natural language truth and validity predicates that
cannot be translated into any formal language. This section focusses on the truth predicate and
the next concentrates on the validity predicate.
The argument that a formal language cannot contain its own truth predicate is, of course,
Tarski’s (1956b) celebrated Unde￿nability Theorem.5 This theorem begins with the Gödel-
Tarski Diagonalisation Lemma, according to which, for any property expressible in a language,
there is a sentence in that language which says of itself that it has that property. More formally:
Gödel-Tarski Diagonalisation Lemma. For any formulaC(v) in the language of arithmetic with
‘v’ as its only free variable, there is a sentence ' in that language such that? ` '$ C(p'q).
This Diagonalisation Lemma can then be used to prove Tarski’s Unde￿nability Theorem, which
entails that no formal language can de￿ne its own truth predicate:
Unde￿nability Theorem. For any formula in the language of arithmetic, C(v) with ‘v’ as its
only free variable, there is a sentence ' in that language such that ? ` ¬['$ C(p'q)].
Proof. Applying the Diagonalisation Lemma to the negation of C(v) yields ? ` ' $
¬C(p'q). Since '$ ¬C(p'q) ` ¬['$ C(p'q)], we have ? ` ¬['$ C(p'q)].
5This presentation of the Unde￿nability Theorem closely follows that of Field (2008, pp. 24–28). I follow
Field in identifying sentences with their Gödel numbers for ease of exposition.
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This proves that a formal language’s truth predicate, Tr, cannot be de￿ned in that language
because, in order for a predicate to be the truth predicate, it must satisfy T-Schema:
T-Schema: For all ': '$ Tr(p'q)
However, letting C be Tr, the Unde￿nability Theorem says that there is a sentence, ', for which
T-Schema fails. In this context, the proof can be understood as stating that, by the Gödel-Tarski
Diagonalisation Lemma, there is a sentence, ', that says of itself that it is not true – that is,
? ` ' $ ¬Tr(p'q). Since this classically entails ¬[' $ Tr(p'q)], it follows that a formal
language cannot contain its own truth predicate satisfying T-Schema on pain of inconsistency.6
There are, of course, a number of formal languages which are – or claim to be – seman-
tically closed.7 However, we need not become embroiled in disputes over their merits for it is
straightforward to see that the same paradox can be used to show that natural languages can-
not contain their own truth predicate satisfying T-Schema.8 Although Tarski’s Unde￿nability
Theorem only applies to formal languages, one can use a Liar sentence to show that natural
languages cannot be semantically closed on pain of inconsistency. Indeed, §1 of Tarski’s The
Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages is devoted to showing precisely this:
A characteristic feature of colloquial language is its universality. . . it could be claimed
that ‘if we can speaking meaningfully about anything at all, we can also speak about it in
colloquial language’. If we are to maintain this universality of everyday language in con-
nexion with semantical investigations, we must admit into the language, in addition to its
sentences and other expressions, also the names of these sentences and expressions, and
sentences containing these names, as well as such semantic expressions as ‘true sentence’,
‘name’, ‘denote’, etc. But it is presumably just this universality of everyday language
6Cotnoir (2018, pp. 312–313) also appeals to (Beall, 2015) to argue that a formal language cannot be closed
on not only on pain of inconsistency, but on pain of triviality. However, I will set this argument aside since Beall
is explicit that his proof holds for natural languages – indeed, the claim he proves is that “any true English theory
of English is either incomplete with respect to all truths about English or. . . trivial” (2015, p. 579).
7For instance, see Kripke (1975) and Field (2008).
8Indeed, Cotnoir’s claim that the Liar undermines the semantic closure of formal but not natural languages is
at odds with much of the existing literature. For instance, one of Priest’s (2006b, Chs.1, 9) central arguments for
dialetheism is that it allows natural languages to be semantically closed without descent into triviality.
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which is the primary source of all semantical antimonies, like the antimonies of the liar
or of heterological words. These antimonies seem to provide a proof that every language which
is universal in the above sense, and for which the normal laws of logic hold, must be inconsistent
[my emphasis] (Tarski, 1956b, pp. 164–165).
Assuming the inference from ‘A i￿ it is not the case that A’ to ‘A and it is not the case that A’ is
truth-preserving, Tarski (1956b, p. 165) contends that any semantically closed natural language
cannot be consistent because a closed language must satisfy the following three conditions:
(1) For any sentence which occurs in the language a de￿nite name of this sentence also
belongs to the language.
(2) For any sentence A, ‘A’ is true i￿ A.
(3) One can formulate a true and empirically established sentence stating that A is identical
with ‘A is false’.
But it can then be proven that a semantically closed language satisfying these conditions is
inconsistent. By (1), let ‘A’ be the name of the sentence, ‘A is false’. By (2), ‘A is false’ is true i￿
A is false. By (3),A is true i￿A is false, which entailsA and it is not the case thatA. Accordingly,
Tarski concludes:
[T]he very possibility of a consistent use of the expression ‘true sentence’ which is in
harmony with the laws of logic and the spirit of everyday language seems to be very
questionable (1956b, p. 165)
Thus, like formal languages, natural languages can also only contain their own truth predicate
satisfying T-Schema on pain of inconsistency. Accordingly, the Liar cannot be used to show that
formal languages cannot contain their own truth predicate satisfying T-Schema if one wishes to
simultaneously uphold that natural languages can. As such, it has not been shown that valid nat-
ural language arguments featuring a truth predicate satisfying T-Schema cannot have formally
valid counterparts in any logic.
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6 THE EXPRESSIVE LIMITATIONS ARGUMENT FROM SEMANTIC CLOSURE II
The second expressive limitations argument from sematic closure focusses on the validity pred-
icate. The argument that a formal language cannot contain its own validity predicate centres
on a novel version of Curry’s Paradox articulated by Beall & Murzi (2013), which they dub
‘v-Curry’.
To state v-Curry, we must ￿rst de￿ne the validity predicate in and for the formal language
in question, val(x, y). For val(x, y) to be the validity predicate, it must unrestrictedly satisfy
the following schema:
V-Schema: For all  ,':   ` ' i￿ ? ` val(p q, p'q)
As Beall &Murzi (2013, p. 152) put it, “if [h ,'i] is in the validity relation, then saying as much
– using the validity predicate – is true in a validity-strength fashion”, and vice versa. Moreover,
Beall & Murzi claim that the validity predicate is detachable in the sense that, from   and the
validity of the argument h ,'i, one can validly infer ':
V-Detach:  , val(p q, p'q) ` '
After all, if   is true and the argument from   to ' is necessarily truth-preserving, then 'must
also be true. Finally, let ⇡ be a sentence saying that the argument from itself to absurdity, h⇡,?i,
is valid:
? ` ⇡ $ val(p⇡q, p?q)
v-Curry may then be stated as follows:
(1) ? ` ⇡ $ val(p⇡q, p?q) (⇡ def.)
(2) ⇡ ` ⇡ (Assumption)
(3) ⇡ ` val(p⇡q, p?q) (1,2, MP)
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(4) ⇡ ` ? (2,3, V-Detach)
(5) ? ` val(p⇡q, p?q) (4, V-Schema)
(6) ? ` ⇡ (1,5, MP)
(7) ? ` ? (5,6, V-Detach)
Thus, one cannot have a validity predicate satisfying V-Schema and V-Detach on pain of absur-
dity.9 However, in much the same way thatT-Schema is constitutive of the truth predicate, Beall
& Murzi highlight that “both [V-Schema] and [V-Detach] are required in order for the validity
predicate to express validity” (2013, p. 157). Thus, v-Curry shows that no formal language can
contain its own validity predicate on pain of absurdity.
This argument su￿ers from the same ￿aw as the truth predicate argument. Namely, we can
reconstruct v-Curry in a natural language to show it cannot contain its own validity predicate
satisfying the natural language analogues of V-Schema and V-Detach:
V-SchemaNL: For all A, B: A entails B i￿ the argument from ‘A’ to ‘B’ is valid.
V-DetachNL: A and the validity of the argument from A to B entail B.
Let our natural language v-Curry sentence, A, be, ‘The argument from ‘A’ to ‘0 = 1’ is valid’.
We can then reconstruct v-Curry as follows. By the de￿nition of A we have:
(1) A i￿ the argument from ‘A’ to ‘0 = 1’ is valid.
Now, given (1) and supposing that A is true, we know:
(2) The supposition that A entails A.
(3) The supposition that A entails that the argument from ‘A’ to ‘0 = 1’ is valid.
9That is, unless one is willing to forgo the claim that ` structurally contracts – that ` is such that: If ↵,↵ `  
then ↵ `  . However, as Cotnoir highlights, the logic resulting from abandoning structural contraction will be too
weak to be correct.
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Thus, under the supposition that A, we know that A and that the argument from ‘A’ to ‘0 = 1’
is valid, from which it follows via V-DetachNL that:
(4) The supposition that A entails 0 = 1.
Since A entails 0 = 1, by V-SchemaNL we can infer:
(5) The argument from ‘A’ to ‘0 = 1’ is valid.
Given that, per (1), A is true i￿ the argument from ‘A’ to ‘0 = 1’ is valid, it follows from (5) via
modus ponens that:
(6) A.
Since (5) says that the argument from ‘A’ to ‘0 = 1’ is valid and (6) says that A is true, it follows
via V-DetachNL that:
(7) 0 = 1.
Thus, the argument used to show that a formal language cannot contain its own validity predi-
cate satisfying V-Schema and V-Detach equally shows that a natural language cannot contain its
own validity predicate satisfying V-SchemaNL and V-DetachNL. Accordingly, v-Curry cannot be
used to show that formal languages cannot contain their own validity predicate if one wishes to
simultaneously uphold that natural languages can. Thus, it has not been shown that valid nat-
ural language arguments featuring a validity predicate satisfying V-SchemaNL and V-DetachNL
cannot have formally valid counterparts in any logic.
7 THE EXPRESSIVE LIMITATIONS ARGUMENT FROM UNRESTRICTED
QUANTIFICATION
The ￿nal argument from expressive limitations concerns unrestricted quanti￿cation. Natural lan-
guage sentences featuring quanti￿cational expressions such as ‘Every’, ‘Some’, and ‘Nothing’
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are evaluated relative to a domain of entities that they are said to quantify over. To borrow
an example from Williamson (2003, p. 415), suppose that I am about to take a ￿ight and say
‘Everything is in my suitcase’. I do not mean that my suitcase contains absolutely everything
that there is. Rather, the domain of entities over which ‘Everything’ quanti￿es is restricted by
the context to those objects which are relevant – my toothbrush, phone charger, passport, and
the like. An unrestricted quanti￿er is one which quanti￿es over absolutely everything that there
is – that is, there is no entity that is not in its domain.
The unrestricted quanti￿cation argument from expressive limitations proceeds as follows:
(1UQ) Natural languages have absolutely unrestricted quanti￿ers.
(2UQ) No formal language has absolutely unrestricted quanti￿ers.
(3UQ) Therefore, no formal language is adequate to natural language.
In support of (1UQ), Cotnoir argues that there are many natural language sentences which are
most plausibly understood as quantifying over absolutely everything. For instance, if I say, ‘Ev-
erything is concrete’, I am saying that absolutely all the objects which exist are concrete. Indeed,
if this sentence was not quantifying over absolutely everything, we might end up in a situa-
tion where the sentence is true even though there are non-concrete entities which lie outside
its domain of quanti￿cation. Moreover, denying (1UQ) is incoherent – after all, the sentence,
‘It is impossible to quantify over absolutely everything’ entails, ‘There is something over which
one cannot quantify’, which is self-contradictory since this sentence quanti￿es over that which
it says cannot be quanti￿ed over (Williamson, 2003, pp. 427–435).
The argument for (2UQ) centres upon the semantics for quanti￿ers in formal languages. Let
a model, M , be an ordered pair of a domain, D , which contains the entities that exist in the
model, and an interpretation function, I , which maps constants and predicates to members
of and relations over D , respectively. A universally quanti￿ed formula such as 8xFx is true in
M just in case every member of the domain being quanti￿ed over, D , is F – that is, i￿ for
every u 2 D , u 2 I (F ). Crucially, domains are typically taken to be sets, and therefore for
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a quanti￿er in a formal language to be unrestricted – that is, for it to quantify over absolutely
everything – there would have to be a universal set containing absolutely everything.
However, due to Russell’s Paradox, there can be no universal set on pain of contradiction.
One of the axiom schema of standard set theory, ZFC, is the axiom schema of restricted compre-
hension (henceforth, Restricted Comprehension). Restricted Comprehension states that, for any set A,
there exists a subset of A, B, whose members are the members of A satisfying '. More formally:
Restricted Comprehension: 8A9B8x[x 2 B $ (x 2 A ^ '(x))]
Suppose that there is a universal set, U . By Restricted Comprehension, there is a subset of U ,
R, comprised of all the non-self-membered sets in U . Since R 2 U , either R 2 R or
R /2 R. By familiar reasoning, contradiction follows in either case. By contrast, if there is
no universal set – and, in particular, if R is not a member of the set of which it is a subset –
then no contradiction follows from R /2 R.10 Thus, there cannot be a universal set, and since
unrestricted quanti￿cation requires the existence of a universal set, no formal language can
contain unrestricted quanti￿ers. Accordingly, any valid natural language argument featuring an
unrestricted quanti￿er cannot have aLi-valid formal counterpart, and so no formal language is
adequate to natural language.11
Notice that Cotnoir’s argument rests entirely upon two claims: that quanti￿cation in formal
languages does involve quanti￿cation over sets, but that quanti￿cation in natural languages does
not. The former claim is a variant of Cartwright’s (1994, p. 7) All-in-One Principle but restricted
to formal languages, and can be stated thus:
All-in-OneFL: Quanti￿cation in formal languages involves quanti￿cation over sets or set-like
domains.
10For a more formal exposition, see Goldrei (1996, p. 90).
11It is again worth noting that Cotnoir’s contention that Russell’s paradox precludes unrestricted quanti￿cation
in formal but not natural languages diverges from the existing literature – as evidenced by the fact that generality
relativists have gone to great lengths to explain themeaning of seemingly unrestrictedly quanti￿ed natural language
sentences (e.g. Glanzberg, 2004, 2006).
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Some have tried to call All-in-OneFL into question by appealing to plural quanti￿cation, on which
the domain quanti￿ed over is not a set but some objects without the further assumption that these
objects form a set. However, it is a matter of great controversy whether plural quanti￿cation
truly is as ontologically innocent as its proponents claim and circumvents commitment to set-
like domains.12 Happily, there is no need to become embroiled in these controversies, for I
shall argue that Cotnoir’s second claim – that natural language quanti￿cation does not involve
quanti￿cation over sets – is false. The upshot of this is that, by Russell’s paradox, unrestricted
quanti￿cation can only be had in natural languages on pain of contradiction.
Recall that the motivation for All-in-OneFL was that the semantics for quanti￿ers in formal
languages are spelt out in terms of a domain, which is the set of entities being quanti￿ed over.
Crucially, the thesis that natural language quanti￿cation involves quanti￿cation over sets, All-
in-OneNL can be motivated in the same way. According to All-in-OneNL:
All-in-OneNL: Quanti￿cation in natural languages involves quanti￿cation over sets or set-
like domains.
Over the past few decades, generalised quanti￿er theory has emerged as the dominant theory of the
meanings of natural language quanti￿ers (see Glanzberg, 2008; Keenan & Westerståhl, 2011;
Peters &Westerståhl, 2006; Westerståhl, 1989). One of generalised quanti￿er theory’s central
theses concerning the meanings (or, semantic values) of natural language quanti￿ers is that “The
semantic values of many quanti￿er expressions (determiners) in natural languages are relations
between sets” (Glanzberg, 2008, p. 799).
For instance, according to generalised quanti￿er theory, there is some set,M, over which the
natural language quanti￿ers ‘Every’ and ‘Most’ quantify. Letting ‘X’ and ‘Y ’ respectively refer
to the sets of all xs and ys in M, and ‘|X|’ be the cardinality of X, the meanings of ‘Every’ and
‘Most’ in the sentences ‘Every x is y’ and ‘Most xs are y’ are given by:
12For further details on plural quanti￿cation, see Florio (2014), Rayo (2007), and Rayo & Uzquiano (2006).
For arguments in favour of plural quanti￿cation’s ontological innocence, see Boolos (1984, 1993), Cartwright
(1994, p. 8), Lewis (1991, pp. 65–69), McKay (2006, Chs.1–2), Oliver & Smiley (2001), Uzquiano (2003), and
Yi (2005, pp. 469–472); for arguments against, see Florio & Linnebo (2016), Hazen (1993), Linnebo (2003),
Parsons (1990), and Resnik (1988).
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Every: Every(x, y) i￿ X ✓ Y
Most: Most(x, y) i￿ |X \ Y | > |X \ Y |
Thus, the sentence ‘Most species of mammals do not lay eggs’ is true just in case the cardinality
of the set of non-egg-laying species of mammals exceeds that of the set of egg-laying species of
mammals – that is, there are more species of non-egg-laying than egg-laying mammals.
Now consider a natural language sentence featuring an unrestricted quanti￿er, such as, ‘Ev-
erything is concrete’. By Every, this sentence is true just in case the set of entities quanti￿ed
over by ‘Everything’,M, is a subset of the set of things that are concrete, C – that is, in this case,
M = C. However, for ‘Everything’ to be unrestricted – that is, for ‘Everything’ to quantify
over all there is – it must be the case thatM is the set of all things. Thus, according to our best
theory of the meanings of natural language quanti￿ers, unrestricted quanti￿cation in natural
language is no less committed to the existence of a universal set than unrestricted quanti￿cation
in formal languages. The upshot of this is that, by Russell’s paradox, unrestricted quanti￿cation
can only be had in natural language on pain of contradiction.
Thus, like formal languages, natural languages can also only contain unrestricted quanti￿ers
on pain of inconsistency. Accordingly, Russell’s paradox cannot be used to show that formal
languages cannot contain unrestricted quanti￿ers if one wishes to simultaneously uphold that
natural languages can. As such, it has not been shown that valid natural language arguments
featuring truth and validity predicates or absolutely unrestricted quanti￿ers cannot have for-
mally valid counterparts in any logic. That is, the arguments from expressive limitations have
not shown that there cannot be correct logics, and the existence claim remains unscathed.
CONCLUSION
Our task in this chapter and the previous has been to defend the lower bound thesis that there
is at least one correct logic. This task was broken down into two parts. First, justifying the
non-emptiness claim that the logical consequence relation proper is non-empty. Second, jus-
tifying the existence claim that there actually is a logic that correctly codi￿es this non-empty
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relation. This chapter has defended the existence claim from Cotnoir’s pessimistic nihilism,
according to which there cannot be a correct logic even though the logical consequence re-
lation proper is non-empty. Cotnoir supported this claim using two families of arguments,
the arguments from diversity and the arguments from expressive limitations. Both arguments
aimed to demonstrate that, for any logic Li, there are valid natural language arguments that
cannot have Li-valid formal counterparts. For the arguments from diversity this was because
any logic whose consequence relation is necessary or formal must be extremely weak in light of
certain pluralist claims. For the arguments from expressive limitations this was because there
are natural language expressions which cannot be translated into any formal language on pain of
contradiction. I argued that neither threaten the existence claim because the reasons given for
thinking that certain valid natural language arguments cannot have formally valid counterparts
in any logic simultaneously undercut the validity of said natural language arguments. With the
existence claim now safe from the pessimistic nihilist’s clutches, our defence of the lower bound
thesis that there is at least one correct logic is complete.
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The present work has sought to defend logical monism, the position that there is exactly one
correct logic. To do so, it has defended two intermediate theses which together entail monism,
namely:
Upper Bound: There is at most one correct logic.
Lower Bound: There is at least one correct logic.
Whilst Part I defended Upper Bound from logical pluralists who contend that there is more than
one correct logic, Part II defended Lower Bound from logical nihilists who maintain that there
are no correct logics.
The groundwork for the defence of Upper Bound was laid in Chapter 2, where it was argued
that the prevailing conception of the normativity of logic is incomplete because logic is doubly
normative for reasoning. That is, logic not only constrains the combinations of beliefs that
agents may have, as has been widely recognised, but it also constrains the methods by which
they may form them. In particular, I argued that, from an objective and ideal standpoint, agents
must not only either believe the logical consequences of their belief sets or else revise them, but
are also forbidden from forming beliefs via invalid deductive inferences.
Chapter 3 then began the defence of the upper bound thesis in ernest. It argued that, given
logic is doubly normative for reasoning, almost all of the logical pluralists’ proposals for cashing
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out the claim that there is more than one correct logic are inconsistent. In support of this I artic-
ulated the normative contradiction argument, according to which most pluralisms entail logically
contradictory claims about how subjects ought to reason whenever they ought to believe some
set of propositions,  , and ' follows from   according to one of the correct logics but not an-
other. The normative contradiction argument did leave some pluralisms unscathed – namely,
Haack’s meaning-relative pluralism and the domain-relative pluralisms of Lynch and Pedersen.
Chapter 4 suggested that the arguments pro￿erred by neither kind of pluralist demonstrate that
there is more than one correct logic, thereby completing our defence of Upper Bound.
Part II sought to complete the defence of monism by defending Lower Bound. For there
to be at least one correct logic, two further claims had to be true. First, the non-emptiness claim
that the logical consequence relation proper is non-empty. Second, the existence claim that there
actually is a logic which correctly codi￿es said non-empty relation.
Chapter 5 sought to establish the non-emptiness claim in spite of opposition from obliter-
ative nihilists such as Russell. Obliterative nihilists claim that the logical consequence relation
proper is empty because there are counterexamples to even the most basic of putative logical
laws, such as conjunction introduction and identity. My defence of the non-emptiness claim
began by disarming the obliterative nihilists’ counterexamples, which I argued were either not
instances of the laws that they were intended to invalidate or, if they were, that they lacked the
true premisses and false conclusions needed to invalidate them. I then went on the o￿ensive
and constructed a positive abductive argument for the existence of certain logical laws. Accord-
ing to this argument, the hypothesis that there are logical laws better explains evidence about
which arguments are necessarily truth-preserving than any of the hypotheses available to the
obliterative nihilist, thereby establishing the non-emptiness claim.
Chapter 6 defended the existence claim from Cotnoir’s pessimistic nihilism. According
to pessimistic nihilists, there cannot be a logic which correctly codi￿es the non-empty conse-
quence relation because, for any logic Li, there are valid natural language arguments that will
lack Li-valid formal counterparts. Cotnoir gave two families of arguments in support of this
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contention. First, the arguments from diversity, according to which a correct logic’s consequence
relation must instantiate certain properties such as necessity and formality, but doing so im-
poses strictures upon its consequence relation that preclude it from validating every valid nat-
ural language argument. Second, the arguments from expressive limitations, which aimed to show
that there are natural language sentences that cannot be translated into formal languages, and
therefore any valid natural language argument in which they feature as premisses cannot have a
formal counterpart, let alone one which is formally valid. In reply, I argued that neither family
of arguments succeeded in establishing their intended conclusion because the reasons given for
thinking that certain valid natural language arguments cannot have formally valid counterparts
in any logic simultaneously undercut the validity of said natural language arguments.
Where does this leave monists? Although I do think that there are such things as conclusive
philosophical arguments, those given here are not in their number. Even if the arguments that
I have given in support of monism were sound – something which pluralists and nihilists will
no doubt deny – they far from settle the question at hand. In particular, they leave plenty of
room for new pluralisms which avoid the normative contradiction argument, and certainly do
not preclude there from being other arguments in support of either kind of nihilism. What I
do hope to have done, however, is bought monists some temporary reprieve and shown that
monism remains defensible at the present time.
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